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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this research is to provide empirical evidence on 
determinants of the economic use of patented inventions in order to 
contribute to the literature on technology and innovation management. 
The current work consists of three main parts, each of which constitutes 
a self-consistent research paper. The first paper uses a meta-analytic 
approach to review and synthesize the existing body of empirical 
research on the determinants of technology licensing. The second paper 
investigates the factors affecting the choice between the following 
alternative economic uses of patented inventions: pure internal use, 
pure licensing, and mixed use. Finally, the third paper explores the least 
studied option of the economic use of patented inventions, namely, the 
sale of patent rights. The data to empirically test the hypotheses come 
from a large-scale survey of European Patent inventors resident in 21 
European countries, Japan, and US. The findings provided in this 
dissertation contribute to a better understanding of the economic use of 
patented inventions by expanding the limits of previous research in 
several different dimensions. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Economic use of patented inventions: patent licensing and sale 
Last decades were characterized by an increasing awareness for the importance 
of intellectual property rights (IPR) and knowledge-based technologies. The number 
of business and scientific publications in this area has been steadily growing since the 
1990’s. The literature has been emphasizing the importance of protecting and 
profitably exploiting available technologies (Rivette & Kline, 2000b). During the same 
time, the development of the markets for technology has increased a variety of 
arrangements for the use and exchange of technologies (Arora, Fosfuri, & 
Gambardella, 2001b). 
One of these technology transfer arrangements, namely, technology licensing, 
deserves a particular attention and can contribute to a better understanding of the 
markets for technology. According to a definition provided by the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), a license is a contractual agreement that the 
patent owner will not sue the licensee for patent infringement if the licensee makes, 
uses, offers for sale, sells, or imports the technology, as long as the licensee fulfills its 
obligations and operates within the limits specified by the license agreement 
(USPTO, 2012). Licensing payments usually consist of lump-sum up-front fee and 
running royalty payments, which usually depend on the volume of output (or on 
sales) (Rockett, 1990a). The licensing of a technology transfers a bundle of rights 
which is less than the entire ownership interest, e.g. rights may be limited as to time, 
geographical area, or field of use (USPTO, 2012). The patent owner may also grant an 
exclusive license that prevents the patent owner or other parties from competing 
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with the exclusive licensee, as to the geographic region, the length of time, and/or 
the field of use, according to the license agreement. 
The managerial and technological literature has long recognized the importance 
of licensing for the transfer of technologies (Gallini, 1984; Rockett, 1990b; Shephard, 
1987; Teece, 1986). Anand & Khanna (2000) describe licensing as one of only a few 
significant methods of technology transfer, and one of the most commonly observed 
inter-firm contractual agreements. The available empirical evidence also supports the 
importance of technology licensing. For instance, Arora et al. (2001b) calculated that 
over 15,000 technology transactions involving licensing rights with a total value of 
over 320 billion dollars took place worldwide in the period of 1985-1995. According 
to the World Bank reports, receipts from royalty and licensing fees (including 
patents, copyrights, and trademarks) have soared from $30.8 billion in 1991 to $237.2 
billion in 2011, with more than 94% of these receipts going to the following three 
major OECD regions: the European Union, Japan, and US (World Bank, 2012).1 
Figure 1.1 clearly shows that the tendency toward increasing licensing revenues is 
common for all three regions. 
FIGURE 1.1 Revenues from licenses for patents, copyright, trademarks and similar 
IPRs in the World, Europe, Japan and US between 1991 and 2011  
 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank 
                                                          
1 OECD data do not take into account inflation during this time span. 
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Another technology transfer mechanism between economic entities is a sale of 
intellectual property rights for a patented invention. Unlike licensing arrangement, 
the sale of patent rights implies a transfer by initial patent owner to another 
economic or legal entity the entirety of the bundle of rights, title, and interest in a 
patent (USPTO, 2012). In the case if the bundle of rights transferred is less than the 
entire ownership interests, such technology transfer is considered as a patent license. 
Hereafter, in this dissertation we clearly differentiate between patent licensing and 
patent sale and consider them as two distinct technology transfer arrangements and 
study them separately. 
In contrast to patent licensing, the management literature has largely 
overlooked the patent sale component of the markets for technology. Recently, few 
scholars attempted to fill up this gap by collecting novel data and developing 
theories that could explain factors affecting the patent sale decision by individuals 
and firms (Galasso, Schankerman, & Serrano, 2011; Serrano, 2006, 2010). For instance, 
using a pooling of all US patents granted from 1983 to 2001, Serrano (2010) shows 
that 13.5% of all granted patents were sold at least once over their lifetime. This 
evidence suggests that the markets for patents are substantial and deserve more 
attention by the scholarly community. 
Interestingly, despite the recent increased interest to the topic, patent licensing 
and sale are not novel phenomena. As described by Lamoreaux & Sokoloff (1999, 
2001, 2007), organized markets for technology existed in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. However, starting from the beginning of the twentieth century, 
many firms started to internalize their inventive activity and for most of the 
twentieth century have followed so called “closed innovation paradigm” 
(Chesbrough, 2003). Mowery (1983) in his study of the rise of the corporate R&D 
laboratory in American manufacturing attributed this tendency to a relative cost 
advantage of organizing innovation within the firm boundaries instead of acquiring 
technology through market based arrangements. According to Mowery (2012), the 
development of in-house R&D laboratories within US firms resembled other 
tendencies within modern corporations in replacing market-based mechanisms with 
administrative control within the firm. Thus, throughout the twentieth century firms 
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relied on their internal R&D capabilities and avoided an extensive use of the markets 
for technology to acquire outside technologies or to license and sell their own. 
However, as argued by Chesbrough (2003), by the end of the twentieth century 
the knowledge environment has changed. Under new conditions, it became clear that 
the integration of technology creation and exploitation within a single firm is not 
always a superior source of economic performance. Instead, firms started to realize 
that they could benefit from the use of outside technologies or appropriate rents from 
their own technologies by licensing or selling them in the markets for technology 
(Arora et al., 2001b). In their seminal paper, Rivette and Kline (2000b, p. 56) have 
suggested managers to “unlock the hidden power of patents” by properly deploying 
firm’s patent portfolio and considering the market opportunities. 
The presence of markets for technology enables to appropriate innovative rents 
alternative to internal use. At the same time, the use of markets for technology may 
enhance both economic growth and social welfare in several ways. First, as noted by 
Arora et al. (2001b), the markets for technology allow for specialization and division 
of innovative labor. Patent licensing or sale may be optimal solutions for small 
technology-based firms that lack downstream manufacturing, distribution and 
marketing capabilities (Fosfuri, 2006). Second, technology markets may decrease 
duplicative R&D and enhance the rate of technological development by better 
diffusing information about already existing technologies. Third, market based 
arrangements can be perceived as an additional option to generate revenues from 
unused technologies, for which internal use options were not identified or unfeasible 
(Rivette & Kline, 2000b). Therefore, the markets for technology may produce benefits 
associated with a better utilization of valuable technologies that otherwise would 
remain underutilized by their owners. Finally, as highlighted by Serrano (2006), the 
existence of technology markets allows for surplus-enhancing transfers of patent 
rights, where the alternative owner has greater valuation for a patent than the 
current owner. 
However, the markets for technology are subject to inefficiencies and 
imperfections caused by a number of reasons, which can be either due to supply side 
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problems, demand side problems or both. Moreover, some imperfections can be 
structural in nature, whereas others can be artificially created by market participants. 
These inefficiencies and imperfections limit the growth of the markets for technology 
by precluding some potential transactions, requiring long and complicated 
bargaining procedures, and discouraging technology specialization and division of 
innovative labor (e.g. Arora et al., 2001b). Hereafter, we provide a review of the 
reasons for these inefficiencies and imperfections in the markets for technology.  
One source of inefficiency in the markets for technology is inherent in the very 
nature of technological knowledge. The first obstacle is associated to a paradox 
highlighted by Kenneth Arrow (1962). A potential buyer is able to evaluate a 
technology only if a seller discloses sufficient information about the invention, 
however, when the seller reveals the information the buyer partly acquires it without 
paying for it (Arrow, 1962). In theory, by defining property rights for technology, 
patents provide a way for technology owners to disclose information while 
preventing its unauthorized use, which should also reduce the challenges of 
assessing the value of invention highlighted by Arrow (1962). However, the evidence 
suggests that patents do not work in practice as they do in theory (Levin, Klevorick, 
Nelson, & Winter, 1987). Although patents afford considerable protection for 
inventions in some industries, in others they do not confer perfect appropriability 
and can be “invented around” at modest costs (Teece, 1986). 
Another characteristic of technological knowledge that hampers its transfer in 
the markets for technology is its tacitness (Polanyi, 1966; Winter, 1987). Technological 
knowledge, as any other forms of knowledge, has both codifiable and tacit 
components. While the codified knowledge about an invention is relatively easy to 
transfer through patent documents, blueprints, and other documents, the tacit 
knowledge is more difficult to communicate and costly to transfer to other parties. 
As Polanyi (1966, p. 136) puts it in his seminal work, “we can know more than we 
can tell”. Teece (1988b) also points out that the production of technology is a 
cumulative process based on tacit knowledge, which is organizationally embedded 
and difficult to transfer. It is necessary to note that, as recognized by Winter (1987), 
the levels of tacit and codified components are not inherent properties of knowledge, 
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and the extent to which knowledge is codified and, therefore, easy to transfer is a 
result of an economic decision. Thus, technology suppliers can codify and “unstick” 
knowledge to facilitate its transfer across firm boundaries (Arora & Gambardella, 
1994a; von Hippel, 1994). However, the codification of tacit knowledge comes at 
certain costs and has its limits. 
Asymmetric information has long been identified as one of the main reasons for 
inefficiencies in technology markets and a barrier for technology transfer in general 
(Gallini & Wright, 1990). For instance, a patent seller that has better information 
about the potential value of technology by knowing detailed characteristics of the 
invention and areas of its possible application may set a relatively high reservation 
price (i.e. the minimum price at which the seller is willing to sell the patent). 
However, if potential buyers are unable to ascertain the future value of the 
technology, they will fear the “lemons problem” (Akerlof, 1970) and will refrain from 
paying that high reservation price for the technology. Moreover, similarly to 
Akerlof’s (1970) conclusion that owners of good cars will not place their cars on the 
used car market, potential buyers that are unable to directly assess the value of the 
technology may consider that good patents are not offered for licensing or sale, and, 
thus, avoid participating in the markets for technology. As a consequence, the 
asymmetric information may cause an adverse selection problem which may bring 
down the overall quality of patents offered for licensing and sale. 
While asymmetric information is definitely important, uncertainty about the 
value of the technology is another relevant problem impeding technology transfer 
and trade. As noted by Arora & Gambardella (2010), uncertainty about technical 
success and commercial applicability can be more serious problem than asymmetric 
information. Uncertainty does not necessarily involve information asymmetry, i.e. 
both parties may symmetrically lack information about the true value of the 
technology. When both the seller and the potential buyer of the invention are 
uncertain about its future value patent transaction can be jeopardized because the 
seller will try to overprice to avoid underpayment while the buyer will try to 
underbid to avoid the “winner’s curse” (Kagel & Levin, 2002). 
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Drawing on the concepts and principles developed by Roth (2007), Gans & 
Stern (2010) argue that technology markets are characterized by a lack of thickness, 
which means that there are few participants at both supply and demand sides that 
makes matching difficult and causes market inefficiency. Moreover, the lack of 
thickness creates conditions of monopoly, monopsony (i.e. market with a single buyer 
and many sellers), or bilateral monopoly, situation when there is only one seller and 
one potential buyer without any possibility of competition among potential sellers or 
among potential buyers (Gans & Stern, 2010). Such conditions result in a difficulty of 
setting efficient equilibrium price and complicated strategic bargaining and 
negotiations. 
Another reason for inefficiency in the markets for technology noted by Gans & 
Stern (2010) is a high congestion defined as a situation when conditions of potential 
trades require that trades are completed without assessing and adequately 
comparing alternative options (Roth, 2007). Rather than having information about all 
potentially interesting technologies that are currently available or will be soon 
available in the market, the buyer usually has information about a particular 
technology and has to make a strategic decision whether to buy it or forego it in 
order to look or wait for other alternatives, which at the end may or may not appear. 
Technology markets can also be characterized by a lack of market safety, when 
parties have incentives for a misrepresentation or strategic action in order to 
undermine others’ ability to evaluate a potential transaction (Gans & Stern, 2010; 
Roth, 2007). Since in the markets for technology information about the other party 
can be strategically exploited during a bargaining process, parties will try to 
strategically disclose information about their true preferences (e.g. the highest price 
the buyer is willing to pay for the technology) or their type (e.g. willingness of the 
buyer to use the technology to compete with the seller). For instance, under 
conditions of asymmetric information the party that has superior information about 
the potential value of the technology may act opportunistically during the bargaining 
process in an attempt to capture as much value as possible. Therefore, the lack of 
market safety may jeopardize the efficiency of technology markets and discourage 
firms from participating. 
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In order to participate in the markets for technology, the potential buyer should 
be willing and able to evaluate and utilize the technology that it may license or 
purchase. Ability to evaluate and utilize acquired technologies requires in-house 
technological expertise (Arora & Gambardella, 1994b; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). 
Ability and willingness to use external technologies may also depend on existing 
organizational structure, norms, and culture. Some firms tend to favor only 
internally developed technologies and completely disregard external technology 
options despite their potential superiority. This tendency is known as a “not invented 
here” syndrome (Katz & Allen, 1982). Firms suffering from such syndrome may 
ignore or underestimate the value of external technologies offered in the market and, 
therefore, waive or limit their participation in the markets for technology. However, 
as noted by Arora et al. (2001a), technology markets may increase the penalty for the 
“not invented here” syndrome because these firms may indulge in a duplicative 
activity and end up “reinventing the wheel”. Nevertheless, the “not invented here” 
syndrome may cause an underexploitation of opportunities offered by the markets 
for technology. 
Technologies are very heterogeneous commodities. Therefore, they are difficult 
to compare one with another in order to set a market price or to have some 
benchmark to estimate their value. Depending on the level of heterogeneity of 
technologies, the problem is sounder for some industries such as telecommunication 
or electronics and less an issue for other industries such as pharmaceuticals. As noted 
by Gambardella & Torrisi (2010b) in their study of barriers to licensing, in 
pharmaceuticals and biotech sectors firms may try to acquire information on similar 
market transactions to find market benchmark. Yanagisawa & Guellec (2009) also 
argue that establishing a shared understanding of reasonable market price for a 
patent based on past similar transactions would be important to facilitate patent 
transactions. However, it is often very difficult for market participants to obtain 
comparative data to make an informed decision about appropriate price for a patent 
because most transactions related to patent licensing and sale have traditionally been 
conducted confidentially (Yanagisawa & Guellec, 2009). However, even if the 
information on previous transactions were available, it often would not very useful 
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because technologies are not easily comparable one with another. Arora & 
Gambardella (2001b) argue that the problem of heterogeneity of technologies could 
be removed naturally by intensive trading, which would allow to more precisely 
estimate the market value of the technology from previous experience and 
performance of similar technologies. 
All these reasons discussed above create inefficiencies and imperfections in the 
markets for technology. They increase the cost of use of the markets and exclude 
from participation firms that otherwise would be willing to trade (Gambardella & 
Torrisi, 2010b). As a consequence, business and society are unable to fully enjoy the 
economic and social benefits offered by the use of technology markets. 
The literature in the field of technology and innovation management has been 
studying the factors and determinants that facilitate and prevent technology transfer 
in the markets for technology. However, as we will demonstrate and discuss in this 
dissertation, there are several important issues that were not well covered and 
studied in the literature. Therefore, by addressing some of this research questions we 
intend to contribute to this stream of literature in order to better understand the 
functioning of the markets for technology. 
 
Description of data 
There are various ways to protect an invention from imitation. These 
mechanisms include the use of patents, lead time advantage, trade secrecy, and use 
of complementary marketing and manufacturing capabilities (Cohen, Nelson, & 
Walsh, 2000). The preference of one method or another depends on characteristics of 
the industry and the technology requiring protection. For instance, trade secrets can 
be viable only if the product can be sold while underlying technology remains secret 
(Teece, 1986). Therefore, patents represent one of several alternative options available 
to a firm to protect its invention from imitation. 
Although not all inventions are patented, and, therefore, patent data provide 
imperfect coverage of inventive activity, we choose patented inventions as a unit of 
our empirical analysis for the following reasons. First, although technology licensing 
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is possible even without patenting (Anton & Yao, 1994; Arora, 1996), available 
evidence suggests that firms that do not patent rarely license; and the empirical 
importance of the alternative mechanisms remains unknown (Arora & Ceccagnoli, 
2006). Second, since the patent data provide relatively extensive information about 
an invention in a highly standardized way it allows collecting and analyzing data for 
each invention using automated procedures that are easily comparable across 
inventions, which is particularly valuable for an empirical analysis with a large 
number of observations. Rivette & Kline (2000b), for instance, describe patent 
databases as “a virtual Alexandrian library of information”. Collecting the equivalent 
data for a large number of unpatented inventions is a difficult and impractical task. 
Third, previous studies based on patent data have developed a number of generally 
accepted indicators affecting the economic use of patented inventions. Thus, the use 
of patent data in our studies allows using similar indicators and comparing our 
findings with earlier empirical works. 
The data to empirically test our hypotheses come from a large scale European 
Patent inventor survey developed and conducted within the InnoS&T project 
(Gambardella et al., 2012). The survey collects cross-sectional data on a number of 
issues related to the invention process, its determinants, the value of the invention, 
and its economic use. The dataset has been constructed by combining initial 
invention level survey data with additional firm and industry level information from 
Amadeus, EPOSYS, Orbis, Osiris, PATSTAT databases. 
The self-administered survey of inventors is global in scope and covers 
patented inventions from 21 European countries, Japan, and US. The sample was 
drawn at the level of patent applications with priority years between 2003 and 2005. 
The final composition of the sample is the following: Europe – 62,148 observations, 
US – 45,861, and Japan – 16,125. After sampling the patents, one inventor listed on 
the patent document was randomly chosen and was sent an invitation letter to 
participate in the survey. The letter asked the inventors to fill out an online 
questionnaire on a website that they can access through an identification number and 
a password, generated for the specific inventor. The number of responses for the 
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survey by the inventors in all surveyed countries is equal to 23,044, which 
corresponds to a corrected response rate of 20%. 
For our analysis, we use a part of the survey that contains only patented 
inventions owned by private for-profit firms. The patented inventions that belong to 
individuals and non-profit organizations are excluded from the analysis. The 
exclusion of non-profit organizations such as universities and research institutes is 
justified by the fact that these organizations have entirely different institutional 
settings and different motivations for the use and transfer of their patented 
inventions. For instance, due to the lack of necessary complementary assets, 
universities tend to specialize in the creation of knowledge assets, the 
commercialization of which is usually left to other organizations. 
 
Structure of the dissertation and summary of studies 
The core of the dissertation is constituted by three self-consistent studies: meta-
analysis on technology licensing and two empirical papers addressing different 
aspects of the economic use of patented inventions. The overarching research 
question of the dissertation is: What factors determine the likelihood of various economic 
uses of patented inventions? Throughout the dissertation the following sub-questions 
are posed: 
1. What factors affect a firm’s decision to license its technologies? What are the patterns 
of relationships between these determinants and technology licensing? Is there a consistency 
between theoretical predictions and empirical findings? 
2. What determines the choice between pure internal use, pure licensing, and mixed use 
of patented inventions? Are there any interaction or moderation effects between explanatory 
factors? 
3. What factors determine the likelihood that a patented invention is sold? What are the 
characteristics of patent sellers in the markets for patents? 
 
12 
 
As follows from the research questions above, although three studies included 
in the dissertation are self-consistent, they are closely interrelated to each other and 
cover different aspects of the overall research question. By systematically reviewing 
the literature on technology licensing, the meta-analysis paper provides a theoretical 
background and serves as a benchmark for other two papers. For instance, many 
explanatory factors identified and discussed in the first paper are also used in the 
subsequent empirical papers. Moreover, following the results and suggestions given 
in the meta-analysis, in the second paper we identify non-linear relationships, and 
consider a moderation effect of the presence of complementary assets on other key 
explanatory variables. The second paper extends the scope of the empirical papers 
considered in the meta-analysis by studying alternative economic uses of patented 
inventions such as pure internal use, pure licensing, and mixed use (i.e. a 
combination of internal use and licensing). Finally, the third paper complements 
earlier studies and focuses on the issue of patent sale, which is another relevant 
method of externally exploiting patented inventions through market-based 
mechanisms. Therefore, the three papers presented and described below can be 
considered as integral components of a wider research agenda. 
The first paper uses a meta-analytic approach to review and synthesize the 
existing body of empirical research on determinants of technology licensing. Meta-
analysis integrates findings across studies to reveal patterns of relationships that 
underlie research literature, thus, allowing to test the consistency of previous 
empirical findings and to provide a basis for further theory development. The paper 
systematically reviews and classifies various factors that, according to the literature, 
affect a likelihood of technology licensing. Our analysis reveals that a significant 
share of empirical findings is inconclusive not only in terms of magnitude and 
relative importance, but also in terms of the direction of relationships between 
technology licensing and its determinants. For instance, out of 13 relationships 
reviewed in the meta-analysis only 7 found full or partial support for their 
hypotheses. Results for remaining relationships either disconfirmed the 
generalizability of theoretical predictions or partially supported alternative 
hypotheses, e.g. hypotheses suggesting a non-linear relationship between dependent 
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and independent constructs. The overall evidence provided by the meta-analysis 
calls for reconsidering and fine-tuning some of the existing theoretical arguments 
and their propositions. More specifically, the analysis suggests considering non-
linear relationships between dependent and independent variables, examining 
possible interaction and moderation effects, and collecting more comprehensive data 
that use more persuasive and less ambiguous proxies to measure theoretical 
constructs. 
The second paper investigates factors affecting the choice between the 
following alternative economic uses of patented inventions: pure internal use, pure 
licensing, and mixed use (both internal use and licensing). In this study, we 
contribute to the literature on technology and innovation management in several 
ways. First, a descriptive analysis presented in the study provides an overview of the 
alternative economic uses of patented inventions that may have valuable research 
implications. For instance, our data reveals that even licensed patents are often 
exploited internally; and this mixed use is actually 2.7 times more frequent than pure 
licensing. Second, we compare the determinants of alternative uses of patented 
inventions. The main explanatory factors are the presence and type of 
complementary assets, technological competition, distance, and generality of 
patented inventions. These key explanatory variables, by and large, have the 
expected association with patent internal use, pure licensing and mixed use. Third, 
we adopt a multidimensional view on complementary assets necessary to turn an 
invention into a success (technological, commercial and both) and explore their role 
in detail. We find that various types of complementary assets are differently 
associated with the economic use of patented inventions. In particular, organization-
specific complementary assets are relevant only for pure internal use and absolutely 
irrelevant for pure licensing and mixed use. Moreover, our findings indicate that the 
presence of complementary assets has a strong moderating influence on different key 
explanatory factors. For instance, we find that technological competition facilitates 
technology licensing only if the patent owner does not possess in-house necessary 
complementary assets. 
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Finally, the third paper explores the least studied option of the economic use of 
patented inventions, namely, the sale of patent rights. Existing literature on the 
markets for technology has primarily focused on patent licensing and largely 
overlooked an aspect of patent sale. Recently, few scholars attempted to fill up this 
gap by developing theories that could explain factors affecting the patent sale. The 
current paper aims at contributing to this novel stream of research. We provide 
theoretical reasoning and empirical tests for a number of patent, firm, and industry 
level factors that may affect the likelihood that a patent is sold in the markets for 
technology. Most notably, our empirical findings suggest that the effectiveness of 
patent protection, presence of complementary assets, and technological fit are 
negatively associated with the likelihood of patent sale; whereas the scientific nature 
of the invention (i.e. substantial reliance on scientific publications) is positively 
associated with the likelihood of patent sale. We also find that, compared to 
European firms, US firms are more likely to sell their inventions, while Japanese 
firms are less likely to do that. We believe that empirical findings provided in this 
study will enhance our knowledge about patent sale and foster future research in this 
field. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE DETERMINANTS OF TECHNOLOGY LICENSING:  
A META-ANALYTIC REVIEW  
 
ABSTRACT 
Technology licensing as one of the most significant methods of technology 
transfer between both start-up and established firms has been growing rapidly 
during the last two decades. Increasing number of scientific research in the field of 
technology and innovation management has been studying factors and determinants 
that facilitate and prevent licensing behavior of firms. However, the empirical 
findings in terms of the magnitude and the relative importance of different factors 
are inconclusive. The meta-analytic approach allows us to review and synthesize the 
existing body of empirical research in order to investigate the determinants of 
technology licensing. The current paper contributes to a better understanding of 
technology licensing that, in turn, can enhance our knowledge about the functioning 
of the markets for technology. The paper also builds a theoretical background for our 
next two studies presented in the dissertation. 
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2.1. INTRODUCTION 
By the end of the twentieth century, it became clear that the earlier vision 
suggesting the integration of technology creation and technology use within a single 
firm as a superior source of economic performance compared to other arrangements 
that involve an exchange of technologies between firms is not always adequate. The 
existence of the markets for technology can enhance both economic growth and 
social welfare at least in three respects. First, by decreasing duplicative R&D they can 
better allocate existing resources for technological innovations. Second, by better 
diffusing the information about already existing technologies they can enhance the 
rate of technological development. Third, the markets for technology can produce 
benefits associated with a better utilization of valuable technologies that otherwise 
remain underutilized by their owners. 
Over the past several decades, there has been an increase in a variety of 
arrangements for the exchange of technologies or technological services, ranging 
from R&D joint ventures and partnerships, to licensing agreements, to contracted 
R&D (Arora et al., 2001b). One of these technology transfer arrangements, namely, 
technology licensing, deserves a particular attention and can contribute to our 
understanding of the markets for technology. The managerial and technological 
literature have long recognized the importance of licensing for the transfer of 
technologies (Gallini, 1984; Rockett, 1990a; Shephard, 1987; Teece, 1986). Anand & 
Khanna (2000) describe it as one of only a few significant methods of technology 
transfer, and one of the most commonly observed inter-firm contractual agreements. 
The available empirical evidence also supports this view. For instance, Arora et al. 
(2001b) calculate that over 15,000 technology transactions involving licensing rights 
with a total value of over 320 billion dollars took place worldwide in the period of 
1985-1995. According to the World Bank reports, receipts from royalty and licensing 
fees (including patents, copyrights, and trademarks) have soared from $30.8 billion 
in 1991 to $237.2 billion in 2011 (World Bank, 2012). Since the literature and the 
evidence suggest that technology licensing has been one of the most significant 
methods of technology transfer between firms during the last several decades, we 
would like to focus this meta-analytic review on determinants of technology 
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licensing in order to contribute to our understanding of antecedents of effective 
markets for technology. 
Although theoretical literature has been considerably interested in rationales for 
technology licensing at least since late 1980’s, empirical studies on technology 
licensing are relatively scarce and recent. One of the reasons for such scarcity of 
empirical studies is limited availability of comprehensive data that could allow to 
empirically test theoretical propositions. There are no formal requirements to 
systematically report licensing agreements, and many transactions related to 
technology licensing have traditionally been conducted confidentially (Yanagisawa 
& Guellec, 2009). Nevertheless, we think that currently available empirical research is 
sufficient to attempt to review determinants of technology licensing using a meta-
analytic approach in order to draw some valuable conclusions. 
The existing body of theoretical literature suggests that firm’s decision to 
license a technology is mainly affected by an interplay of two effects: a revenue effect 
and a rent dissipation effect (Arora et al., 2001b). The revenue effect is driven by the 
flow of licensing payments by the licensee. The rent dissipation effect is caused by 
erosion of profits in licensor’s product market due to additional competition coming 
from the licensee (Arora & Fosfuri, 2003; Fosfuri, 2006). Prior research proposes a 
long list of determinants that influence the licensing decision either directly or 
through the revenue and profit dissipation effects. These determinants can be 
grouped into industry level (e.g. the effectiveness of patent protection, technological 
competition), firm level (e.g. the presence of complementary assets, R&D intensity), 
and technology level determinants (e.g. the technological fit, value of technology). 
Recent empirical studies on licensing have attempted to utilize different measures in 
order to capture these constructs and empirically test the existing theoretical 
hypotheses. However, even precursory look at the empirical findings reveal that they 
are inconclusive not only in terms of magnitude and relative importance, but 
sometimes in terms of the direction of relationships. Therefore, there is a need for a 
systematic effort to identify and analyze the full set of factors that determine 
technology licensing. 
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Considering the above, the main research questions to be addressed using the 
meta-analytic approach are: What factors affect a firm’s decision to license its technologies? 
What are the patterns of relationships between these determinants and technology licensing? 
Is there a consistency between theoretical predictions and empirical findings? 
The goal of any science is to cumulate knowledge. Meta-analysis integrates 
findings across studies to reveal patterns of relationships that underlie research 
literature and, thus, provides a basis for further theory development. Moreover, 
meta-analysis can correct for some artifacts such as sampling error and measurement 
error that produce the illusion of conflicting results (Hunter & Schmidt, 2004). The 
meta-analytic approach can also be considered as a form of survey research in which 
research results, rather than individuals, are surveyed (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). Meta-
analysis allows comparing or combining the results of empirical studies by 
employing either effect size or significance level (Hunter, Schmidt, & Jackson, 1982). 
Since for the studies selected for our meta-analysis it was problematic to estimate, 
compare and combine effect sizes, we focused our analysis on the directionality and 
significance of the effects rather than on their magnitude (Sobrero & Schrader, 1998). 
The aim of the current paper is to review and analyze the consistency of 
empirical findings in terms of direction of the relationships between the firm’s 
licensing decision and its various determinants. We also try to understand the 
reasons for existing inconsistencies. We argue that these inconsistencies may partly 
stem from the interaction and moderating effects between various key factors, the 
presence of non-linear relationships, or the use of different proxies to measure 
theoretical constructs. Most of these issues are not fully addressed in the licensing 
literature and constitute an area for further research that could help to resolve some 
of these inconsistencies. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the 
theoretical literature on determinants of technology licensing and proposes several 
hypotheses. The third section describes procedures for search and selection of 
studies, meta-analytic method, and data coding technique. The fourth section reports 
the results of our meta-analysis, while the last section discusses and concludes. 
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2.2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
2.2.1. Technology licensing and its measures 
As described in the previous section, technology licensing has long been 
considered as one of the most significant methods of technology transfer between 
firms during the last several decades. Although theoretical literature has long been 
considerably interested in rationales for technology licensing, empirical studies on 
technology licensing are relatively scarce and recent. This scarcity of empirical 
studies is partly caused by limited availability of comprehensive data that could 
allow to empirically test theoretical propositions about technology licensing. In many 
countries, there are no legal requirements for firms to systematically report their 
licensing agreements. Therefore, data on licensing agreements need to be collected 
either by using various survey questionnaires and interviews (e.g. Carnegie Mellon 
survey by Cohen et al., 2000) or by collecting and analyzing information from 
financial documents and press publications in the media (e.g. Thomson Financial’s 
SDC Platinum database). 
In order to systematically review factors that affect technology licensing 
described in the empirical studies, there is a need to differentiate between two 
theoretical constructs of our dependent variable. As suggested by Gambardella et al. 
(2007), it is necessary to disentangle the willingness to license and actual technology 
licensing because there is a fair share of patents are not licensed despite the owner’s 
willingness to license them. Therefore, in our study we will account for the difference 
between these two dependent variable constructs. 
There are various measures of technology licensing used in the reviewed 
empirical studies. Some studies that use a survey method measure technology 
licensing by asking respondents whether the patented invention was licensed or 
owner wanted to license it (Gambardella, Giuri, & Luzzi, 2007). Other studies, using 
various databases on firm characteristics and licensing agreements, distinguish 
between licensing and non-licensing firms (Ceccagnoli & Hicks, 2009; Kim, 2005; 
Novelli, Padula, & Rao, 2007). Another set of studies considers the number of 
licensed technologies (Kim & Vonortas, 2006) or the percentage of licensed 
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technologies (Arora & Ceccagnoli, 2006) by a firm as the dependent variable in their 
studies. Finally, some studies operationalize the dependent variable as a ratio of out-
licensed patents to the total number of patents owned (Motohashi, 2008). 
 
2.2.2. Determinants of technology licensing  
The literature suggests that a firm’s decision to license a technology is mainly 
affected by the interplay of two effects: the revenue effect and the rent dissipation 
effect (Arora et al., 2001b). The revenue effect is driven by the flow of licensing 
payments by the licensee, net of all transaction costs carried by licensor. The rent 
dissipation effect is caused by erosion of profits in licensor’s product market due to 
additional competition coming from the licensee that either reduces price-cost 
margin and/or erodes market share (Arora & Fosfuri, 2003; Fosfuri, 2006). Therefore, 
the licensing decision is expected to be positively affected by the revenue effect and 
negatively affected by the rent dissipation effect. The trade-off between these 
opposite effects, where licensing payments net of transaction costs must be compared 
with the lower price margin and reduced share implied by higher competition from 
the licensee, determines the technology owner’s licensing propensity (Fosfuri, 2006). 
There is an extensive literature that identifies several theoretical determinants 
of technology licensing that affect the revenue and the rent dissipation effects. 
Depending on whether they represent the characteristics of an industry, firm, or 
specific technology, these determinants can be classified into three groups. The first 
set of determinants represents the characteristics of an innovating firm’s primary 
industry. The second set of factors describes the features of potential or actual 
licensor such as its technological and commercial capabilities. Finally, the last set of 
determinants reveals the characteristics of the specific technology that can be licensed 
out.  
 
 
 
 
21 
 
FIGURE 2.1 Determinants of technology licensing 
 
 
Industry level determinants 
Effectiveness of patent protection. By defining property rights for technology or 
knowledge, patents provide a way for technology owners to publicly disclose 
information while preventing its unauthorized use for a limited time period. The 
main social function of the patent system is to create the incentive to engage in 
inventive activity and to undertake costly investments required to further develop an 
invention and embed it into economically valuable products and services (Levin, 
1986). However, the evidence suggests that patents do not work in practice as they 
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do in theory (Levin et al., 1987). Although patents afford considerable protection for 
inventions in some industries, in others they do not confer perfect appropriability. 
Teece (1986) defines the effectiveness of patent protection as the efficacy of the legal 
system to assign and protect intellectual property.  
Anand & Khanna (2000) argue that more effective patent protection reduces 
transaction costs of technology licensing and induces firms to license more. Arora et 
al. (2001) argue that stronger IPRs can enhance the efficiency of technology transfers 
by reducing opportunistic behavior and, thus, enhance technology diffusion through 
licensing, even including the technologies such as know-how that are not protected 
by the patents (Arora et al., 2001b; Merges, 1998). Gambardella et al. (2007) also assert 
that, since licensor cannot fully control licensees’ actions and fully prevent 
opportunistic behavior, licensing implies lower control over diffusion of the 
technology. Therefore, more effective patent protection makes it more problematic 
for anyone to “free ride” on the right to use the technology. 
However, the effectiveness of patent protection may have an opposite effect on 
licensing propensity since it can increase the opportunity cost of licensing by 
enhancing the payoff from exclusive commercialization of technology (Arora & 
Ceccagnoli, 2006; Gans, Hsu, & Stern, 2002). The effective patent protection as a 
mechanism that prevents imitation by rivals secures a larger market for products 
made using the patented invention. However, Gans et al. (2002) argue that the 
returns to cooperation through licensing are more sensitive to the effectiveness of 
patent protection than the returns to competition through commercializing the 
technology internally. While expropriation may occur under both competition and 
cooperation, more effective patent protection should increase the relative returns of 
the latter by enhancing the bargaining power of the licensor and lowering the 
transaction costs (Gans et al., 2002). 
Considering the measurement of the construct in the literature, as summarized 
by Gambardella et al. (2007), most of the patent level measures use the scope and the 
length of patent protection. The main justification is that a patent with a broader 
scope or length of protection covers larger number of applications and, therefore, 
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decreases a possibility for other parties to “invent around” it. Thus, they measure 
patent scope by the number of claims listed in the patent (Gambardella et al., 2007; 
Palomeras, 2007). Another proxy for patent scope used by Gambardella et al. (2007) 
is the number of 4-digit IPC technological classes in which patent has been classified. 
However, authors admit that they cannot unambiguously interpret if this variable 
measures patent protection or the generality of technology (Gambardella et al., 2007). 
Arora & Ceccagnoli (2006) use the Carnegie Mellon survey, which asks respondents 
to indicate the percentage of their product and process innovations for which patent 
protection had been effective for their firm’s competitive advantage (Arora & 
Ceccagnoli, 2006). Kim (2004) argues that the total number of patents granted in a 
firm’s primary two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) industry divided by 
total R&D expenditures in the industry at a given period (i.e. propensity to receive 
patents) partly reflects the effectiveness of IPR (Kim, 2004; Kim, 2005). 
Hypothesis 1: Technology licensing is positively related with the effectiveness of patent 
protection in the industry. 
 
Competition in the product market. The literature suggests that another 
determinant affecting the licensing decision is the level of competition in the product 
market. In an extreme case, there is only one monopolist firm operating in the 
product market. In this case, the rent dissipation effect is higher than the revenue 
effect because licensing eliminates a possibility to earn monopoly profits. By contrast, 
when there are several firms in the product market, losses due to increased 
competition are shared with other firms in the product market and, thus, the rent 
dissipation effect is only partially internalized by each firm. Therefore, in a highly 
competitive market, the rent dissipation effect can be lower than the revenue effect 
(Arora et al., 2001b). In other words, the existence of many competitors in the patent 
owner’s current primary product market makes technology licensing more likely, 
since creating an additional competitor in already highly competitive market will be 
less costly for the firm with respect to rent dissipation effect, while the revenue effect 
due to licensing payments can be still significant (Gambardella et al., 2007; Kim, 2004; 
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Kim, 2005). Moreover, one would also expect to have a negative correlation between 
product market competition and the market share of a firm. 
Empirical studies measure the product market competition in the industry 
through a market concentration operationalized as a cumulative market share of the 
four dominant firms in the primary operating industry of a firm (Kim, 2004; Kim, 
2005; Kim & Vonortas, 2006). 
Hypothesis 2: Technology licensing is positively related with the intensity of 
competition in the product market. 
  
Technological competition. The markets for technology imply that there can be 
several firms that have similar or substitutable technologies. The existence of 
multiple parties with similar or interchangeable technologies extends the earlier 
economic literature that has typically analyzed licensing decision of a monopolist 
innovator (Arora et al., 2001b). Each of these multiple firms that has developed the 
technology can potentially license it to a market entrant. Therefore, Fosfuri (2006) 
reasons that the presence of multiple sources for technology creates a strategic 
incentive to license because a technology holder’s refusal to license not only will fail 
to keep technology secret and block entry to the product market but also will deprive 
the possibility of receiving licensing payments (Fosfuri, 2006). For the same reason, 
Gambardella et al. (2007) argue that when there are many firms operating in a 
technological area, licensing is more likely. Arora et al. (2001) find that this is 
especially true if there is a high share of small specialized firms without downstream 
capabilities and with no stake in the final product market. These firms, in addition to 
supplying technology themselves, may also induce firms with downstream 
capabilities to license out their technologies by creating a so called “inducement 
effect” (Arora et al., 2001b). 
To measure technological competition, Arora & Ceccagnoli (2006) use the 
Carnegie Mellon survey, which asks respondents to indicate the number of 
technological rivals (Arora & Ceccagnoli, 2006). Gambardella et al. (2007) use the 
share of patents held by the top four applicants in each 4-digit IPC patent class. 
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Fosfuri (2006), in turn, uses the number of firms that have licensed a process 
technology to produce a given product or have built a plant in-house using their own 
technology during a period prior to one analyzed in the study. 
Hypothesis 3: Technology licensing is positively related with the intensity of 
technological competition in the industry. 
 
Market growth. The previous studies hypothesize that there should be a positive 
relationship between demand growth in an industry and technology licensing. These 
studies argue that increasing demand partly reduces the negative consequences of 
the rent dissipation effect, which is caused by additional competition from the 
licensee (Fosfuri, 2006; Kim, 2004). Moreover, by increasing the number of potential 
licensees, the market growth can positively affect the licensor’s bargaining power 
and, thus, make licensing a more attractive strategy (Fosfuri, 2006). 
Fosfuri (2006) measures the market growth potential in the industry using the 
ratio between the total number of plants constructed in a given product sector in a 
given geographical area during two time frames before and during a period analyzed 
in the study. Other studies measure the market growth through the percentage 
change in total sales of the primary industry of a firm at a given period (Kim, 2004; 
Kim, 2005; Kim & Vonortas, 2006). 
Hypothesis 4: Technology licensing is positively related with the demand growth in the 
industry. 
 
Firm level determinants 
Presence of complementary assets. Starting with the seminal paper by Teece (1986), 
a significant body of theoretical literature has considered the role of complementary 
assets in appropriating returns from commercializing innovations (Arora & 
Ceccagnoli, 2006). Complementary assets are assets owned by an innovating firm 
that are valuable in production and commercialization of a technology. These 
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complementarities arise if the assets are rare and difficult to create or if extensive 
coordination between activities is required (Arora & Ceccagnoli, 2006). 
The literature suggests that if a producer of a technology does not have 
necessary complementary assets to commercialize it, such as manufacturing, 
distribution, and marketing capabilities, it can obtain higher economic value from its 
technology by supplying it to other parties that already posses these complementary 
assets or can create them at lower costs (Arora et al., 2001b; Fosfuri, 2006). Arora & 
Ceccagnoli (2006) also argue that firms with weak complementary assets are more 
likely to license their technologies, while firms that have capabilities and resources to 
appropriate returns by commercializing innovations in-house have lower incentives 
to license. Another perspective relating complementary assets and licensing decision 
is given by Somaya, Kim & Vonortas (2011). They note that managers and technology 
commercialization professionals often view licensing as a way to get access to 
complementary capabilities owned by the licensee in order to develop and 
commercialize their own technologies (Somaya, Kim, & Vonortas, 2011). 
On the contrary, when downstream complementary assets are available, they 
need to be fed with production activities to avoid underutilization. Therefore, in such 
cases firms tend to use their technologies internally to produce a final product 
(Gambardella & Giarratana, 2006). 
Arora & Ceccagnoli (2006) use the Carnegie Mellon survey to measure the 
presence of specialized manufacturing capabilities. By looking at the frequency of 
face to face interactions between personnel from R&D and production departments, 
they code their complementary asset dummy as 1 if the interaction is daily (Arora & 
Ceccagnoli, 2006; Ceccagnoli & Hicks, 2009). Gambardella & Giarratana (2006) 
construct two measures as proxies for downstream assets in software: the share of 
live software trademarks on the total trademark multiplied by firm fixed assets, and 
the share of live software trademarks on the total trademark multiplied by firm sales. 
Hypothesis 5: Technology licensing is negatively related with the presence of 
complementary assets necessary to commercialize the technology. 
 
27 
 
Firm’s product market share. The impact of licensor’s market share in the product 
market on licensing decision is mainly explained by the rent dissipation effect. Firms 
with smaller market shares have stronger incentives to license out their technologies 
because compared to firms with larger market shares they suffer less from the rent 
dissipation effect (Gambardella et al., 2007; Kim, 2004). Increased competition may 
reduce the price-cost margin producing negative effect on all incumbent producers 
proportional to their current market share. Similarly, market share erosion can 
damage more those firms that are the product market leaders. Put differently, 
smaller the profits the licensor gets from direct production before licensing smaller 
the negative effect from the rent dissipation (Fosfuri, 2006). By the same token, firms 
specializing in technology production with no share in the product market will have 
higher incentives to license.  
Fosfuri (2006) measures the market share of the firm as the ratio between the 
capacity built by the firm in a given product and geographical area and the total 
capacity. Kim (2004) measures the market share as the firm’s proportion of sales in 
primary industry at a given period. 
Hypothesis 6: Technology licensing is negatively related with the firm’s product market 
share. 
 
R&D intensity. Another relevant factor that affects the rate of technology 
licensing is the R&D intensity, which is defined as a ratio between firm’s R&D 
expenditures and sales. The higher level of R&D intensity is usually associated with a 
higher possibility of new inventions. Therefore, it implies that the firm is more likely 
to have valuable technological assets to license out (Fosfuri, 2006; Kim, 2005). R&D 
intensive firms may be more predisposed to license out their technologies because 
they can have more technologies available than they can commercialize internally. 
The R&D intensity is empirically measured as a ratio between R&D expenditures and 
sales (Fosfuri, 2006; Gambardella & Giarratana, 2006; Kim, 2005). 
Hypothesis 7: Technology licensing is positively related with the firm’s R&D intensity.  
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Firm size. As theoretical and empirical literature assert, firm size affects the rate 
of technology licensing and this effect is expected to be negative (Arora & 
Ceccagnoli, 2006; Arora et al., 2001b; Fosfuri, 2006; Gambardella et al., 2007; Kim, 
2005). Large firms with well-established downstream production capabilities have 
less to gain and more to lose from a competition created by licensee due to the rent 
dissipation effect (Arora et al., 2001b). Moreover, larger firms may have less financial 
constraints and, therefore, be less enforced to license out their technologies for 
revenue. Kim (2005) argues that small firms are less likely to commercialize their 
inventions on their own because they have cash flow constraints and often lack a 
sales network.  
On the other hand, there are some alternative arguments for the relationship 
between the firm size and the likelihood of technology licensing. For instance, Fosfuri 
(2006) argues that larger firms have stronger bargaining power in the licensing 
negotiations, which is expected to be positively associated with the revenue effect 
and, consequently, with the propensity to profitably license out technology. 
Considering the measurement aspect, some studies use the amount of 
aggregate sales (Gambardella & Giarratana, 2006) or the log of sales of a firm 
(Fosfuri, 2006; Kim, 2005; Kim & Vonortas, 2006) to control for the firm size. 
Gambardella et al. (2007) measure the firm size by the number of employees. Arora & 
Ceccagnoli (2006) measure the firm size by the log of the number of business unit 
employees (Arora & Ceccagnoli, 2006), but note that the firm size, measured by the 
log of the total employees of unit’s parent firm, give similar results. 
Hypothesis 8: Technology licensing is negatively related with the firm size. 
 
Patent stock. Another important firm-specific determinant that can affect 
licensing behavior is the stock of patents that a firm has received up to a certain point 
in time. Kim (2004) argues that patent-intensive firms may be more predisposed to 
license out their technologies because they can have more technologies available than 
they can use in-house. Kim & Vonortas (2006) highlight that patent-intensive firms 
may also be interested in extending revenue frame from technologies that have past 
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time of their internal use but which can be still valuable to others. Moreover, larger 
patent stock increases the likelihood that a company has non-core or peripheral 
technologies to license out.  
Most of the studies measure the patent stock as a number of patents received by 
the firm up to a given point in time (Kim, 2004; Kim, 2005; Palomeras, 2007). Kim & 
Vonortas (2006) use a more sophisticated measure for the patent stock that also 
accounts for technology depreciation due to the technological obsolescence.  
Hypothesis 9: Technology licensing is positively related with the firm’s patent stock. 
 
Previous licensing experience. The transaction costs associated with gathering 
information about potential licensees, negotiating, writing and enforcing licensing 
contracts decrease licensor’s profits and discourage the licensing behavior of the 
firm. Therefore, as suggested by the literature previous licensing experience lowers 
these types of transaction costs and, thus, should have a positive effect on further 
technology licensing decisions (Fosfuri, 2006; Kim, 2004; Kim, 2005).  
Empirical studies measure previous licensing experience with the average 
number of licenses granted by the firm during the pre-sample period (Kim, 2004) or 
use a dummy variable to account for previous licensing experience (Fosfuri, 2006; 
Kim, 2004; Kim, 2005).  
Hypothesis 10: Technology licensing is positively related with the firm’s previous 
licensing experience. 
 
Technology level determinants 
Value of the technology. An essential factor that may affect the licensing 
likelihood is the technical importance or the value of the technology. The 
technological value was found to be positively correlated with the economic value of 
innovation (Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 2005; Harhoff, Narin, Scherer, & Vopel, 1999). 
On the one hand, valuable innovation raises interest by potential licensees to be 
commercially exploited, which means that the licensor can extract a larger payment 
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from the licensees for the valuable technology (Fosfuri, 2006; Palomeras, 2007). On 
the other hand, innovator can also be interested in exploiting the valuable innovation 
in-house or can decide to avoid potential competition caused by licensing out 
valuable innovation (Palomeras, 2007). Gambardella et al. (2007) argue that although 
not all valuable patents are licensed, licensed patents are selected from a subset of 
better patents, thus, licensed patents, on average, have a higher economic value. 
Therefore, we hypothesize a positive relationship between these two variables. 
Palomeras (2007) measures the value of the technology by the number of 
citations patent receives. Gambardella et al. (2007) measure the economic value of the 
technology by the occurrence of opposition, the occurrence of presented observations 
to the EPO by a third party, and the number of designated countries in the 
application. Ceccagnoli & Hicks (2009) use the number of forward citations to 
measure the value of the technology. 
Hypothesis 11: Technology licensing is positively related with the value of the 
technology. 
 
Technological fit. The literature suggests that the technological fit is another 
determinant of technology licensing. Palomeras (2007) defines the technological fit as 
a degree to which a given innovation falls within core activity of the firm. As it was 
emphasized by Prahalad & Hamel (1990), firms should invest in and protect their 
core technologies, which are key to their sustainable competitive advantage 
(Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). Since the transfer of core technology through licensing 
implies disclosure of innovator’s source of competitive advantage, it can have 
significant negative effect on its competitive position in the product market (Fosfuri, 
2006; Palomeras, 2007). Moreover, in the area of their core activity firms develop 
particular organizational and technological capabilities and, therefore, have some 
cost advantages in exploiting the innovation, which implies that the core technology 
can be more valuable to innovating firm than to potential licensees that lack these 
capabilities (Palomeras, 2007). Hence, firms are less likely to license out their core 
technologies. 
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On the contrary, non-core technologies are more likely to be licensed out for 
revenue. Arora et al. (2001) argue that even a large well-established firm may decide 
to license out its technology because of inability to exploit its technology to full effect 
or because the technology has application in markets in which the innovator does not 
typically operate. Such non-core technologies may exist, for instance, because large 
firms invest in peripheral technologies in order to develop an “absorptive capacity” 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) or as a by-product of their main R&D activities. Moreover, 
for non-core technology firms do not usually posses relevant downstream 
manufacturing and marketing capabilities (Gambardella et al., 2007).  
The technological fit is measured by a share of patents in the firm’s overall 
patent portfolio that belongs to the same 3-digit International Patent Classification 
(IPC) class as the focal patent (Palomeras, 2007). Gambardella et al. (2007) distinguish 
between core, background, marginal and niche technologies by using the two 
measures: the patent share and the revealed technology advantage (RTA). 
Hypothesis 12: Technology licensing is negatively related with the technological fit of 
technology. 
 
Scientific nature of the technology. Finally, another factor that may affect the 
technology licensing is the level of tacitness and codifiability of technological 
knowledge (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Polanyi, 1966). Tacit knowledge is difficult to 
communicate and transfer to others, while codified knowledge can be easily 
transferred through patents, blueprints, and articles (Arora et al., 2001b; Teece, 1986). 
Winter (1987) developed a taxonomy that distinguished eight pairs of attributes of 
knowledge: articulable or tacit, teachable or unteachable, articulated or 
nonarticulated, observable or nonobservable, simple or complicated, system-
independent or system dependent, context-independent or context dependent, 
monodisciplinary or transdisciplinary. The first attribute in each pair makes 
knowledge easier to transfer while the second attribute makes it more difficult (Arora 
et al., 2001b).  
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Generally, technologies that are strongly science-based are more likely to be 
codifiable and not tacit (Arora & Ceccagnoli, 2006; Arora & Gambardella, 1994a; 
Winter, 1987). Codifiability makes it easier to protect the technology since the object 
of protection is clearer (Gambardella et al., 2007). Moreover, tacit technology is costly 
to transfer, which implies lower licensing payoffs (Teece, 1977). Thus, the 
relationship between codifiability and technology licensing should be positive, 
whereas tacitness will assume the negative relationship. 
There are different measures of the degree to which the firm’s knowledge is 
science based and, therefore, likely to be codifiable and nontacit. Arora & Ceccagnoli 
(2006) use measures labeled as “importance of basic science”, “importance of medical 
science”, “% of R&D efforts devoted to basic research” to assess the degree of 
codifiability. Gambardella et al. (2007) measure the scientific nature of knowledge 
(codifiability) by asking respondents to rank on the 5-point Likert scale the 
importance of the scientific literature, the importance of university or other public 
labs as a source of knowledge. Tacitness is measured by asking respondents to rate 
on the 5-point scale the importance of users, suppliers and competitors as a source of 
knowledge (Gambardella et al., 2007). Ceccagnoli & Hicks (2009) consider the 
number of patent references to scientific papers as the science linkage indicator. 
Hypothesis 13: Technology licensing is positively related with the scientific nature of 
the technology. 
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2.3. DATA AND METHODS 
2.3.1. Search Strategy 
The current study investigates the determinants of technology licensing. The 
main research questions that are expected to be addressed using the meta-analytic 
approach are: What factors affect a firm’s decision to license its technologies? What are the 
patterns of relationships between these determinants and technology licensing? 
Therefore, we select research studies, code and analyze data from these studies 
according to these research questions. Before starting the search for the relevant 
empirical literature, we have set the following eligibility criteria in order to include 
studies in the meta-analysis. First, the studies should empirically investigate the 
relationship between technology licensing and its various determinants. Second, the 
studies have to focus on decisions to license by for-profit firms rather than non-profit 
organizations or universities, which have different motives and reasons for licensing 
their technologies. For instance, university licensing decisions differ considerably 
from those made by for-profit firms, primarily because universities do not have 
stakes in the product market (Fosfuri, 2006). Third, the studies should provide some 
theoretical interpretation of expected direction of the relationship between the 
technology licensing and a given determinant. 
Following the suggestions in the relevant methodological literature (Lipsey & 
Wilson, 2001), in the meta-analysis we have used multiple methods to identify, 
locate, and retrieve studies reporting relationship between technology licensing and 
its various determinants. First, we have conducted keyword searches in specialized 
computer-based bibliographic databases (ProQuest, ABI/INFORM, EBSCO, Scopus, 
Google Scholar). The following variation of keywords was used to search for relevant 
literature: “markets for technology”, “licensing”, “patent use”, “technology 
management”, “technology use”, “technology transfer”, “technology licensing”, 
“technology commercialization”, “technology exploitation”.  
Second, we have conducted a manual search in the following journals that were 
found to be the source of already retrieved studies: Applied Economics Letters, 
California Management Review, Industrial and Corporate Change, Journal of Economics and 
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Business, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Journal of Technology Transfer, 
Management Science, Managerial and Decision Economics, Research Policy, S.A.M. 
Advanced Management Journal, Strategic Management Journal, The Journal of Industrial 
Economic.  
Third, since meta-analysis is frequently criticized as being based on biased data 
sets of published studies, in order to decrease possible publication bias we have 
decided to include unpublished works in our meta-analysis, even though we admit 
that inclusion of unpublished research is controversial (Hunter & Schmidt, 2004; 
Rosenthal, 1991). Additional argument for inclusion of unpublished papers in our 
analysis stems from the fact that empirical research on this issue is quite recent, and 
the number of published papers is limited. Thus, some relevant studies may still be 
under the review process. The main sources of unpublished and working papers are 
the following two databases: Social Science Research Network (SSRN) and The 
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Working Papers. We have also 
consulted other unpublished papers from conference proceedings (e.g. DRUID 
Summer Conference). Finally, we have used so-called “snow ball” technique to find 
additional studies on the topic using the references contained in the already selected 
studies.  
The search procedure resulted in 11 relevant studies that reported 18 samples 
with a total of 66,165 observations (see Table 2.1). Among the 8 published studies 
included, 2 were published between 2000 and 2005, and 6 of them - between 2006 
and 2011. Other 3 unpublished works used in the analysis also fall into the 2006-2011 
interval. This also indicates a recent increasing interest in the topic of technology 
licensing and its various determinants.  
Although for testing some hypotheses we do not have many empirical studies 
investigating the relationship, the use of several major methods for combining levels 
of significance suggested by Rosenthal (1991) allows us to conduct meta-analysis 
with two or more empirical studies (e.g. Sobrero & Schrader, 1998).  
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TABLE 2.1 List of studies included in the meta-analysis 
Authors Year Source 
   
Arora & Ceccagnoli 2006 Management Science 
Ceccagnoli & Hicks 2009 Working Paper 
Fosfuri  2006 Strategic Management Journal 
Gambardella, Giuri & Luzzi  2007 Research Policy 
Gambardella & Giarratana 2006 Working Paper  
Kim 2004 Applied Economics Letters 
Kim 2005 S.A.M. Advanced Management Journal 
Kim & Vonortas 2006 Managerial and Decision Economics 
Motohashi 2008 Research Policy 
Novelli 2007 Working Paper, DRUID Summer Conference 2007 
Palomeras 2007 Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 
 
 
2.3.2. Methods 
During the last several decades, meta-analysis has been increasing in its 
importance as a way to conduct a literature review in a more quantitative manner. 
Meta-analysis integrates findings across studies to reveal patterns of relationships 
between various constructs and can be understood as a form of survey research in 
which research results, rather than individuals, are surveyed (Lipsey & Wilson, 
2001). Meta-analysis allows comparing or combining the results of empirical studies 
by employing either effect sizes or significance levels (Hunter et al., 1982). 
In order to fully exploit the possibilities offered by the meta-analytic technique, 
there is a need to calculate effect sizes from the reviewed studies. However, in social 
sciences many reports of multiple regressions fail to report the full correlation 
matrices (Hunter & Schmidt, 2004). Most of studies in our sample also lack 
correlation matrices for their key variables. Moreover, unlike other sciences where 
experimental studies are very common, social sciences often use non-experimental 
studies that usually include different sets of explanatory and control variables. 
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Therefore, for these studies comparing or combining effect sizes is quite problematic 
since it is impossible to single out the effects of different explanatory variables. For 
these reasons, following Sobrero & Schrader (1998), we would like to focus on the 
directionality and significance of effects rather than on their magnitude.  
An alternative approach to the problem of the absence of correlation matrices is 
to estimate missing Pearson correlation coefficients using standardized regression 
(beta) coefficients (Peterson & Brown, 2005). Peterson & Brown (2005) report that the 
use of corresponding beta coefficients to impute missing correlations coefficients 
(effect sizes) generally produces relatively accurate and precise population effect-size 
estimates. However, the conventional view of meta-analysts is that beta coefficients 
should not be used as substitutes for correlation coefficients in meta-analysis (Hunter 
& Schmidt, 2004). Moreover, as highlighted by Peterson & Brown (2005), this 
imputation approach can be successfully utilized only when missing data constitutes 
a relatively small percentage of all studies. In our case majority of studies fail to 
report their correlation matrices. Therefore, this alternative approach can only be 
used if more complete information for the majority of studies is collected by directly 
contacting the authors. 
Although we have tried to address a possible problem of publication bias by 
including unpublished studies in our meta-analysis, it is likely that we could not 
successfully retrieve the majority of unpublished studies. Therefore, as suggested by 
Rosenthal (1991), we also conducted the file drawer test. This test allows to assess 
how many unpublished studies reporting non-significant or contradicting to 
theoretical expectations results are needed to invalidate conclusions of the meta-
analysis (Rosenthal, 1991). 
 
2.3.3. Data Coding  
As it was described in the previous sections, the focus of our meta-analysis is 
the relationship between technology licensing and its various determinants. Each 
paper selected for meta-analysis was coded in a database, by collecting key 
methodological and descriptive characteristics including authors’ name, year of 
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publication, source, unit of analysis, used methodology, research context, constructs 
of interest, and key statistics useful for the meta-analysis (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001).  
The review of the selected sample of studies revealed that there is a need to 
distinguish between two types of dependent variables: willingness to license and 
actual licensing. Considering explanatory variables, we have coded the following 
determinants of technology licensing: the effectiveness of patent protection, the 
competition in the product market, the technological competition, the market size 
and growth, the presence of complementary assets, the firm’s product market share, 
the R&D intensity, the firm size, the previous licensing experience, the technological 
fit, the value of the technology, and the scientific nature of the technology. 
During the coding process, we retained information about research design and 
method in order to distinguish between studies that used survey data, databases or 
both to measure the relationship of interest. Further, to account for differences in 
research contexts represented in the selected studies we coded each study on the base 
of the composition of its sample. To see the distinction in the results between 
empirical studies that used firm level measures and studies that used technology 
level measures, we also coded level of measurement for each study.  
By reviewing theoretical sections of the studies, we have determined and coded 
the theoretically predicted direction of the relationship between technology licensing 
and its determinants. Whereas next sections gave us the sign of the relationship 
suggested by empirical findings that could either support theoretical prediction or 
contradict it. 
For each relationship of interest in our studies, we coded the one-tailed p-value 
associated with the significance test. Whenever p-values were not available or were 
reported as threshold levels (e.g. p<0.01), the exact p-values were calculated from 
reported t-statistics and associated distributions. It should be noted that one-tailed 
p’s are always less than 0,5 when the results are in the consistent direction, but they 
are always greater than 0,5 when the results are not consistent with theoretical 
predictions (Rosenthal, 1991). Moreover, we have calculated the corresponding 
standard normal deviate (Z). The sign of the Z-score was coded as positive if the 
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empirical evidence supported theoretical prediction, and was coded as negative 
otherwise (Sobrero & Schrader, 1998).  
As recommended by Rosenthal (1991), when for a given construct several 
measures were used we found the standard normal deviate (Z) that corresponds to 
the p-value associated to each measure, calculated average Z-score, and converted it 
into corresponding p-value. Finally, following Sobrero & Schrader (1998), we used a 
similar procedure for calculating p-value, when two or more models that tested the 
relationship of interest were present in the same study based on the same sample. 
Analyses performed on different samples within the same study were considered as 
independent observations. 
 
2.3.4. Statistical Procedure 
In order to compare the relationships in the reviewed studies according to their 
significance levels, as suggested by Rosenthal & Rubin (1979), we, first, tested for the 
homogeneity of the Z-scores corresponding to p-values using the following formula: 
∑ �𝒁𝒋 − 𝒁��
𝟐𝑲
𝒋=𝟏 , 
where K equals to the number of reviewed studies, 𝑍𝑗 is the standard normal 
deviates computed for each study, ?̅? is the mean of the 𝑍𝑗. The test for homogeneity 
is distributed as χ2 with K – 1 degrees of freedom. Whenever the results of studies 
failed the homogeneity test, we attempted to assess and explain the reasons for this 
heterogeneity. Whereas when the results of studies were found to be homogeneous, 
they were further analyzed using the statistical procedures of combining the results 
suggested by Rosenthal (1991).  
There are several major methods for combining the levels of significance 
obtained from two or more studies testing the same directional hypothesis 
(Rosenthal, 1991). Taking into account their advantages and drawbacks, for our 
study we decided to use several methods to combine probabilities, namely adding p’s, 
adding t’s, adding Z’s, testing the mean p, and testing the mean Z.  
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Adding p’s. This powerful method that has been described by Edgington (1972a) 
uses the following formula:  
𝑷 = (∑𝒑)𝑵
𝑵!  . 
However, this method is useful only for small sets of studies because it requires 
that the sum of p levels doesn’t exceed unity by very much, otherwise, the results 
tend to be too conservative (Rosenthal, 1991).  
Adding t’s. Another method of combining probabilities described by Winer 
(1971) involves the following calculations: 
𝒁 = ∑𝒕
�∑[𝒅𝒇/(𝒅𝒇−𝟐)]. 
Unlike previous one, this method is not affected by the number of studies 
reviewed. Nevertheless, its limitation is that it may not give good approximations 
when df < 10 for each t (Rosenthal, 1991). 
Adding Z’s. The main advantage of the Stouffer method is that it is the simplest 
of all to apply: 
𝒁 =  ∑𝒁
√𝑵
. 
In order to effectively employ this method, number of studies reviewed should 
not be too small (Rosenthal, 1991).  
Testing the mean p. Another method proposed by Edgington (1972b) that can be 
used when there are four or more studies to be combined is a normal curve method: 
𝒁 =  (𝟎,𝟓 − 𝒑�)√𝟏𝟐𝑵. 
Testing the mean Z. Finally, the fifth method is the one suggested by Mosteller & 
Bush (1954), which represents a modification of the Stouffer method: 
𝒕 =  ∑𝒁/𝑵
�𝑺𝟐(𝒁)/𝑵. 
The authors discourage from the usage of this method when there are fewer 
than five studies to be combined because of the lower power of the t-test when based 
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on few observations (Rosenthal, 1991). Therefore, we use this additional test only 
when number of studies exceeds five. 
As we have mentioned earlier, to examine how many unpublished studies 
reporting non-significant, or contradicting to theoretical expectations are needed to 
invalidate results of the meta-analysis, we also conducted a file drawer test for 
subsample of published studies using the following formula suggested by Rosenthal 
(1991): 
𝑿 =  𝑲�𝑲𝒁�𝟐− 𝟐,𝟕𝟎𝟔�
𝟐,𝟕𝟎𝟔  , 
where K equals to the number of reviewed studies, ?̅? is the mean of the 𝑍𝑗. The 
idea behind the file drawer test is to calculate the number of studies reporting null 
results that must be in file drawers in order to lower the overall probability of a type 
I (“false positive”) error in the results of our combination procedures to 0,05 
(Rosenthal, 1991). 
 
41 
 
2.4. RESULTS 
Even precursory look at the empirical findings reveals that some of them 
inconclusive not only in terms of magnitude and relative importance, but also in 
terms of direction of the relationships between technology licensing and its various 
determinants. Table 2.2 describes all the studies reviewed, whether they have been 
published or not, the dependent and independent constructs, the size of the firms in 
the samples, the level of measurement, the theoretically predicted and empirically 
observed relationships between the dependent and independent variables, 
corresponding p-values and degrees of freedom. The studies in the table are 
presented in 13 groups according to the independent construct, each of them 
investigating a different relationship. The number of studies in each of these groups 
varies from 2, as in the case of the relationship between technology licensing and 
firm’s product market share, to 14, as in the case of the relationship between 
technology licensing and the effectiveness of patent protection. As noted earlier, 
methods for combining levels of significance used in the paper allow us to conduct 
meta-analysis with two or more empirical studies (Rosenthal, 1991). 
 The analysis points out to the heterogeneity of the results both in terms of 
reported significance levels and directionality of the relationships. Therefore, the 
remaining of this section describes our findings for each of the relationships. 
Most of the studies addressing the relationship between licensing and the 
effectiveness of the patent protection report positive relationship, which is in 
accordance with theoretical expectation. However, the heterogeneity test shows that 
the p-values are statistically different (χ2=22.26, df=13, p<0.1). One possible reason 
for such heterogeneity is the difference in operationalization of the construct in 
different studies. For instance, more detailed analysis reveals that studies that use 
technology level measures for the independent construct such as the number of 
claims and the number of 4-digit IPC technological classes in which patent has been 
classified get more homogeneous results that can be combined (χ2=1.86, df=3, p=0.6). 
As shown in Table 2.3, for these subgroups of studies all the different combining 
procedures confirm the positive relationship. 
42 
 
TABLE 2.2 Summary of reviewed studies 
 
Determinants 
of technology 
licensing 
Study Reviewed Published Study Dependent Construct 
Size of firms in 
the sample 
Level of 
measurement 
Expected 
Direction 
Observed 
Direction 
p-value 
one tailed df 
Industry level determinants 
Effectiveness of 
patent 
protection 
Arora & Ceccagnoli (2006) Yes Willingness to license Large Firm + + 0.0001 747 
Gambardella, Giuri & Luzzi (2007) Yes Actual licensing Small & large Technology + + 0.0087 7,087 
Gambardella, Giuri & Luzzi (2007) Yes Willingness to license Small & large Technology + + 0.0187 6,137 
Kim (2005) Yes Actual licensing Large Firm + + 0.4678 4,044 
Kim (2005) Yes Actual licensing Large Firm + + 0.0285 2,931 
Kim (2005) Yes Actual licensing Large Firm + - 0.8280 1,299 
Kim (2004) Yes Actual licensing Large Firm + + 0.0001 12,184 
Palomeras (2007) Yes Willingness to license Small & large Technology + + 0.0385 8,551 
Palomeras (2007) Yes Willingness to license Large Technology + + 0.2801 3,405 
Kim & Vonortas (2006) Yes Actual licensing Large Firm + + 0.0042 9,298 
Ceccagnoli & Hicks (2009) No Actual licensing Small & large Firm + + 0.1222 1,036 
Ceccagnoli & Hicks (2009) No Actual licensing Small & large Firm + + 0.0971 1,036 
Ceccagnoli & Hicks (2009) No Actual licensing Small Firm + + 0.3295 412 
Ceccagnoli & Hicks (2009) No Actual licensing Large Firm + + 0.0991 612 
Competition in 
the product 
market 
Kim (2005) Yes Actual licensing Large Firm + + 0.0035 4,044 
Kim (2005) Yes Actual licensing Large Firm + + 0.4361 2,931 
Kim (2005) Yes Actual licensing Large Firm + + 0.2095 1,299 
Kim (2004) Yes Actual licensing Large Firm + + 0.0002 12,184 
Kim & Vonortas (2006) Yes Actual licensing Large Firm + - 0.9008 9,298 
Technological 
competition 
Arora & Ceccagnoli (2006) Yes Willingness to license Large Firm + + 0.2744 747 
Gambardella, Giuri & Luzzi (2007) Yes Actual licensing Small & large Technology + + 0.0579 7,087 
Gambardella, Giuri & Luzzi (2007) Yes Willingness to license Small & large Technology + + 0.0475 6,137 
Fosfuri (2006) Yes Actual licensing Large Technology + + 0.0050 2,009 
Market growth 
Fosfuri (2006) Yes Actual licensing Large Technology + + 0.0077 2,009 
Kim (2005) Yes Actual licensing Large Firm + + 0.0009 4,044 
Kim (2005) Yes Actual licensing Large Firm + - 0.8108 2,931 
Kim (2005) Yes Actual licensing Large Firm + - 0.7474 1,299 
Kim (2004) Yes Actual licensing Large Firm + + 0.6203 12,184 
Kim & Vonortas (2006) Yes Actual licensing Large Firm + + 0.0001 9,298 
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Determinants 
of technology 
licensing 
Study Reviewed Published Study Dependent Construct 
Size of firms 
in the sample 
Level of 
measurement 
Expected 
Direction 
Observed 
Direction 
p-value 
one tailed df 
Firm level determinants 
Presence of 
complementary 
assets 
Arora & Ceccagnoli (2006) Yes Willingness to license Large Firm - - 0.0035 747 
Ceccagnoli & Hicks (2009) No Actual licensing Small & large Firm - + 0.6712 1,036 
Ceccagnoli & Hicks (2009) No Actual licensing Small & large Firm - - 0.3116 1,036 
Ceccagnoli & Hicks (2009) No Actual licensing Small Firm - + 0.9635 412 
Ceccagnoli & Hicks (2009) No Actual licensing Large Firm - - 0.0305 612 
Novelli, Padula, & Rao (2007) No Actual licensing Small Firm - - 0.0001 1,260 
Gambadella & Giarratana (2006) Yes Actual licensing Small & large Firm - + 0.7748 691 
Firm’s product 
market share 
Fosfuri (2006) Yes Actual licensing Large Technology - - 0.0117 2,009 
Kim (2004) Yes Actual licensing Large Firm - + 0.9996 12,184 
R&D intensity 
Fosfuri (2006) Yes Actual licensing Large Technology + - 0.9883 2,009 
Kim (2005) Yes Actual licensing Large Firm + + 0.0139 4,044 
Kim (2005) Yes Actual licensing Large Firm + - 0.9064 2,931 
Kim (2005) Yes Actual licensing Large Firm + - 0.7103 1,299 
Gambadella & Giarratana (2006) No Actual licensing Small & large Firm + + 0.0153 691 
Firm size 
Arora & Ceccagnoli (2006) Yes Willingness to license Large Firm - - 0.0914 747 
Gambardella, Giuri & Luzzi (2007) Yes Actual licensing Small & large Technology - - 0.0001 7,087 
Gambardella, Giuri & Luzzi (2007) Yes Willingness to license Small & large Technology - - 0.0001 6,137 
Kim (2005) Yes Actual licensing Large Firm - + 0.9999 4,044 
Kim (2005) Yes Actual licensing Large Firm - + 0.9175 2,931 
Kim (2005) Yes Actual licensing Large Firm - + 0.9990 1,299 
Kim & Vonortas (2006) Yes Actual licensing Large Firm - + 0.7138 9,298 
Ceccagnoli & Hicks (2009) No Actual licensing Small & large Firm - + 0.5420 1,036 
Ceccagnoli & Hicks (2009) No Actual licensing Small & large Firm - + 0.9771 1,036 
Ceccagnoli & Hicks (2009) No Actual licensing Small Firm - - 0.2341 412 
Ceccagnoli & Hicks (2009) No Actual licensing Large Firm - + 0.8412 612 
Novelli, Padula, & Rao (2007) No Actual licensing Small Firm - - 0.0672 1,260 
Motohashi (2008) Yes Actual licensing Small & large Firm - - 0.0008 1,598 
Gambadella & Giarratana (2006) No Actual licensing Small & large Firm - + 0.2929 691 
Patent stock 
Kim (2005) Yes Actual licensing Large Firm + - 0.7392 4,044 
Kim (2005) Yes Actual licensing Large Firm + + 0.0062 2,931 
Kim (2005) Yes Actual licensing Large Firm + + 0.0001 1,299 
Kim (2004) Yes Actual licensing Large Firm + + 0.0716 12,184 
Palomeras (2007) Yes Willingness to license Small & large Technology + - 0.9999 8,551 
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Determinants 
of technology 
licensing 
Study Reviewed Published Study Dependent Construct 
Size of firms 
in the sample 
Level of 
measurement 
Expected 
Direction 
Observed 
Direction 
p-value 
one tailed df 
Patent stock 
Palomeras (2007) Yes Willingness to license Large Technology + - 0.9941 3,405 
Kim & Vonortas (2006a) Yes Actual licensing Large Firm + + 0.0040 9,298 
Ceccagnoli & Hicks (2009) No Actual licensing Small & large Firm + + 0.0001 1,036 
Ceccagnoli & Hicks (2009) No Actual licensing Small & large Firm + + 0.0055 1,036 
Ceccagnoli & Hicks (2009) No Actual licensing Small Firm + + 0.0010 412 
Ceccagnoli & Hicks (2009) No Actual licensing Large Firm + + 0.0001 612 
Novelli, Padula, & Rao (2007) No Actual licensing Small Firm + + 0.0001 1,260 
Gambadella & Giarratana (2006) No Actual licensing Small & large Firm + + 0.0273 691 
Previous 
licensing 
experience 
Fosfuri (2006) Yes Actual licensing Large Technology + + 0.0050 2,009 
Kim (2005) Yes Actual licensing Large Firm + + 0.0001 4,044 
Kim (2005) Yes Actual licensing Large Firm + + 0.0001 2,931 
Kim (2005) Yes Actual licensing Large Firm + + 0.0001 1,299 
Kim (2004) Yes Actual licensing Large Firm + + 0.0001 12,184 
Kim & Vonortas (2006) Yes Actual licensing Large Firm + + 0.0003 9,298 
Technology level determinants 
Value of 
technology  
Gambardella, Giuri & Luzzi (2007) Yes Actual licensing Small & large Technology + + 0.0054 7,085 
Gambardella, Giuri & Luzzi (2007) Yes Willingness to license Small & large Technology + + 0.0113 6,137 
Palomeras (2007) Yes Willingness to license Small & large Technology + + 0.1836 8,551 
Palomeras (2007) Yes Willingness to license Large Technology + - 0.8499 3,405 
Ceccagnoli & Hicks (2009) No Actual licensing Small & large Firm + + 0.0618 1,036 
Ceccagnoli & Hicks (2009) No Actual licensing Small & large Firm + + 0.4698 1,036 
Ceccagnoli & Hicks (2009) No Actual licensing Small Firm + - 0.9685 412 
Ceccagnoli & Hicks (2009) No Actual licensing Large Firm + + 0.0001 612 
Technological 
fit 
Gambardella, Giuri & Luzzi (2007) Yes Actual licensing Small & large Technology - - 0.0576 7,087 
Gambardella, Giuri & Luzzi (2007) Yes Willingness to license Small & large Technology - - 0.0473 6,137 
Palomeras (2007) Yes Willingness to license Small & large Technology - - 0.0331 8,551 
Palomeras (2007) Yes Willingness to license Large Technology - - 0.1440 3,405 
Scientific 
nature 
 of technology 
Arora & Ceccagnoli (2006) Yes Willingness to license Large Firm + + 0.0042 747 
Gambardella, Giuri & Luzzi (2007) Yes Actual licensing Small & large Technology + + 0.1374 7,087 
Gambardella, Giuri & Luzzi (2007) Yes Willingness to license Small & large Technology + + 0.0200 6,137 
Ceccagnoli & Hicks (2009) No Actual licensing Small & large Firm + + 0.0460 1,036 
Ceccagnoli & Hicks (2009) No Actual licensing Small & large Firm + + 0.0419 1,036 
Ceccagnoli & Hicks (2009) No Actual licensing Small Firm + + 0.0035 412 
Ceccagnoli & Hicks (2009) No Actual licensing Large Firm + + 0.2716 612 
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Our analysis does not confirm the relationship between technology licensing 
and competition in the product market (χ2=14.95, df=4, p=<0.01). Inconsistency in the 
empirical findings is more surprising considering the fact that all five studies in our 
analysis use the same measure to assess the competition in the product market, 
namely, the cumulative market share of four leading firms in the primary operating 
industry of the firm. For instance, three studies coming from the same paper by Kim 
(2005) use three independent samples of firms from three high-tech industry clusters: 
information and communication technology (ICT), biotechnology, and advanced 
materials. The positive relationship between technology licensing and competition in 
the product market is statistically significant only for the sample of firms in the ICT 
sector. These findings suggest that theoretical predictions regarding the effect of 
product market competition cannot be generalized across industries.  
For the third relationship between licensing and the technological competition, 
we find that all results are in the predicted direction and relatively homogeneous 
(χ2=1.96, df=3, p=0.58). Combining tests confirmed the generalizability of the positive 
relationship between the technological competition and the likelihood of technology 
licensing (see Table 2.3). 
Despite the similar measurement of the independent construct by most studies, 
the positive relationship between licensing and the market growth is not supported 
by the empirical findings. As it can be seen in Table 2.2, the results are not only 
heterogeneous in terms of significance levels but, most importantly, the studies find 
opposite relationships between the variables (χ2=19.97, df=4, p<0.001). 
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TABLE 2.3 Comparison and combination of significance levels 
 
Determinants of technology licensing 
Comparing Combining File 
drawer 
Test Result 
Test 
Result Test Adding p’s Adding t’s Adding Z’s Mean p Mean Z 
1. Effectiveness of patent protection (All) 
χ213=22.26, 
p=0.051 
The studies may not 
be combined 
- - - - - 
Relation not 
confirmed - 
    Effectiveness of patent protection   
(Technology) 
χ23=1.86,  
p=0.603 
The studies can be 
combined 
p<0.001 3.40 
p<0.001 
3.40 
p<0.001 
2.87 
p<0.005 
- 
Relation 
confirmed 13 
2. Competition in the product market χ24=14.95,  
p=0.005 
The studies may not 
be combined 
- - - - - 
Relation not 
confirmed - 
3. Technological competition χ23=1.96,  
p=0.581 
The studies can be 
combined 
p<0.001 3.21 
p<0.001 
3.21 
p<0.001 
2.80 
p<0.005 
- 
Relation 
confirmed 11 
4. Market growth χ25=19.97,  
p=0.001 
The studies may not 
be combined 
- - - - - 
Relation not 
confirmed - 
5. Presence of complementary assets (All) 
χ26=24.03,  
p=0.001 
The studies may not 
be combined 
- - - - - 
Relation not 
confirmed - 
    Presence of complementary assets (Small 
& large) 
χ22=0.84,  
p=0.657 
The studies can be 
combined 
p=0.905 - 0.41 
p=0.658 
- 0.41 
p=0.658 
- 0.52 
p=0.697 
- 
Relation not 
confirmed - 
    Presence of complementary assets 
(Large) 
χ21=0.34,  
p=0.563 
The studies can be 
combined 
p<0.001 0.323 
p<0.001 
0.323 
p<0.001 
0.237 
p<0.01 
- 
Relation 
confirmed 6 
6. Firm’s product market share χ21=15.66,  
p<0.001 
The studies may not 
be combined 
- - - - - 
Relation not 
confirmed - 
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Determinants of technology licensing 
Comparing Combining 
File 
drawer 
Test Result 
Test 
Result Test 
Adding p’s Adding t’s Adding Z’s Mean p Mean Z 
7. R&D intensity χ24=16.69,  
p<0.005 
The studies may not 
be combined 
- - - - - 
Relation not 
confirmed 
- 
8. Firm size (All) 
 
χ213=72.88,  
p<0.001 
The studies may not 
be combined 
- - - - - 
Relation not 
confirmed 
- 
    Firm size (Small) χ21=0.30,  
p=0.585 
The studies can be 
combined 
p=0.045 1.57 
p=0.058 
1.57 
p=0.058 
1.71 
p=0.044 
- 
Relation 
confirmed 
- 
9. Patent stock (All) χ212=73.70,  
p<0.001 
The studies may not 
be combined 
- - - - - 
Relation not 
confirmed 
- 
    Patent stock (without Palomeras (2007)) χ210=29.17,  
p<0.001 
The studies may not 
be combined 
p<0.001 8.63 
p<0.001 
8.61 
p<0.001 
4.85 
p<0.001 
6..46 
p<0.001 
Relation 
confirmed 
>100 
10. Previous licensing experience 
 
χ25=1.05, 
p=0.958 
The studies can be 
combined 
p<0.001 8.52 
p<0.001 
8.52 
p<0.001 
4.24 
p<0.001 
18.59 
p<0.001 
Relation 
confirmed 
>100 
11. Value of technology χ27=24.92,  
p<0.001 
The studies may not 
be combined 
- - - - - 
Relation not 
confirmed 
- 
12. Technological fit χ23=0.33,  
p=0.953 
The studies can be 
combined 
p<0.001 3.07 
p<0.005 
3.07 
p<0.005 
2.98 
p<0.005 
- 
Relation 
confirmed 
10 
13. Scientific nature of technology χ26=3.51,  
p=0.742 
The studies can be 
combined 
p<0.001 4.73 
p<0.001 
4.73 
p<0.001 
3.90 
p<0.001 
6.18 
p<0.001 
Relation 
confirmed 
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Considering the firm level determinants of technology licensing, we start our 
analysis with the presence of complementary assets. Overall homogeneity test 
reports that the empirical findings are very different both in terms of direction of the 
relation and in their level of significance (χ2=24.03, df=6, p<0.001), which means these 
studies may not be combined. However, more detailed analysis reveals some 
compelling findings suggesting that the empirical results depend on the size of firms 
in the samples used for the analysis. Separate homogeneity tests for two subgroups, 
first that consist of both small and large firms (χ2= 0.84, df=2, p=0.657) and second 
that consist of only large firms (χ2= 0.34, df=1, p=0.563), suggest that they can be 
combined. First combination tests for the subgroup consisting of both small and large 
firms reject the theoretical proposition of the negative relationship between the 
presence of complementary assets and licensing because the relationship found to be 
insignificant for all studies. Whereas combination tests for the second subgroup of 
large firms confirm the relationship (see Table 2.3). Hence, the results suggest that 
theoretical prediction of a negative relationship between the presence of 
complementary assets and the technology licensing cannot be generalized. One 
possible source of inconsistency in findings can be heterogeneity of proxies used to 
measure complementary assets. Therefore, there is a need to come up with better 
measures of complementary assets and maybe to account for the presence of 
different types of complementary assets. 
The negative relationship between technology licensing and the firm’s product 
market share is not supported by our analysis (χ2= 15.66, df=1, p<0.001). Although 
both studies report quite significant results, the directions of these relationships are 
opposite. Again, one reason for such an outcome can be the fact that the studies use 
very different measures to operationalize their independent construct. Moreover, 
two studies are not enough to be able to make a confident inference about the 
relationship between variables. 
The meta-analysis does not provide any support for the positive effect of R&D 
intensity on technology licensing (χ2= 16.69, df=4, p<0.005). All five studies that 
consider this relationship measure the construct in the same way: as a ratio between 
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R&D expenditures and sales. Thus, our analysis suggests that theoretically predicted 
positive relationship cannot be generalized across firms and industries. 
The next hypothesis examined relationship is between the firm size and 
licensing propensity. Our meta-analysis includes 14 studies that measure this 
independent construct. Overall homogeneity test suggests that the directions and the 
significance levels of these studies vary substantially, and they may not be combined 
(χ2= 72.88, df=13, p<0.001). However, taken separately, studies that investigate the 
relationship using the samples of small firms are quite homogeneous and can be 
combined (χ2= 0.30, df=1, p=0.585). Combining tests suggest that the negative 
relationship between constructs can be confirmed for the subgroup of studies that 
use the sample of small firms, however, results of the tests are significant at the 0.05 
level (see Table 2.3). A possible explanation for such results can be one proposed by 
Motohashi (2008), who argues that there is a non-linear U-shaped relationship 
between licensing propensity and firm size. Therefore, studies that use the sample of 
small firms observe a negative relationship between firm size and licensing, whereas 
studies that use samples of only large or both large and small firms get contradicting 
results. Future research on technology licensing should consider and investigate the 
possibility for non-linear relationship between technology licensing and the firm size. 
A visual analysis of heterogeneity of studies examining the relationship 
between the firm’s patent stock and its licensing propensity reveals that 10 out of 13 
studies report positive and significant relationship, even though formal homogeneity 
test reports high dispersion (χ2= 73,70, df=12, p<0,001). Among three studies that 
find a negative relationship two are taken from Palomeras (2007), who uses patent 
stock as a measure of firm size without any other extra control, which may be the 
main reason that these studies report results very distinct from other studies. 
Therefore, we can omit these to studies from our calculations. The remaining study 
that reports negative relationship has non-significant p-value. However, even after 
excluding two studies by Palomeras (2007) homogeneity tests does not recommend 
combining the studies (χ2= 29.17, df=10, p<0.001). More detailed inspection of the 
reviewed studies shows that the results of homogeneity tests are caused by the 
magnitude of divergence of their significance levels. Out of 11 studies 4 have p-
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values of 0.0001, while others have lower but still highly significant p-values. Thus, 
following Sobrero & Schrader (1998), we argue that the existing heterogeneity does 
not prevent the combination of studies. All combination procedures support our 
intuition and confirm the generalizability of a positive relationship between the 
firm’s patent stock and the licensing propensity (see Table 2.3). 
Our findings fully support the theoretical prediction that previous licensing 
experience is positively related to the current licensing propensity. Homogeneity test 
reports that significance levels are highly similar and can be combined (χ2= 1.05, 
df=5, p<0.001). Combination tests also report highly significant p-values (see Table 
2.3). There can be two main possible explanations for the positive relationship. First, 
previous licensing experience can lower transaction costs of current licensing. 
Second, the variable can also detect unobserved effects such as management 
predisposition toward licensing, which means that firms that have licensed before 
are likely to license in the future as part of their management strategy (Kim & 
Vonortas, 2006). 
With respect to the effect of the value of the technology, our analysis does not 
find support for theoretically predicted positive relationship. The results are not only 
heterogeneous in terms of significance levels (χ2= 24.92, df=7, p<0.001) but also in 
terms of direction. The ambiguous effect of the value of the technology licensing can 
stem from following reasons. On the one hand, valuable innovation raises interest by 
potential licensees to be commercially exploited that has a positive effect on licensing 
revenues. On the other hand, innovator can also be interested in exploiting valuable 
innovation in-house or can decide to avoid potential competition caused by licensing 
out valuable innovation (Palomeras, 2007).  
The evidence for the relationship between the technological fit and licensing 
propensity confirms the theoretical proposition that core technology is less likely to 
be licensed out. Comparison test reports that studies can be combined (χ2= 0.33, df=3, 
p=0.953), whereas combination tests confirm the generalizability of conclusions (see 
Table 2.3). However, in our analysis we have only four studies coming from two 
research papers, which can be a reason for the homogeneity of their results. 
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Therefore, there is a need for more studies to be able to better justify the 
generalizability of our conclusions. 
Finally, the last relationship considered in our meta-analysis is related to the 
scientific nature of the technology. Theoretical proposition suggests that science 
based and codifiable technologies, rather than tacit ones, are more likely to be 
licensed out. According to the homogeneity test, results of all the studies reviewed 
are similar and can be combined (χ2= 3.51, df=6, p=0.742). All the performed 
combination tests also present that conclusions observed in the sample can be 
generalized (see Table 2.3). 
The last column in the Table 2.3 reports the result of the file drawer test. The 
test calculates the number of studies reporting null or opposite results necessary to 
lower the overall probability of a type I (“false positive”) error in the results of our 
combination procedures to 0.05. The tests suggest that for the confirmed 
relationships the number of studies needed to falsify the conclusions varies from 6 
for the relationships that are represented by very limited number of studies to more 
than 100 for the relationships that are addressed by a higher number of studies. 
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2.5. DISCUSSION 
2.5.1. Implications for future research 
This paper used meta-analytic approach based on 18 studies retrieved from 11 
papers to review, compare, and synthesize the results of prior empirical research 
addressing the relationships between technology licensing and its various 
determinants. Out of 13 hypothesized relationships suggested in the literature only 7 
found full or partial support in the meta-analysis. Results for remaining 6 studies 
either disconfirmed the generalizability of theoretical predictions or partly supported 
alternative hypotheses, e.g. hypotheses suggesting a non-linear relationship between 
dependent and independent constructs.  
The evidence fully supports the hypothesized relationships between technology 
licensing and the technological competition, the size of patent stock, the previous 
licensing experience, the technological fit, and the scientific nature of the technology. 
Two hypothesized relationships for the effectiveness of patent protection and the 
presence of complementary assets are confirmed only for subsets of available studies. 
Eventually, other six hypotheses related to the product market competition, the 
market growth, the firm’s product market share, the R&D intensity, the firm size, 
and the value of the technology are not supported by our results. 
The cumulative evidence provided by the meta-analysis may have several 
implications for future research in the field of markets for technology in general, and 
in the field of technology licensing in particular. Overall inconclusiveness of 
empirical findings in term of direction and significance levels calls for reconsidering 
and fine-tuning some of the existing theories and their propositions. As a result of 
our analysis, we can propose several possible directions of such improvements. 
First, all theoretical hypotheses reviewed in this paper suggest for linear 
relationships between technology licensing and various explanatory variables. 
However, as in the case of such determinant as the firm size a functional form of the 
relationship can be U-shaped rather than linear. For instance, Motohashi (2008) on 
the sample of Japanese firms found that compared to their small and large 
counterparts medium sized firms are less likely to license their technologies. 
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Therefore, the possibility of a non-linear relationship between the variables can be a 
key for resolving some of inconsistencies between theoretical propositions and 
empirical evidence. 
Second, although the studies analyze the effect of an independent variable by 
trying to hold all the other relevant variables constant, they usually ignore the 
possible interaction and moderating effects between key explanatory variables. For 
instance, Arora & Ceccagnoli (2006) find that the effectiveness of patent protection 
positively effects the licensing decision only when necessary complementary assets 
are absent or unimportant, whereas Palomeras (2007) finds that the core technology 
is more likely to be licensed if it has a higher value. These interaction and moderating 
effects are still not fully explained and constitute an area for further research. Thus, 
an important implication for empirical research is that our review reveals a need for 
other studies that include many of the discussed determinants of technology 
licensing and that test various interaction and moderating effects. 
Third, the fact that studies based on the samples represented by different 
combination of industries get different results, despite similar measurement and 
operationalization of the independent constructs, suggests that some theoretical 
predictions can only be applied for specific industries or specific categories of firms 
and may not be generalized. To understand better these differences in technology 
licensing across industries, technological classes, countries and various categories of 
firms (e.g. in terms of size) future empirical studies should collect and utilize richer 
and more comprehensive datasets that cover a wide range of industry, firm, and 
technology level characteristics. 
Finally, the empirical studies on technology licensing used in the analysis 
utilize many different measures and proxies for the same explanatory variables. 
Some of these measures have quite ambiguous and unpersuasive relationships with 
the theoretical constructs. Therefore, there is a need for better proxies and measures 
that actually capture the intended theoretical constructs.  
The implementation of these recommendations in the future research could 
improve our understanding of the determinants of technology licensing. 
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2.5.2. Limitations 
The main limitation of the current study is related to the scarcity of studies that 
empirically address the relationship between technology licensing and its 
determinants. Most of the studies selected for the analysis are relatively recent and 
fall within the period between 2006 and 2010. This situation is substantially caused 
by the limited availability of comprehensive data. The problem is especially severe 
for some independent constructs, the measures for which are not easily available at 
the public or commercial databases. Hence, the current meta-analysis can be further 
improved by including additional studies that may appear in the future. The second 
concern is related to the variance in the operationalization of the theoretical 
constructs used in the different studies. The detected heterogeneity among studies in 
terms of significance levels may partly stem from the variety of measures used. 
Moreover, since the studies in our sample usually include different sets of 
independent and control variables it becomes problematic to single out the effect size 
of a particular determinant and compare it across studies. Therefore, we are not able 
to fully exploit the possibilities offered by meta-analysis and limit our analysis to the 
directionality and significance levels of the effects rather than focusing on their 
magnitude. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE DETERMINANTS OF THE ECONOMIC USE OF PATENTED 
INVENTIONS: PURE INTERNAL USE, PURE LICENSING, AND MIXED USE† 
 
ABSTRACT 
A firm’s ability to choose an optimal strategy for the economic exploitation of 
its patented inventions is critical for creating and appropriating value from its 
intellectual property. In this study, we contribute to the literature on technology and 
innovation management in several ways. First, we compare the determinants of 
alternative uses of inventions such as pure internal use, pure licensing and mixed use 
(both internal use and licensing). The main explanatory factors are complementary 
assets, technological competition, technological distance, and technological 
generality of a patented invention. Second, we adopt a multidimensional view on 
complementary assets needed to turn an invention into a success (technological, 
commercial and both) and explore their role in detail, including the interaction 
between complementary assets and key explanatory factors. The data to test our 
hypotheses come from a large-scale survey of European Patent inventors resident in 
21 European countries, Japan, and US. The results show that various types of 
complementary assets are differently associated with the economic use of patented 
inventions. Our findings indicate that the presence of complementary assets has a 
strong direct and moderating influence on different patent uses. Other key 
explanatory variables, by and large, have the expected association with patent pure 
internal use, pure licensing, and mixed use.  
 
                                                          
† The paper has been developed in collaboration with the main supervisor Prof. Salvatore Torrisi. 
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3.1. INTRODUCTION 
A firm that has created and patented an invention has different alternatives for 
its exploitation. The recent development of the markets for technology has increased 
the number of these options available to firms that range from pure internal use to 
pure licensing (or sale). The main motivation for the current study is the lack of 
comprehensive understanding of the determinants of the choice between alternative 
economic uses of patented inventions.  
Not all inventions are patented, and, therefore, patent data provide imperfect 
coverage of inventive activity. However, we choose patented inventions as a unit of 
our analysis for the following reasons. First, although, in principle, licensing is 
possible even without patenting (Anton & Yao, 1994; Arora, 1996), available evidence 
suggests that firms that do not patent rarely license and the empirical importance of 
the alternative mechanisms remains unknown (Arora & Ceccagnoli, 2006). Second, 
since the patent data provide relatively extensive information about an invention in a 
highly standardized way it allows collecting and analyzing data for each invention 
using automated procedures. Moreover, patent data is easily comparable across 
inventions, which is particularly important for an empirical analysis with a large 
number of observations. Rivette & Kline (2000b), for instance, describe patent 
databases as “a virtual Alexandrian library of information”. Collecting the equivalent 
data for a large number of unpatented inventions is a difficult and impractical task. 
Third, since previous studies based on patent data have developed a number of 
generally accepted indicators affecting the economic use of patented inventions, the 
use of patent data in our study allows using similar indicators and comparing our 
findings with earlier works. For the sake of simplicity, throughout this paper we will 
often refer to patented inventions as technologies or innovations. 
Although previous empirical studies have examined the determinants of 
technology licensing, they have not explicitly accounted for alternative exploitation 
strategies such as direct internal use and mixed use (i.e. combination of internal use 
and licensing). As noted by Arora et al. (2001b), licensing is an option not mutually 
exclusive with own production, therefore, a firm can combine them and come up 
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with a mixed use strategy. We review the literature to identify benefits and 
drawbacks of combining internal use and licensing compared to the alternatives of 
pursuing pure internal use or pure licensing strategies. Our findings reveal that the 
frequency of such mixed use is about 2.7 times higher than pure licensing. Empirical 
results suggest that the mixed use strategy is an important alternative to pure 
internal or external exploitation of technology, especially for technologically distant 
or general-purpose technologies with a wide range of potential application. 
Moreover, we find that determinants of mixed use are not necessarily the same as 
determinants of pure internal use and pure licensing. 
The importance of complementary assets for technology commercialization is 
not a novel idea. Starting from the seminal work of Teece (1986) complementary 
assets have received substantial attention in the literature. However, past empirical 
research on licensing was mainly focusing on downstream manufacturing 
complementary assets (e.g. Arora & Ceccagnoli, 2006). Here, we emphasize the 
importance of the multidimensional nature of complementary assets and distinguish 
complementary assets necessary for economic success of the invention, such as 
manufacturing and marketing assets, from complementary assets necessary for 
technical success, such as advanced R&D capabilities. Another dimension that we 
focus on is the presence of organization-specific complementary assets that are 
developed within the firm during the invention process. We find that various types 
of complementary assets are differently associated with the alternative economic 
uses of patented inventions. 
Arora & Ceccagnoli (2006) found that the presence of complementary assets has 
moderating effect on the relationship between the appropriability regime and 
technology licensing. Inspired by their findings, we further investigate the 
moderating effect of complementary assets on other determinants of the economic 
use of patented inventions. Our results suggest that the presence of complementary 
assets has strong moderating influence on technological competition, distance, and 
generality, apparently, the effects are different for the various patent use alternatives. 
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The data to empirically test our hypotheses come from a large scale inventor 
survey developed and conducted within the InnoS&T project (Gambardella et al., 
2012). The survey collects cross-sectional data on a number of issues related to the 
invention process, its determinants, the value of the invention, and its economic use. 
The dataset has been constructed by combining initial invention level survey data 
with additional firm and industry level information from public and commercial 
databases. 
The purpose of this study is to contribute to a better understanding of the 
economic use of patented inventions by expanding the limits of previous research in 
several different dimensions discussed above, whereas the limitations present in our 
study could be addressed by future research. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the literature and 
introduces a set of hypotheses. The third section describes the dataset, variables, and 
econometric methods. The fourth section reports our empirical results. Finally, the 
last section discusses the findings and concludes. 
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3.2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
3.2.1. Economic exploitation of patented inventions: internal commercial use, 
licensing, and mixed use 
A firm that has created and patented an invention has different alternatives for 
its exploitation. The first and most traditional option is to commercialize it directly 
by embedding it into a final product or a production process. The existence of the 
markets for technology facilitates the external use of patented inventions through 
licensing or sale as an alternative or in addition to internal commercial use. In the 
literature, licensing and internal use of technology are often viewed as alternatives of 
each other, and the empirical research has investigated the determinants of one or 
the other in a “either-or” decision setting (Arora & Ceccagnoli, 2006; Teece, 1986). 
However, as noted by Arora et al. (2001b), licensing is an option not mutually 
exclusive with own production, therefore, a firm can combine internal use and 
licensing. Empirical evidence suggests that such mixed use strategy is an alternative 
to pure internal or pure external exploitation of technology, especially in industries 
characterized by general-purpose technologies with a wide range of potential 
application (e.g. Arora et al., 2001b). As emphasized by Teece (1986, p. 289), 
“decisions to integrate or license involve tradeoffs, compromises, and mixed 
approaches. It is not surprising therefore that the real world is characterized by 
mixed modes of organization, involving judicious blends of integration and 
contracting”. 
Apparently, there can be different tracks that lead to this mixed use strategy. 
For instance, the patent holder may first license out its invention in order to acquire 
more information about its technical or economic value and then decide to start its 
own production or vice versa. For the purpose of this study, we will use the term 
mixed use to define such combination, as opposed to pure commercial use and pure 
licensing. 
It is important to emphasize that the determinants of mixed use are not 
necessarily the sum of the determinants of pure internal use and pure licensing. This 
argument is supported by recent theoretical works that emphasize possible synergies 
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or diseconomies between internal use and licensing of technology (Teece, 2006). 
There are a number of theoretical arguments that suggest either positive or negative 
synergies resulted from the mixed use strategy, but so far there is no conclusive 
answer to a question as to when these positive synergies overbalance the negative 
ones. 
Below we will briefly outline the possible benefits of combining licensing and 
internal use of inventions. First, an obvious benefit of pursuing together internal use 
and licensing is a possibility of having multiple sources of revenue (Arora et al., 
2001b). Second, by exploiting the same invention internally and externally a firm 
may achieve economies of scale in its R&D activities and successfully allocate 
relatively fixed costs of initial R&D investments across multiple parties represented 
by the firm itself and multiple licensees (Chesbrough, 2003; Fosfuri, 2006). Third, the 
combination of internal and external use creates more complex business strategy or 
business model that makes it more difficult for competitors to identify the source of 
value and to imitate these strategies by creating an additional layer of competitive 
advantage (Hamel & Prahalad, 1989).  
Additionally, the combination of internal use and licensing can benefit and 
stimulate the firm’s own product business. First, the firm may sell products that are 
complementary to licensed inventions (Rivette & Kline, 2000a), therefore, by 
licensing, the firm can stimulate additional sales of own products. Moreover, 
licensing, in addition to internal use, can be pursued in order to create a dominant 
design or set a technological standard (Khazam & Mowery, 1994), which will be 
definitely beneficial for the firm in terms of stimulating its product sales. Second, 
licensing, in addition to internal use, may actually enhance a demand for the firm’s 
products by securing for its customers a “second source of supply” represented by 
licensee (Davis & Harrison, 2001; Shephard, 1987). If the firm’s customers are part of 
downstream production chain and use firm’s products as an input to their own 
production process, in the absence of the “second source of supply” they will have to 
deal with a monopolist supplier and be subject to hold-up and lock-in problem. By 
licensing to others, the technology owner creates the “second source of supply” and 
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mitigates these problems to its potential customers and, therefore, may actually 
enhance the demand for its own products.  
Considering the benefits of internal use on licensing, first, internal commercial 
use may have a signaling effect about potential technical and economic value of the 
invention. For instance, potential licensees often require a proof of the concept by 
means of prototypes (Jensen & Thursby, 2001) or by other means. The successful 
application of the invention in the firm’s own production may represent the proof of 
its functionality and technical value (Arora et al., 2001b). Moreover, the internal use 
of technology may facilitate potential licensees’ interest by demonstrating areas of 
possible application of the technology. Finally, internally used technologies due to 
learning effect can be constantly improved, and any existing defects and bugs can be 
efficiently fixed. Therefore, if internally exploited technologies are offered for 
licensing, they are more likely to have higher licensing prospects due to their higher 
overall quality. 
The main drawback of combining licensing and internal use of inventions is 
that licensing creates new competitors in the product market (the rent dissipation 
effect) and, therefore, reduces the price-cost margin and/or market share (Arora & 
Fosfuri, 2003; Fosfuri, 2006). In an extreme case, licensing, in addition to internal use, 
could turn a monopoly into a competitive market (Arora et al., 2001b). Thus, 
although the combination of internal use and licensing may increase revenue 
opportunities, the size of these revenue flows could be overbalanced by the rent 
dissipation effect due to increased competition (Arora & Fosfuri, 2003). Teece (2007) 
has made a similar point by claiming that licensing is likely to yield some 
cannibalization of profitable product lines for large, diversified firms, which are, 
therefore, less willing to license their technology. Moreover, internal use may 
discourage potential licensee to adopt the technology due to the presence of strong 
and powerful competitor in the product market represented by the licensor. 
Therefore, in certain cases licensees seek an exclusive license that prevents the patent 
owner from internally using its invention and competing with the licensee. 
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It is worth noting that a firm may internally and externally exploit different 
inventions or the same invention. In the first case, firms may use one invention for 
developing a new product and license another invention to enable other firms to 
develop complementary products. In the second case, firms may commercialize 
internally and license the same invention. Firm level analyses cannot clearly 
distinguish between these two cases, whereas our invention level analysis clearly 
focuses on the combination of internal and external uses of a particular patented 
invention. Considering the discussion above, it is interesting to investigate and 
compare the determinants of pure internal use, pure licensing and mixed use 
strategies. 
Two main theories that help us to identify and explain the determinants of 
economic use of patented inventions are the transaction cost theory and the resource-
based theory. Drawing on the transaction cost theory (Williamson, 1975; Williamson, 
1979), Teece (1988a) explains the use of technology by emphasizing the importance of 
minimizing transaction costs. He suggests that market-based technology transfer 
mechanisms like licensing are attractive when the associated transaction costs are 
lower compared with internal exploitation. On the other hand, the resource-based 
theory highlights the role of unique combinations of resources in maximizing value 
creation and imperfections in the market for strategic resources (Dierickx & Cool, 
1989), suggesting that a technology is best used by those who possess the bundle of 
complementary resources that are required to profit from the technology (Teece, 
1986).  
The main limitation of the transaction costs theory in its examination of market 
based technology transfers is a too narrow focus on separate transactions (Fosfuri, 
2006). The resource-based view, on the other hand, focuses on the resources and 
capabilities that maximize value creation by overlooking the organization of markets 
for these resources and capabilities. Therefore, using only one of these two 
theoretical frameworks does not permit to fully understand the use of strategic assets 
like patents phenomena. For this reason, we examine licensing and commercial use 
of patents through an integrated framework which takes into account the transaction 
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cost theory, the resource-based view in order to study the problem by looking at it 
through multiple theoretical lenses. 
 
Complementary assets. The resource-based view suggests that one of the most 
significant determinants of the economic use of inventions is the presence and the 
nature of complementary assets (Teece, 1986). The complementary assets are defined 
as resources necessary to produce and commercialize an invention. In this study, we 
identify and investigate two types of complementary assets: complementary assets 
necessary for economic success and complementary assets necessary for technical 
success of the invention. The first type of complementary assets comprises 
manufacturing, marketing and distribution assets that are necessary to turn an 
invention into an economically successful product or process innovation. The second 
type of complementary assets is represented by the firm’s R&D capabilities such as 
specialized technical knowledge or sophisticated equipment necessary to improve 
and refine the invention. For instance, a small R&D intensive biotechnology 
company that has discovered and patented new therapies for diseases such as 
diabetes, heart attacks, or cancer may lack technical complementary assets necessary 
for further research, development, and testing that are required before full scale 
commercialization of the pharmaceutical product. 
Given these two types of complementary assets, firms can be endowed either 
with the first type, the second type or both types of complementary assets. Therefore, 
in this study we investigate the effect of these different types of complementary 
assets on the economic use of patented inventions. 
The literature suggests that the effect of complementary assets on the use of 
inventions is relatively clear. If the owner of the invention does not have 
complementary assets necessary to commercialize it, the transfer of the invention 
through market-based arrangements to other parties that possess these 
complementary assets is a rational strategy. Therefore, the pure internal use of 
patented inventions is a natural choice for the firm which is endowed with all 
necessary complementary assets. By the same token, these firms are unlikely to 
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purely license their invention, which would imply that the firm does not utilize 
already available complementary assets to use the invention internally.  
By contrast, when an innovating firm does not possess all necessary 
complementary assets (e.g. firm has downstream production and marketing assets 
but misses sufficient technical capabilities), it may access missing complementary 
assets through collaboration with other firms that already own these resources and 
capabilities. For instance, during the convergence of computer and communication 
technology, firms in each industry were discovering that they often lack the 
necessary technical capabilities in the other industry that induced the collaboration 
between the two (Teece, 1986). Such collaboration through technology licensing, in 
addition to internal commercial use, may result in a mixed use strategy. Building on 
these considerations, we formulate the first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The availability of all complementary assets (i.e. for both economic and 
technical success) is positively associated with pure internal use, but negatively associated 
with pure licensing and mixed use.  
 
Organization-specific complementary assets. As mentioned before, complementary 
assets are important to develop an innovation. However, complementary assets are 
particularly difficult to imitate and acquire on the strategic factor markets (Barney, 
1986) if they are organization-specific and highly rely on tacit knowledge. Clearly, 
the organizational specificity of complementary assets has important implications for 
the use of the inventions. Patented inventions, as any other forms of knowledge, 
have both codifiable and tacit dimensions (Arora, 1995; Nelson & Winter, 1982; 
Polanyi, 1966). While codified knowledge about the invention is relatively easy to 
transfer through patent documents, blueprints, and other documents, tacit 
knowledge is more difficult to communicate and costly to transfer to other parties. 
Teece (1988a) emphasizes that the production of technology is a cumulative process 
based on tacit knowledge, which is organizationally embedded and difficult to 
transfer. Dierickx & Cool (1989) argue that implementation of strategy often requires 
highly firm specific assets. Because of their idiosyncratic nature, organization-specific 
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assets have to be accumulated over time and cannot be traded in the strategic factor 
markets. 
Kline & Rosenberg (1986) argue that inventive activity and commercialization 
activities (i.e. production and marketing activities) are intertwined and require 
frequent information exchange, improvements and modifications in the underlying 
technology at different commercialization phases. Therefore, tacit knowledge and 
organizational routines are developed within the organization during the invention 
stage through frequent communication and knowledge flows. For this reason, 
inventions are often developed and commercialized internally. 
Moreover, Teece (1992) argues that the firm’s ownership of unique and difficult 
to replicate complementary assets represents a second line of defense for the 
invention against imitators even in the absence of effective patent protection. Thus, 
tacit knowledge about the invention embedded in the organizational routines makes 
the imitation of strategic assets difficult and, therefore, can be a source of competitive 
advantage. 
Frequent interactions between employees from different functional 
departments of the organization can be considered as a mechanism that creates and 
develops idiosyncratic capabilities, skills, and tacit knowledge about the invention by 
means of mutual learning, specific organizational routines, interpersonal 
relationships, and unique communication channels (Nelson & Winter, 1982). The 
innovating firm may benefit from the presence of such tacit knowledge developed 
within the organization over time only if the invention is commercialized internally. 
Drawing on the notion of tacitness and organizational embeddedness, Arora & 
Ceccagnoli (2006, p. 299) have claimed that the frequency of interactions between 
R&D and manufacturing personnel is “the quintessence of the notion of specialized 
complementary assets”. We elaborate on this idea and consider frequent interactions 
between inventors and all other organizational departments during the inventive 
process as an indicator of the presence and importance of organization-specific 
complementary assets. On this basis, we posit the following:  
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Hypothesis 2: Organization-specific complementary assets are positively associated with 
pure internal use, but negatively associated with pure licensing and mixed use. 
 
Technological competition. The presence of several firms that have similar or 
substitutable technologies competing with each other could affect the decision about 
the use of the invention. With regard to internal use, intensive technological 
competition is likely to discourage firms from commercializing their inventions. 
First, with several firms competing for the technology there is uncertainty about 
which technology will outperform others and eventually become a technical 
standard, therefore, firms will be cautious about making large irreversible 
investments into commercialization of their technology (Kauffman & Li, 2005). 
Second, the intensive technological competition is a predictor of highly competitive 
product market in the future. Therefore, firms may prefer to concentrate their 
resources into commercialization of inventions for which they possess some 
technological and competitive advantage, i.e. inventions associated with lower 
external technological competition. 
With regard to pure licensing and mixed use options, we argue that 
technological competition should encourage both. Arora & Fosfuri (2003) 
demonstrate analytically that competition in the markets for technology induces 
licensing of innovations and that even incumbent firms may find it profitable to 
license, especially in highly competitive markets. This is because the entry of new 
competitors in a competitive market produces limited rent dissipation effects for 
incumbents. Even in a monopolistic market, despite the potentially high rent 
dissipation effects, the presence of competing technologies may lead the incumbent 
to license out for various reasons such as deterring the entry of strong competitors 
(Rockett, 1990b) or establishing a market standard (Khazam & Mowery, 1994). The 
presence of multiple sources for technology creates a strategic incentive to license 
because a technology holder’s refusal to license not only will be unable to keep 
technology secret and block entry of other firms to the product market but also will 
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reduce the flow of licensing payments (Fosfuri, 2006). Therefore, we posit the 
following: 
Hypothesis 3a: Technological competition is negatively associated with pure internal 
use, but positively associated with pure licensing and mixed use. 
 
The absence of complementary assets may reinforce the effect of technological 
competition on the likelihood of licensing. First, without necessary complementary 
assets the only way for firms to profit from their inventions under conditions of high 
technological competition is by aggressively licensing to other firms that already 
posses these assets and, therefore, can exploit the invention. Second, the lack of 
complementary assets may stem from a strategic choice not to become a downstream 
producer and focus on upstream technology creation (Gambardella et al., 2007), 
which implies a business model that is primarily based on technology licensing 
strategy (Teece, 2010). In this case, technological competition should intensify the 
licensing behavior by these specialized technology firms in order to disseminate their 
technology and try to earn more licensing revenues than their competitors. In other 
words, in their licensing behavior firms without complementary assets should be 
more sensitive to the technological competition than firms with complementary 
assets. Therefore, we expect the following: 
Hypothesis 3b: The positive association between technological competition and pure 
licensing is stronger if the firm does not possess necessary complementary. 
 
Technological distance. The technological distance is defined as a degree to which 
a given invention overlaps the firm’s existing patent portfolio, which represents the 
firm’s core knowledge and competencies (Laursen, Leone, & Torrisi, 2010). For 
instance, when the existing patent portfolio contains high fraction of patents in the 
same technological class as the focal patent, the technological distance is considered 
low. 
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Other things being equal, a low technological distance will favor pure internal 
use, while a high technological distance will induce external use strategies. Rivette & 
Kline (2000b) suggest that while core technologies that give the firm competitive 
advantage should be rigorously protected, non-core technologies should be actively 
licensed for revenue. Empirical studies on licensing find that marginal technologies 
are more likely to be licensed out (Gambardella et al., 2007). Thus, firms tend to 
license out non-core technologies rather than sharing their core technologies, which 
are usually commercialized internally (Gambardella & Torrisi, 2010a).  
Pure licensing and mixed-use strategies are less likely to be adopted with 
respect to core technologies due to the potentially strong rent dissipation effects that 
we have discussed earlier. Licensing the core technology that is also used internally 
may allow new competitors to enter the licensor’s core product market, with 
potential negative consequences for its profits and market shares. Therefore, we 
expect the following: 
Hypothesis 4a: High technological distance is negatively associated with pure internal 
use, but positively associated with pure licensing and mixed use.  
 
Considering the moderating role of the complementary assets on the effect of 
technological distance, we argue that the absence of complementary assets will 
reinforce the positive relationship between the technological distance and licensing. 
The real option theory suggests that, under uncertainty, an option to wait and 
preserve the right to make investment choices in the future is valuable to a firm 
(McDonald & Siegel, 1986; McGrath & Nerkar, 2004). In our context, the choice here 
is whether to invest in the development of necessary complementary assets for the 
internal commercial use of an invention or not. We argue that for the technologically 
distant or non-core inventions the firm is less likely to consider seriously future 
investments in complementary assets, therefore, these inventions are more likely to 
be licensed out for revenue. Therefore, we pose the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 4b: The positive association between technological distance and pure 
licensing (mixed use) is stronger if the firm does not possess necessary complementary assets. 
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Technological generality. The generality of technology refers to the variety of 
applications where the technology can be potentially used. For instance, Bresnahan & 
Trajtenberg (1995) characterize general-purpose technologies by their potential for 
pervasive use in a wider range of sectors, their technological dynamism, and the 
need for complementary investments after adoption. The level of technological 
generality and associated variety of applications imply the higher number of 
potential licensors that could exploit the invention and, therefore, higher demand for 
the technology. As emphasized by Arora et al. (2001b), the technological generality 
affects the breadth of the markets for technology. Therefore, the more general is the 
patented invention the higher the likelihood that it can be licensed to a large number 
of different licensees operating in different industries and product markets, thus 
providing multiple sources of licensing revenue. 
The technological generality may also be positively associated with the mixed 
use strategy. Since the licensor can structure a licensing agreement in a way that 
limits the licensee’s use of technology as to time, geographical area, or field of use, 
this allows licensing out more general-purpose technology to parties that operate in 
different product markets and do not directly compete with each other or with the 
licensor. Consequently, the technological generality allows for combining internal 
use and licensing (i.e. mixed use) without creating a significant rent dissipation effect 
arising from the competition between the licensor and licensee. Therefore, we posit 
the following: 
Hypothesis 5: The level of technological generality of the invention is negatively 
associated with pure internal use, but positively associated with pure licensing and mixed 
use. 
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3.3. DATA AND METHODS 
3.3.1. Data 
The data to empirically test our hypotheses come from a large scale inventor 
survey developed and conducted within the InnoS&T project (Gambardella et al., 
2012). The survey collects cross-sectional data on a number of issues related to the 
invention process, its determinants, the value of the invention, and its economic use. 
The dataset has been constructed by combining initial invention level survey data 
with additional firm and industry level information from Amadeus, EPOSYS, Orbis, 
Osiris, PATSTAT databases. 
The self-administered survey of inventors is global in scope and covers 
patented inventions from 21 European countries, Japan, and US. The sample was 
drawn at the level of patent applications with priority years between 2003 and 2005. 
The final composition of the sample is the following: Europe – 62,148 observations, 
U.S. – 45,861, and Japan – 16,125. After sampling the patents, one inventor listed on 
the patent document was randomly chosen and was sent an invitation letter to 
participate in the survey. The letter asked the inventors to fill out an online 
questionnaire on a website that they could access through an identification number 
and a password, generated for the specific inventor. The number of responses for the 
survey by the inventors in all surveyed countries is equal to 23,044, which 
corresponds to a corrected response rate of 20%. 
For the analysis, we use a part of the survey that contains only patented 
inventions owned by private for-profit firms. The patented inventions that belong to 
individuals and to non-profit organizations are excluded from the further analysis. 
The exclusion of non-profit organizations such as universities and research institutes 
is justified by the fact that these organizations have completely different institutional 
settings and different motivations for the use of their patented inventions. For 
instance, due to the lack of necessary complementary assets universities tend to 
specialize in the creation of knowledge assets, the commercialization of which is 
usually left to other organizations. As a result of this restriction, incomplete 
responses about the economic use of patented inventions, and missing data for 
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different explanatory and control variables, the final sample comprises 14,006 
observations on 6,131 firms. 
 
3.3.2. Variables 
Dependent Variables 
Based on dichotomous responses about internal commercial use and licensing 
of the patented inventions we generate 4 dummy variables. Pure internal use equals to 
1 if the patent owner or affiliated parties only used the patented invention 
commercially (i.e., in a product, service or manufacturing process) without licensing 
it. Pure licensing takes a value of 1 if the patent has only been licensed by the patent owner to an independent party without using it internally. Mixed use accounts for the 
fact that the patent owner or affiliated parties used the patent in a product, service or 
manufacturing process and licensed it to an independent party. Finally, no use equals 
to 1 if the patent has neither been used commercially by any of the patent owners nor 
licensed out to other parties. Sold patents (i.e. when the entire ownership rights for 
an invention were transferred to another firm) were excluded from the non use 
category and from the sample used in the regressions. 
 
Independent Variables 
The independent and control variables used in the study can be classified in the 
following three categories: characteristics of the patent, characteristics of the 
organization, and characteristics of the industry or external context (see the 
Appendix I for a summary of variables and their measures). These measures 
represent either indicators adapted from existing literature or novel indicators 
developed within the InnoS&T project. 
Complementary assets. The survey asks whether (a) the organization had all the 
complementary resources to make the invention a technical success and (b) the 
organization had all the resources to turn the invention into something economically 
valuable (e.g. new product, process or else). The answers are measured on the 5-
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point Likert scale ranging from 1 (completely disagree) to 5 (completely agree). Based 
on this information we construct the following 4 dummy variables. No complementary 
assets takes a value of 1 if both types of assets for the technical and economic success 
were absent, whereas complementary assets both indicates that both assets were 
present. Finally, technical complementary assets and economic complementary assets 
indicate that only one type of asset was present. The assets are considered to be 
present if the answer to the question equals to 4 or 5 and absent if the answer is 1, 2 
or 3 on the Likert scale. 
Organization-specific complementary assets. The variable organizational-specific 
complementary assets measures a particular dimension of complementary assets that is 
theoretically distinct from the availability of technological and economic 
complementary assets. The variable captures the importance and scope of tacit and 
organizationally embedded complementary assets developed within the firm during 
the invention process. To measure the organizational specificity of complementary 
assets, we use the communication breadth. The communication breadth measures the 
number of other functional departments of the organization that are different from 
the inventor’s department with which the inventor communicated frequently for the 
invention. The variable is constructed based on response of inventors to the question 
about frequency of communication with various functional departments with 
answers ranging from 1 (never) to 5 (daily). The communication is considered to be 
frequent if the interaction with personnel from other departments was at least 
weekly, i.e. answer to the question equals to 4 or 5. 
Technological competition. The survey provides a measure of technological 
competition by asking respondents whether they were aware of one or of several 
parties competing for the patent. Technological competition takes the value of 1 if the 
inventor was aware of such parties. For about 18% of observations respondents did 
not know whether there was a competition or not. To maintain the sample size these 
observations are coded as 0 (i.e. the absence of technological competition), and we 
include a dummy variable for these observations so that technological competition 
coefficient will not be biased. 
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Technological distance. The technological distance is defined as a degree to which a 
given invention is distant from the firm’s core knowledge and competence. 
Following Laursen et al. (2010), the distance is measured by the degree of 
overlapping between the existing patent portfolio and the focal patented invention. 
Thus, the distance is considered high when the existing patent portfolio contains only 
a small fraction of patents in the same 3-digit International Patent Classification (IPC) 
class as the focal patent. 
To measure the technological distance we first calculate so-called focus index 
proposed by Ziedonis (2007) and then subtract it from 1. The focus index is calculated 
on the basis of two patent stocks. The patent stock class represents the number of 
patents received by the firm in the same 3-digit IPC class as our focal patent, i.e. the 
patent that was surveyed. The patent stock total stock represents the total number of 
patents received by the firm. The two variables measuring the patent stocks are 
constructed using a perpetual inventory method. The routine considers year 1985 as 
an initial period to calculate patent stock for entities that existed before 1985, and 
includes all patents for firms established after that year. The selection of year 1985 is 
reasonable because the term of patent lasts 20 years. The last date to calculate the 
patent stock is the priority year of the focal patent. The routine accounts for a 
depreciation rate of 15% due to technological obsolescence and the expiration of legal 
rights (Hall, Thoma, & Torrisi, 2007). Next, since high share of patenting intensity in 
a particular technological class represents a field of firm’s knowledge and expertise, 
to create a variable technological distance we divide the patent stoke class by patent stock 
total and subtract it from 1: 
 
𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 = 1 − 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠
𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 
 
Technological generality. One commonly used method to measure generality of 
technology is based on the number of forward citations. Since it follows from the 
discussion above that the higher level of generality is associated with the wider range 
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of technological areas in which technology can be applied, it implies that more 
general-purpose patented inventions will have a larger number of citations from 
within and outside their technological area (Hall & Trajtenberg, 2004). Therefore, as 
suggested by Trajtenberg et al. (1997) generality of technology is measured on the 
basis of the Herfindahl concentration index by the following formula:  
  𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 = 1 −  ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑗2𝑛𝑖𝑗 , 
 
where sij denotes the percentage of citations received by patent i that belongs to 
IPC class j, out of ni patent classes. Thus, if a patent is cited by other patents that 
represent a wide range of technological classes then the measure should be higher, 
whereas if most citations originate in a few classes then it is expected to be low (Hall 
& Trajtenberg, 2004). 
 
Control Variables  
There are several other factors that can impact the economic use of patented 
inventions. Therefore, we include control variables to capture additional invention-, 
firm-, and industry-level effects. In order to control for technological class of an 
invention, we use 6 macro technological classes (see Appendix II). Since another 
generally recognized factor affecting the use of a patent is its value, we control for the 
economic value of the invention. The survey asks to rate the economic value of the 
patented invention relative to the other inventions in the same industry or 
technological area (top 10%, 10%-25%, 25%-50%, bottom 50%). Based on this 
information we generate 4 dummy variables for the economic value. A small number 
of observations for which economic value is missing are included into bottom 50% 
group to maintain the sample size. For these observations, we include a dummy 
variable so that the economic value coefficient will not be biased. 
In addition to these invention-level control variables, we include firm-level 
control variables. As suggested by previous research, we control for the firm size 
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measured by the number of employees. The size of firms ranges from very small (less 
than 10 employees) to very large (more than 5000 employees) firms. For convenience, 
in the analysis the firm size variable is represented by 3 classes indicating the size of 
the organization based on the number of employees. The firm is classified as small if 
it has 1-49 employees, medium if there are 50-499 employees, and large if it employs 
more than 500 people. 
 Since patent intensive firms may be more predisposed to licensing out their 
technologies or may be less effective in managing their large patent portfolios, we 
control for the firm’s overall patent stock using the logarithms of the patent stock total 
variable that was described above. 
Another important factor discussed in the literature is the effectiveness of patent 
protection. The effectiveness of patent protection or the appropriability regime is a quite 
complex concept, and its measure is not straightforward in the literature. The survey 
measures the patent protection by asking respondents how important prevention of 
imitation as a reason for patenting was. The answers are measured on the 5-point 
Likert scale ranging from 1 (not important) to 5 (very important). Since the literature 
suggests that patent protection is an industry level construct, we aggregate 
individual survey responses at the 3-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
level. 
In their study of technology licensing Gambardella et al. (2007) find that the 
scientific nature of the invention (i.e. the importance of scientific knowledge and 
literature to create and develop the invention) is positively associated with the 
probability of licensing. Therefore, we control for it. The PatVal II survey measures 
the scientific nature of the invention by asking respondents to rank the importance of 
the scientific publications as a source of information. The answers are measured on 
the 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not important) to 5 (very important). We 
generate a dummy variable that equals to 1 if scientific publications as a source of 
information for the invention are important. Scientific publications are considered to 
be important if the answer to the question equals to 4 or 5 and unimportant if the 
answer is 1, 2, or 3 on the Likert scale. 
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Finally, to account for the geographical composition of the dataset we include 3 
aggregated region dummies that control for patented inventions from Europe, Japan, 
and US. 
 
3.3.3. Econometric Model 
The current section specifies the econometric model and describes estimation 
methods. The decisions regarding the economic use of the invention are qualitative 
choices among a set of alternatives such as pure internal use, pure licensing, and 
mixed use (see Figure 3.1.). Considering the nature of the dependent variables, in this 
case conventional linear regression methods are inappropriate, thus, for quantitative 
analysis there is a need to use econometric models for discrete choices, more 
precisely, for unordered discrete choices. 
 
FIGURE 3.1 Model specification 
 
 
 
Unordered choices can be interpreted as the result of an optimization process 
described by a random utility model (Greene, 2002). For the ith patent owner faced 
with j choices, the utility of choice j is: 
 
𝑈𝑖𝑗 =  𝑧′𝑖𝑗𝛽 +  𝜀𝑖𝑗.                                                       (1) 
 
Patented invention 
Pure internal  Mixed use Pure licensing No use 
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Choosing option j implies maximization of Uij. The probability that a choice j 
made for patent i is driven by the probability of the latent unobservable utility 
attached to that choice relative to the utility of alternative choices: 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑈𝑖𝑗 > 𝑈𝑖𝑘) for all other k ≠ j.                                         (2) 
 
The two most popular models for unordered discrete choices are multinomial 
logit and multivariate probit models. Due to an assumption of independent, 
identical, normal distributed errors and need to evaluate multiple integrals, 
multivariate probit model found rather limited use compared to multinomial logit 
model that has been used in many fields. 
The multinomial logit model is very convenient for modeling probabilistic 
choice; however, multinomial logit model has some limitations. The main important 
restriction is a requirement of independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA), which 
implies that adding another alternative or changing the characteristics of a third 
alternative does not affect the relative odds between other two alternatives 
(Wooldridge, 2002). Put differently: 
 
𝑝𝑗 �𝑥𝑗�
𝑝ℎ(𝑥ℎ) =  𝑒𝑥𝑖𝛽𝑒𝑥ℎ𝛽 =  𝑒(𝑥𝑖−𝑥ℎ)𝛽                                               (3) 
 
so that relative probabilities for any two alternatives depend only on the 
attributes of those two alternatives. This implication is not very attractive and not 
always plausible for applications with similar alternatives. In particular, the presence 
of mixed use alternative can significantly affects the odds between pure internal use 
and pure licensing alternatives. 
Another possible specifications are bivariate and multivariate probit models. 
For the purpose of this study, the main advantage of multivariate probit model 
compared to multinomial logit model is the absence of the assumption of 
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independence from irrelevant alternatives requirement. A bivariate probit model that 
is a natural extension of probit model allows more than one equation with correlated 
disturbances (Greene, 2003). The specification for a two-equation model would be: 
 
 𝑦1∗ =  𝑥1′𝛽1 +  𝜀1,     𝑦1 = 1     𝑖𝑓 𝑦1∗ > 0, 0 otherwise,                                        
𝑦2
∗ =  𝑥2′𝛽2 + 𝜀2,     𝑦2 = 1     𝑖𝑓 𝑦2∗ > 0, 0 otherwise,                                        
𝐸�𝜀1|𝑥1,𝑥2� = 𝐸�𝜀2|𝑥1,𝑥2 � = 0,                                                                      (4)  
𝑉𝑎𝑟�𝜀1|𝑥1,𝑥2� = 𝑉𝑎𝑟�𝜀2|𝑥1,𝑥2 � = 1,                                                                       
𝐶𝑜𝑣�𝜀1, 𝜀2|𝑥1,𝑥2� = 𝜌.                                                                                                  
 
Estimation of bivariate probit model is carried out by maximum likelihood. A 
multivariate probit model would extend (4) to more than two outcome variables just 
by adding equations (Greene, 2003). The multivariate probit estimations also account 
for unobservable factors that affect all choices through the correlation between the 
error terms of the different alternatives. To analyze the determinants of different 
patent use alternatives we conduct a multivariate probit regression analysis using 
simulated maximum likelihood (Cappellari & Jenkins, 2003). In all our estimations, 
we cluster observations by firms to account for unobserved correlation among the 
patents owned by the same company. 
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3.4. RESULTS 
3.4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 3.1 shows that on average 47.34% of patented inventions are only used 
internally for commercial purposes by the patent owner or affiliated parties, i.e. in a 
product, service or manufacturing process. About 1.48% of patented inventions are 
purely licensed by the patent owner to an independent party, while 4.05% of patents 
are both used internally and licensed to an independent party. As described earlier, 
we refer to this combination of patent uses as a mixed use. Finally, 47.13% of 
patented inventions are neither used internally nor licensed out to other parties. 
An important point that deserves a discussion in itself is that mixed use of 
patented inventions is more than 2.7 times more frequent than pure licensing. Given 
the fact that there are numerous studies on licensing in the markets for technology 
literature, it is striking that such important issue as the combination of licensing and 
internal use has received a very scant attention in the literature. Therefore, one of the 
important contributions of this study to highlight the importance and investigate 
determinants of the mixed use of patented inventions. 
 
TABLE 3.1 Descriptive statistics, economic use of patented inventions  
 
Economic use of patent Freq. Percent 
Pure internal use 6,631 47.34 
Pure licensing 207 1.48 
Both commercial use and licensing 567 4.05 
No use 6,607 47.13 
Total 14,006 100.00 
 
Table 3.2 reports the differences in the economic use of patented inventions 
across three regions, namely, Europe, Japan, and US. Although there are some 
differences within Europe in terms of patent exploitation, for the sake of space we 
present aggregated data for European firms in order to compare it with Japanese and 
US firms. Table 3.2 shows that the proportion of pure internal use is relatively higher 
for European firms. Japanese firms have relatively lower proportion of pure internal 
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use. With regard to pure licensing and mixed use, patented inventions owned by US 
firms display about 1.5 higher proportions compared to inventions owned by 
European firms and about 2.4 times higher compared to inventions owned by 
Japanese firms. In other words, US firms are most active in pursuing pure licensing 
and mixed use strategies for their patented inventions, whereas Japanese firms are 
more reluctant to exploit these two strategies. Finally, the proportion of unused 
patents is higher for Japanese firms compared to European and US firms. These 
findings suggest for the presence of some regional differences in the exploitation of 
patented inventions, which may stem from different organizational cultures or from 
maturity of technology markets in these regions. 
 
TABLE 3.2 Descriptive statistics, economic use of patented inventions by region 
(percentages in parentheses) 
 
  Economic use of patent   
Region Pure internal 
use 
Pure 
licensing Mixed use No use 
Total 
Europe 4,116 121 336 3,883 8,456 
 (48,68) (1.43) (3.97) (45.92) (100.00) 
Japan 1,339 28 77 1,551 2,995 
 (44.71) (0.93) (2.57) (51.79) (100.00) 
US 1,176 58 154 1,167 2,555 
 (46.03) (2.27) (6.03) (45.68) (100.00) 
Total 6,631 207 567 6,601 14,006 
 (47.34) (1.48) (4.05) (47.13) (100.00) 
 
 
Table 3.3 presents the economic use of patented inventions by firm size. The 
table suggests that pure internal use of patented inventions can be characterized by 
an inverse U-shaped form with lower proportions for small and large firms and 
higher proportions for medium firms. We will further consider the relationship 
between pure internal use and the firm size in our empirical estimations. As 
expected, small firms with less than 50 employees have relatively high proportion of 
pure licensing. Moreover, small firms have also the highest proportions of mixed use, 
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which is more than three times higher than their proportion of pure licensing. 
Relatively higher proportion of mixed use compared to pure licensing is persistent 
across different size categories. 
 
TABLE 3.3 Descriptive statistics, economic use of patented inventions by firm size 
(percentages in parentheses) 
 
  Economic use of patent   
Number of employees Pure internal 
use  
Pure 
licensing Mixed use No use 
Total 
1-49 empl. 743 50 172 532 1,497 
 (49.63) (3.34) (11.49) (35.54) (100.00) 
50-99 empl. 342 12 30 196 580 
 (58.97) (2.07) (5.17) (33.79) (100.00) 
100-249 empl. 619 11 44 365 1,039 
 (59.58) (1.06) (4.23) (35.13) (100.00) 
250-499 empl. 541 13 29 377 960 
 (56.35) (1.35) (3.02) (39.27) (100.00) 
500-999 empl. 537 10 47 491 1,085 
 (49.49) (0.92) (4.33) (45.25) (100.00) 
1000-4999 empl. 1,327 30 65 1,292 2,714 
 (48.89) (1.11) (2.39) (47.61) (100.00) 
5000 and more empl. 2,522 81 180 3,348 6,131 
 (41.14) (1.32) (2.94) (54.61) (100.00) 
Total 6,631 207 567 6,601 14,006 
 (47.34) (1.48) (4.05) (47.13) (100.00) 
 
 
The economic use of patented inventions across macro technological classes is 
displayed in Table 3.4 (see Appendix II for the concordance between macro 
technological classes and 30 technological classes). There are marked differences in 
the use of patented inventions across macro technological classes. Consumption and 
Process Engineering have the highest proportions of pure internal use, whereas 
Chemistry/Pharmaceuticals have the lowest proportions. As for pure licensing, 
Chemistry/Pharmaceuticals are characterized by the highest proportion and 
Mechanical Engineering is characterized by the lowest. Finally, mixed use strategies 
are more frequent in Consumption and Process Engineering macro technological 
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classes. As in other tables, the proportion of mixed use is always higher than pure 
licensing across all macro technological classes. 
 
 
TABLE 3.4 Descriptive statistics, economic use of patented inventions by macro 
technological class (percentages in parentheses) 
 
 Economic use of patent   
Macro technological class Pure internal 
use 
Pure 
licensing 
Mixed 
use No use 
Total 
Electrical engineering 1,562 42 133 1,682 3,419 
 (45.69) (1.23) (3.89) (49.20) (100.00) 
Instruments 1,024 33 89 1,070 2,216 
 (46.21) (1.49) (4.02) (48.29) (100.00) 
Chemistry/Pharmaceuticals 1,023 79 113 1,460 2,675 
 (38.24) (2.95) (4.22) (54.58) (100.00) 
Process engineering 1,078 25 106 764 1,973 
 (54.64) (1.27) (5.37) (38.72) (100.00) 
Mechanical engineering 1,389 18 74 1,345 2,826 
 (49.15) (0.64) (2.62) (47.59) (100.00) 
Consumption 555 10 52 280 897 
 (61.87) (1.11) (5.80) (31.22) (100.00) 
Total 6,631 207 567 6,601 14,006 
 (47.34) (1.48) (4.05) (47.13) (100.00) 
 
Table 3.5 presents the use of patented inventions by their economic value. The 
table suggests that the proportion of pure internal use, pure licensing, and mixed use 
increase with the economic value of patent. Consequently, the non use of a patent is 
inversely associated with the economic value. These findings are consistent with the 
patent literature that suggests that a substantial share of patented inventions remains 
unused due to their low economic value.  
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TABLE 3.5 Descriptive statistics, economic use of patented inventions by economic 
value (percentages in parentheses) 
 
  Economic use of patent   
Economic value Pure internal 
use 
Pure 
licensing Mixed use No use 
Total 
Value bottom 50%  2,334 71 131 3,196 5,732 
 (40.72) (1.24) (2.29) (55.76) (100.00) 
Value 25%-50% 1,737 45 126 1,618 3,526 
 (49.26) (1.28) (3.57) (45.89) (100.00) 
Value 10%-25% 1,548 48 150 1,122 2,868 
 (53.97) (1.67) (5.23) (39.12) (100.00) 
Value top 10% 1,012 43 160 665 1,880 
 (53.83) (2.29) (8.51) (35.37) (100.00) 
Total 6,631 207 567 6,601 14,006 
 (47.34) (1.48) (4.05) (47.13) (100.00) 
 
Finally, Table 3.6 reports the correlation matrix for all explanatory and control 
variables used in the analysis. 
 
3.4.2. Regression results 
We conduct a multivariate probit regression analysis for the economic use of 
patented inventions, first entering the controls and then explanatory variables one by 
one. Table 3.7 presents the results of the regressions. Due to the fact that there is no 
default marginal effects output after multivariate probit regression, in the table, we 
report only β coefficients and associated p-values. 
Model 1 in Table 3.7 includes only the controls. The model shows that, 
compared to other firms, medium-sized firms are more likely to commercialize their 
inventions internally. This inverse U-shaped relationship between the firm size and 
pure internal use becomes more evident when we further add our explanatory 
variables. Small firms, instead, are more active in pure licensing and mixed use. 
Moreover, when we add key explanatory variables in the subsequent models we 
observe a U-shaped relationship between the firm size and pure licensing. In other 
words, compared to small and large firms, medium sized firms are less likely to 
purely license their patented inventions. 
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TABLE 3.6 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
Variables Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. No complementary assets  0.33  0.47 1.00              
2. Technical complementary assets  0.11  0.32 -0.25 1.00             
3. Economic complementary assets  0.10  0.30 -0.24 -0.12 1.00            
4. Complementary assets both  0.45  0.50 -0.64 -0.33 -0.31 1.00           
5. Organization-specific compl. assets  0.76  1.09 -0.08 -0.04 0.03 0.09 1.00          
6. Technological competition  0.33  0.47 0.09 -0.01 -0.02 -0.07 -0.04 1.00         
7. Technological distance (log) -0.78  1.25 -0.04 0.01 -0.03 0.05 -0.17 0.08 1.00        
8. Technological generality (log) -3.59  1.74 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.04 1.00       
9. Size small  0.11  0.31 0.09 0.02 0.01 -0.10 0.17 -0.06 -0.45 -0.01 1.00      
10. Size medium  0.18  0.39 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.17 -0.05 -0.16 -0.03 -0.16 1.00     
11. Size large  0.71  0.45 -0.04 -0.00 -0.03 0.06 -0.26 0.09 0.44 0.03 -0.54 -0.74 1.00    
12. Patent stock total (log)  4.95  2.62 -0.06 0.01 -0.05 0.08 -0.26 0.05 0.63 0.03 -0.44 -0.31 0.57 1.00   
13. Patent protection  4.05  0.17 -0.02 -0.04 0.03 0.02 0.11 0.02 -0.06 -0.03 0.01 0.10 -0.09 -0.22 1.00  
14. Scientific nature  0.37  0.48 0.01 0.06 -0.02 -0.03 -0.00 0.16 0.02 0.09 0.03 -0.04 0.01 0.01 -0.07 1.00 
15. Value bottom 50%  0.41  0.49 0.03 0.04 -0.01 -0.05 -0.07 -0.07 0.09 -0.04 -0.07 -0.05 0.10 0.13 -0.06 -0.06 
16. Value 25%-50%  0.25  0.43 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.03 -0.00 0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.02 
17. Value 10%-25%  0.20  0.40 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.03 -0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 -0.05 -0.06 0.05 0.05 
18. Value top10  0.13  0.34 0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.00 0.06 0.03 -0.10 0.01 0.09 0.05 -0.10 -0.13 0.04 0.01 
19. Electrical engineering  0.24  0.43 0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.07 -0.00 0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.07 0.08 0.18 -0.31 -0.02 
20. Instruments  0.16  0.36 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.03 -0.00 -0.08 0.03 0.07 0.01 -0.06 -0.04 -0.03 0.03 
21. Chemistry/Pharmaceuticals  0.19  0.39 -0.04 0.03 -0.02 0.03 -0.06 0.07 0.07 0.13 -0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.27 
22. Process engineering   0.14  0.35 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.09 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.05 -0.06 -0.10 0.17 -0.07 
23. Mechanical engineering  0.20  0.40 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.05 -0.08 -0.04 -0.01 0.04 0.03 0.09 -0.14 
24. Consumption  0.06  0.24 -0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.02 0.07 -0.05 -0.09 -0.05 0.06 0.05 -0.09 -0.14 0.16 -0.11 
25. Europe  0.60  0.49 -0.10 -0.00 0.03 0.08 0.12 -0.29 -0.10 -0.14 0.08 0.11 -0.15 -0.08 0.05 -0.12 
26. Japan  0.21  0.41 0.20 0.00 -0.05 -0.16 -0.20 0.44 0.17 0.01 -0.15 -0.13 0.21 0.12 0.02 0.07 
27. US  0.18  0.39 -0.08 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.07 -0.10 -0.05 0.17 0.06 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.08 0.07 
 
Variables Mean s.d. 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 
15. Value bottom 50%  0.41  0.49 1.00             
16. Value 25%-50%  0.25  0.43 -0.48 1.00            
17. Value 10%-25%  0.20  0.40 -0.42 -0.29 1.00           
18. Value top10  0.13  0.34 -0.33 -0.23 -0.20 1.00          
19. Electrical engineering  0.24  0.43 0.04 0.02 -0.04 -0.04 1.00         
20. Instruments  0.16  0.36 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.25 1.00        
21. Chemistry/Pharmaceuticals  0.19  0.39 -0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.00 -0.28 -0.21 1.00       
22. Process engineering   0.14  0.35 -0.02 -0.03 0.02 0.05 -0.23 -0.18 -0.20 1.00      
23. Mechanical engineering  0.20  0.40 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.29 -0.22 -0.24 -0.20 1.00     
24. Consumption  0.06  0.24 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.04 -0.15 -0.11 -0.13 -0.11 -0.13 1.00    
25. Europe  0.60  0.49 -0.05 -0.03 0.05 0.05 -0.09 -0.07 -0.07 0.06 0.12 0.10 1.00   
26. Japan  0.21  0.41 0.03 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.06 0.00 0.03 -0.04 -0.02 -0.07 -0.64 1.00  
27. US  0.18  0.39 0.04 0.01 -0.03 -0.04 0.05 0.08 0.05 -0.02 -0.12 -0.05 -0.58 -0.25 1.00 
Note: N=14,006 
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The negative association between the firm’s patent stock and all patent uses can 
be explained by the fact that larger patent portfolios are less effectively managed, 
and many inventions remain unused. Moreover, the owners of large patent portfolios 
often stack up a number of patents for purely strategic reasons (e.g., patent blocking, 
litigation or cross-licensing). These strategic patents are rarely commercially 
exploited. 
The effectiveness of patent protection has a significant positive effect on pure 
internal use. However, in contrast with the literature and our expectations we find 
that the effectiveness of patent protection is negatively associated with pure licensing 
and mixed use. This finding suggests that more effective patent protection actually 
facilitates the internal use of patented inventions rather than their transfer to other 
parties through licensing. 
Considering the variable scientific nature of the invention, we find a negative 
association with pure internal use and a positive association with pure licensing. The 
results can be interpreted that highly science-based inventions are practically less 
relevant and often do not find an application within the firm. This reason may also 
lead to a decision to license out the invention to other parties that have a better idea 
about its application. Moreover, the literature suggests that the scientific nature of 
the invention is associated with higher level of codifiability of technological 
knowledge, which makes it easier to transfer from the licensor to the licensee. 
The difference in the economic use of patented inventions in various regions 
also deserves a discussion. Although it is not apparent in the Model 1, in the 
subsequent models we find that, compared to European and US counterparts, 
Japanese firms are more likely to internally use their patented inventions. With 
regard to pure licensing, US firms are more likely, and Japanese firms are less likely 
compared to European firms to purely license their inventions. Finally, US firms are 
more likely to combine internal use and licensing. All these relationships are 
statistically significant and relatively similar across the models. In addition, we also 
control for the economic value of inventions and six macro technological classes. 
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Model 2 adds the first set of variables included in our hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 
proposed that the presence of complementary assets required for the technical and 
economic success of the invention will be positively associated with pure internal 
use, but negatively associated with pure licensing and mixed use. For pure internal 
use and pure licensing we find a full support for our hypothesis (β = 0.55 and β = -
0.26, respectively, p < 0.01). Hypothesis also predicted a negative association 
between complementary assets and mixed use which does not find support in the 
data. However, the positive and significant coefficient of the economic 
complementary assets on mixed use suggests that a mixed use strategy requires some 
level of complementary manufacturing or marketing resources to be implemented. 
Instead, pure licensing is less likely to be pursued if a firm possesses complementary 
economic assets, whereas it is more likely to occur in the presence of only technical 
complementary assets. This comparison suggests that pure licensing firms tend to be 
small technology specialists with limited manufacturing and commercial capabilities. 
Model 3 adds the variable organization-specific complementary assets, which 
were developed during the invention stage. The first part of the hypothesis 2 
proposes that organizational specificity of complementary assets will be positively 
associated with pure internal use. The results fully support this argument (β = 0.12, p 
< 0.01). Although such organization-specific complementary assets are highly 
relevant  for pure internal use, they are absolutely unimportant for pure licensing 
and mixed use. This finding suggests that these types of organization-specific 
complementary assets are valuable and useful only if the patented invention is 
exploited internally. Asset specificity then hampers the generation of value from the 
use of the invention outside the inventor’s organization. 
Model 4 includes the variable technological competition. The estimation results 
support only positive relationship between the technological competition and pure 
licensing proposed in hypothesis 3a (β = 0.15, p < 0.05). This finding is in line with 
the technology licensing literature and previous empirical findings. The competition 
in the markets for technology facilitates the technology licensing. 
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TABLE 3.7 Hierarchical multivariate probit regression analyses 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Pure internal use       
Controls       
Size medium       0.29***        0.21***        0.21***        0.21***        0.22***        0.21***  
Size large       0.12***        0.02           0.07          0.07           0.07           0.07     
Patent stock total (log)      -0.05***       -0.06***       -0.05***       -0.05***       -0.05***       -0.05***  
Patent protection       0.51***        0.46***        0.41***        0.41***        0.41***        0.41***  
Scientific nature      -0.26***       -0.25***       -0.26***       -0.26***       -0.26***       -0.26***  
Japan      -0.01           0.15***        0.19***        0.21***        0.21***        0.21***  
US       0.03           0.00          -0.01          -0.01          -0.02          -0.01     
Economic value Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macro technological class Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Explanatory variables       
Technical complementary assets                     -0.08**        -0.08**        -0.09**        -0.09**        -0.09**   
Economic complementary assets                      0.51***        0.50***        0.50***        0.50***        0.49***  
Complementary assets both                      0.55***        0.53***        0.53***        0.53***        0.53***  
Organization-specific compl. assets                                     0.12***        0.12***        0.12***        0.12***  
Technological competition                                                   -0.04          -0.04          -0.04     
Technological distance (log)          -0.00          -0.00     
Technological generality (log)                         -0.01*    
       
Pure licensing       
Controls       
Size medium      -0.25***       -0.21**        -0.21**        -0.22**        -0.24**        -0.24**   
Size large      -0.21**        -0.16          -0.14          -0.14          -0.16          -0.16     
Patent stock total (log)      -0.03**        -0.03**        -0.03**        -0.03**        -0.04***       -0.04***  
Patent protection      -0.61***       -0.56***       -0.59***       -0.59***       -0.59***       -0.59***  
Scientific nature       0.17***         0.16***         0.15***         0.14**         0.14**         0.14**   
Japan      -0.14          -0.20**        -0.19**         -0.25***       -0.26***       -0.26***  
US       0.10          0.12*          0.12*          0.13*          0.13*          0.13*    
Economic value Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macro technological class Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Explanatory variables       
Technical complementary assets                      0.11           0.11           0.12          0.12           0.12     
Economic complementary assets                     -0.22**        -0.23**        -0.23**        -0.24**        -0.23**   
Complementary assets both                     -0.26***       -0.28***       -0.27***       -0.27***       -0.27***  
Organization-specific compl. assets                                     0.03           0.03           0.03           0.03     
Technological competition                                                    0.15**         0.15**         0.15**   
Technological distance (log)           0.03           0.03     
Technological generality (log)                          0.02     
       
Mixed use       
Controls       
Size medium      -0.43***       -0.44***       -0.44***       -0.44***       -0.47***       -0.47***  
Size large      -0.42***       -0.43***       -0.43***       -0.43***       -0.46***       -0.46***  
Patent stock total (log)      -0.03***       -0.03***       -0.04***       -0.04***       -0.05***       -0.05***  
Patent protection      -0.24**         -0.28**         -0.27**         -0.28**         -0.29**         -0.28**    
Scientific nature       0.03           0.04           0.04           0.03          0.03           0.02     
Japan      -0.08          -0.07          -0.07          -0.10          -0.11*          -0.12*    
US       0.22***        0.22***        0.22***        0.21***        0.21***        0.18***  
Economic value Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macro technological class Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Explanatory variables       
Technical complementary assets                      0.02           0.02           0.02           0.02           0.02     
Economic complementary assets                      0.17***        0.17***        0.17**        0.16**        0.17**  
Complementary assets both                      0.02           0.02           0.02           0.02           0.02     
Organization-specific compl. assets                                    -0.01          -0.02          -0.02          -0.02     
Technological competition                                                    0.07           0.07           0.07     
Technological distance (log)           0.05***        0.05** 
Technological generality (log)                          0.02   
       
N   14,006   14,006   14,006   14,006   14,006   14,006  
Ll -12,078.47 -11,743.76 -11,676.75 -11,665.07 -11,660.48 -11,654.09 
Chi2   1,435.67 2,093.26 2,167.24 2,196.32 2,203.33 2,227.70 
Note: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
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TABLE 3.8 Split-sample multivariate probit regression analyses 
Variable Pure internal use (Model 6)  Pure licensing (Model 6)  Mixed use (Model 6) 
 Both assets Partial or no 
assets 
Full sample  Both assets Partial or no 
assets 
Full sample  Both assets Partial or no 
assets 
Full sample 
            
Controls            
Size medium       0.25***        0.20***        0.29***        -0.30*         -0.20*         -0.27***        -0.45***       -0.48***       -0.47***  
Size large       0.10           0.08           0.17***        -0.14          -0.18          -0.21**         -0.44***       -0.45***       -0.44***  
Patent stock total      -0.06***       -0.04***       -0.04***        -0.05*         -0.03*         -0.04***        -0.03          -0.08***       -0.05***  
Patent protection       0.29***        0.56***        0.45***        -0.63**        -0.53**        -0.57***        -0.09          -0.17          -0.19     
Scientific nature      -0.29***       -0.23***       -0.27***         0.22**         0.13*          0.13**          0.10           0.00           0.01     
Japan       0.09*          0.21***        0.09***        -0.04          -0.33***       -0.20**         -0.19          -0.08          -0.12*    
US       0.02          -0.04           0.02            0.05           0.17**         0.11            0.16**         0.20***        0.18***  
Economic value Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Macro technological class Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
            
Explanatory variables            
Organization-specific assets       0.11***        0.14***        0.14***         0.05           0.01           0.01           -0.03          -0.01          -0.02     
Technological competition      -0.06          -0.03          -0.04           -0.19           0.27***        0.14**          0.02           0.08           0.06     
Technological distance       0.01          -0.01          -0.00            0.09*          0.02           0.03            0.04           0.07***        0.05***  
Technological generality      -0.02          -0.01          -0.01*           0.06*          0.01           0.02            0.05***       -0.00           0.02     
            
N       6,345           7,661          14,006            6,345           7,661          14,006            6,345           7,661          14,006     
Ll   -5,133.41       -6,574.62      -11,949.61        -5,133.41       -6,574.62      -11,949.61        -5,133.41       -6,574.62      -11,949.61     
Chi2     853.72         994.96        1,602.93          853.72         994.96        1,602.93          853.72         994.96        1,602.93     
Note: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01  
 
89 
 
Model 5 adds the variable technological distance. Hypothesis 4a states that a 
higher distance from the firm’s core technological domain (i.e., the technological area 
where a large share of patents is taken) will be negatively associated with pure 
commercial use and positively associated with pure licensing and mixed use. While 
the relationships for pure internal use and pure licensing have the expected sign, 
they are not statistically significant. However, we find support for the part of the 
hypothesis about a positive relationship with mixed use (β = 0.05, p < 0.01). This 
means that firms tend to combine internal use and licensing only for their non-core 
inventions, for which they do not posses profound knowledge and competence. 
Finally, Model 6 contains the variable technological generality introduced in 
hypothesis 5. Although all coefficients have the expected sign, the results are 
statistically significant only for pure internal use (β = -0.01, p < 0.1). Therefore, the 
findings based on the pooled sample do not support our hypothesis. However, we 
will further investigate the role of technological generality in the next section 
devoted to the moderation effect of complementary assets. 
 
3.4.3. Moderation effect of complementary assets 
To see the moderating role of complementary assets we conduct additional 
multivariate probit regressions (Model 6) by splitting the sample into two 
subsamples according to the presence or absence of complementary assets for both 
technical and economic success of the invention (Table 3.8). 
Hypothesis 3b proposes that the absence of complementary assets for both 
technical and economic success will strengthen the positive association between the 
level of technological competition and pure licensing. The data fully support the 
hypotheses 3b, as the coefficient of competition in the pure licensing equation 
increases considerably, from β = 0.14, p < 0.05 in the full sample to β = 0.27, p < 0.01 
in the subsample without complementary assets. When both types of complementary 
assets are present, the relationship between technological competition and pure 
licensing becomes statistically insignificant. This difference between two subsamples 
is striking. While firms with complementary assets are indifferent to technological 
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competition in their pure licensing decision, firms without complementary assets are 
highly sensitive and more likely to purely license out their inventions if there is a 
technological competition in the market. 
Hypothesis 4b states that the positive association between the technological 
distance and pure licensing (mixed use) will be stronger if the firm does not possess 
complementary assets for both technical and economic success of the invention. Our 
findings support this hypothesis for mixed use. Technological distance does not have 
any significant effect on mixed use when complementary assets are present, while 
the effect remains positive and highly significant when the firm lacks complementary 
assets (β =0.07, p < 0.01). The finding suggests that when firms do not possess entire 
set of complementary assets they may choose to combine internal use and licensing 
only for their non-core inventions and not for core inventions. The possible 
interpretation is that for their core inventions firms are concerned that the licensee 
with better complementary asset position can cannibalize their current or future 
product market. For non-core inventions, on the other hand, it is less important issue 
and firms without necessary complementary assets can license out their inventions, 
in addition to internal use, to get access to licensee’s complementary assets. 
Finally, we consider the moderation effect of the presence of both 
complementary assets on the relationship between the technological generality and 
the economic use of patented inventions. Our findings show that there is a significant 
positive moderation effect of the presence of complementary assets on the 
relationship between the generality and the likelihood of mixed use (β = 0.05, p < 
0.01). This suggests that only vertically integrated firms with complementary assets 
can appropriate the benefits of a general-purpose invention by sharing their 
technology with other parties while they use it internally. Our findings also show 
that vertically integrated firms with complementary assets are more likely to purely 
license out their general-purpose inventions compared with firms without 
complementary assets (β = 0.09, p < 0.1). This finding apparently contradicts the idea 
that general purpose technologies favor vertical disintegration and the growth of 
technology specialists. But it also shows that vertically integrated firms participate in 
the markets for technology by sharing their general-purpose inventions with others. 
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3.5. DISCUSSION 
3.5.1. Implications of the study 
This section summarizes and discusses the main findings of our study and their 
implications for research, management, and policy. 
First of all, the descriptive statistics presented in the study provides an 
overview of the alternative economic uses of patented inventions that by itself may 
have valuable implications. Our data reveals that only about a half of patented 
inventions are used internally for commercial purposes by their owners. The 
proportions of purely licensed and mixed used patents represent about 1.5% and 
4.0%, respectively. This suggests that, in general, the share of inventions transacted in 
the markets for technology is not large. However, most importantly, our data reveals 
that even licensed patents are often exploited internally; and this mixed use is 
actually 2.7 times more frequent than pure licensing. Considering the fact that there 
are numerous studies on licensing in the markets for technology literature, it is 
striking that such relevant issue as the combination of licensing and internal use has 
received a very scant attention in the literature. Therefore, an important purpose of 
this study is to highlight the importance of mixed use of patented inventions and 
investigate its determinants. Finally, we find that a large share of patents are neither 
used internally nor licensed out to others. However, the study of unused patents is 
beyond the scope of this study and represents a fertile area for future research in 
itself. 
In the study, we provide a number of descriptive statistics on the alternative 
economic uses of patented inventions by region of the patent owner, firm size, macro 
technological class, and economic value of the patented invention. We find that there 
are notable differences and regularities across these technology, firm, and industry 
characteristics. Therefore, we include all these variables to our empirical estimations 
as controls in order to further investigate them.  
With regard to noteworthy findings associated with control variables, we find 
some evidence for an inverse U-shaped relationship between the firm size and pure 
internal use, i.e. medium size firms are more likely than small and large counterparts 
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to internally use their patented inventions. In the case of pure licensing, on the 
contrary, we find some evidence on a U-shaped relationship with the firm size. The 
research implication of this finding is that the relationship between firm size and 
economic use of patented inventions is likely to be non-linear with medium sized 
firms different from their small and large counterparts. However, to better examine 
the non-linear relationship it is necessary to obtain a continuous measure of firm size.  
We also find that firms with large patent portfolio are less likely to use 
internally or license their inventions. This finding has two main interpretations and, 
therefore, two different implications for public policy and business practice. The first 
interpretation is that larger patent portfolios are less effectively managed and, 
therefore, many inventions remain unused. Moreover, R&D intensive firms with 
large patent portfolios are unable to overstretch their limited resources to 
commercially exploit all their inventions. Here, the managerial implication is that 
firms with large patent portfolios need to implement processes to constantly monitor 
and manage their patent portfolios to identify patents that can be offered for 
licensing or sale in order to derive additional value from their inventions. The second 
interpretation is that owners of large patent portfolios often stack up a number of 
patents for purely strategic reasons (e.g., patent blocking, litigation or cross-
licensing). This interpretation suggests for strategic anticompetitive role of unused 
patents and, therefore, may have some valuable policy implications. 
Next, the effectiveness of patent protection has a significant positive effect on 
pure internal use. However, in contrast with the licensing literature we find that the 
effectiveness of patent protection is negatively associated with pure licensing and 
mixed use. This finding suggests that more effective patent protection actually 
facilitates the internal use of patented inventions but not their transfer to other 
parties through licensing. The results support the argument that the effective patent 
protection increases the opportunity cost of licensing by enhancing the payoff from 
exclusive internal commercialization of patented inventions. Therefore, our findings 
contribute to an ongoing discussion whether the patent system promotes or hampers 
technological development and diffusion of technologies. 
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Consistent with the literature, we also find that highly science-based inventions 
are less likely to be used internally and more likely to be purely licensed out. This 
finding supports the idea that inventions that significantly rely on scientific literature 
are practically less relevant and often do not find an in-house application. However, 
such inventions are more likely to find external application outside firm boundaries. 
Moreover, codified nature of scientific knowledge makes the transfer of technology 
from licensor to licensee more convenient and less costly. If this interpretation is 
correct, then the managerial implication of this finding is that in order to successfully 
license out an invention there is a need to invest additional time and resources to 
codify technological knowledge about the invention to facilitate its transfer to 
potential licensees. 
We also observe some difference in the economic use of patented inventions in 
various regions. In particular, compared to European and US counterparts, Japanese 
firms are more likely to internally use their patented inventions. With regard to pure 
licensing, US firms are more likely, and Japanese firms are less likely compared to 
European firms to purely license their inventions. Finally, US firms are more likely to 
combine internal use and licensing. As discussed earlier, these differences may stem 
either from organizational cultures or the efficiency of technology markets in these 
regions. In terms of research implication, this evidence calls for further research that 
investigates the reasons for differences across countries and regions in their 
propensity to use and license their technologies. 
Although the importance of complementary assets for technology 
commercialization is not a novel idea, past empirical research has not fully 
appreciated the multidimensional nature of complementary assets. To address this 
problem, our study distinguishes between complementary assets necessary for 
technical and for economic success of an invention and emphasizes the role of 
organization-specific complementary assets developed during the invention process. 
Our results show that these various types of complementary assets are differently 
associated with the economic exploitation of patented inventions.  
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In particular, we find that firms that have only technical complementary assets 
(e.g. R&D capabilities) are unlikely to vertically integrate and acquire requisite 
downstream assets in order to commercialize their inventions in-house. On the 
contrary, firms that have only economic complementary assets (e.g. manufacturing 
and marketing assets) are more likely to adopt pure internal use and mixed use 
strategies and less likely to purely license out their inventions. Moreover, firms that 
possess both types of complementary assets are extremely likely to internally use 
their inventions and avoid purely licensing. In addition, we empirically test the role 
of organization-specific complementary assets that highly rely on the tacit 
knowledge developed within the organization during the invention process. As 
shown in our results, these types of complementary assets are only relevant for pure 
internal use of the invention and absolutely irrelevant for other uses. Summarizing 
all above-mentioned, an important contribution of this study is that it reveals that 
firms possess different types of complementary assets, which have different impacts 
on the economic use of patented inventions. 
Next, our study provides additional support to the argument that technological 
competition is positively associated with technology licensing. Our novel 
contribution here is that we identify a moderating role of complementary assets on 
the effect of technological competition on pure licensing. We find that technological 
competition facilitates technology licensing only if the patent owner does not possess 
in-house necessary complementary assets. In other words, only firms without 
downstream complementary resources are sensitive to technological competition in 
their licensing decision. Our interpretation of this finding is that firms without 
downstream complementary assets can primarily profit from their inventions by 
licensing them to other firms that already possess these assets. Moreover, the lack of 
complementary assets may stem from a strategic choice to become an upstream 
technology specialist and rely on a business model based on technology licensing 
strategy. Therefore, technological competition may induce these firms to license more 
aggressively. On the contrary, firms that own requisite complementary assets have a 
wider array of options including pure internal use, pure licensing, and mixed use. 
Moreover, these firms may have a higher real option value for their inventions and 
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may prefer to wait in order to decide whether to pursue internal commercialization 
option in the future. Thus, these firms can be less subject to the inducement effect to 
license out their inventions caused by intense technological competition. 
Consistent with our hypothesis and the rent dissipation effect suggested in the 
literature, we find that mixed use of patented inventions is more likely for 
technologically distant inventions that do not fall in the area of firm’s core activity 
and competence. While for core technologies combining internal use and licensing is 
associated with the rent dissipation effect and risk of licensor’s product market 
cannibalization by the licensee, for non-core technologies this problem is relatively 
less severe. Our additional contribution is that we find strong moderation effect of 
complementary assets on the relationship between technological distance and mixed 
use. More precisely, in our regressions technological distance is statistically 
significant only when the patent owner does not own all necessary complementary 
assets. We interpret this finding that for technologically distant inventions licensing, 
in addition to internal use, is a way for the patent owner to access licensee’s 
complementary assets and capabilities, which are necessary to successfully 
commercialize the invention.  
 Finally, our last key explanatory variable is technological generality. In line 
with our hypothesis, we find some empirical support to the argument that the level 
of technological generality of the invention is negatively associated with pure 
internal use, but positively associated with pure licensing and mixed use. Our 
findings also reveal that there is a significant positive moderation effect of the 
presence of both complementary on the relationship between the generality and the 
likelihood of mixed use. This suggests that only vertically integrated firms with 
complementary assets can appropriate the benefits of a general-purpose invention by 
sharing their technology with other parties while using it internally. Our findings 
also show that vertically integrated firms with complementary assets are more likely 
to purely license out their general-purpose inventions compared with firms without 
complementary assets. 
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Summarizing the discussion above, we conclude that by investigating the 
determinants of economic uses of patented inventions this study contributes to the 
innovation and technology management literature and provides multiple 
implications for research, management and policy. 
 
3.5.2. Robustness checks 
To find out whether our main results are robust and stable, we run several 
robustness checks. For reasons of space, we briefly report the results and do not 
include tables in the paper. The robustness check tables are available from the 
author. 
First, as a robustness check, we have tried other measures of the effectiveness of 
patent protection such as appropriability index developed by B. Hall (University of 
California at Berkeley), G. Thoma (University of Camerino) and S. Torrisi (University 
of Bologna). Our main findings remain similar and do not change due to the use of 
alternative control for the effectiveness of patent protection. Moreover, although 
significance levels are lower, we still find a negative relationship between the 
effectiveness of patent protection and the likelihood of pure licensing and mixed use. 
This provides another support to our earlier argument that strong appropriability 
regime may actually hamper technology transfer and diffusion. 
Second, we have tried alternative set of dependent variables. Instead of using 
pure licensing as a dependent variable in the second equation of the multivariate 
probit regression, we generated variable pure external use that took value 1 if patented 
invention was only licensed or sold to other parties not affiliated with initial patent 
owner. The use of this dependent variable in the second equation does not change 
our findings for other two equations. However, we find some differences between 
pure licensing and pure external use in the effect of some key explanatory variables. 
In particular, the technological competition that is an important factor affecting pure 
licensing, but it does not appear to be a significant factor when we use pure external 
use as a dependent variable. These results suggest that, although pure patent 
licensing and patent sale have many common determinants, there are still some 
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differences that need to be studied in more detail. Therefore, our next study will 
address and focus on the issue of patent sale.  
 
3.5.3. Limitations 
This study is subject to several limitations. First, the study focuses only on the 
supply side of technology markets. However, as it has been emphasized in the 
literature, it is important to look at both supply and demand sides of the market 
because the likelihood of the transaction is affected by the behavior and 
characteristics of parties from both sides. Unfortunately, for the dataset of this size it 
is not feasible to match the corresponding information about the demand side. 
Furthermore, lack of information about the demand side does not permit to analyze 
the characteristics of technology licensees such as their size, market share and 
competitive position vis-à-vis technology supplier.  
Second, cross-sectional nature of the data precludes the adaptation of 
longitudinal perspective and poses certain limitations on the range of applicable 
econometric methods and estimations. Moreover, cross-sectional data do not allow to 
fully account for firm-specific unobserved heterogeneity. Thus, obtaining a panel 
dataset with a longitudinal dimension remains the objective of future research. All 
these limitations notwithstanding, we believe that this study will contribute to a 
better understanding of the economic use of patented inventions. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE SALE OF PATENT RIGHTS:  
A STUDY OF EUROPEAN PATENTS 
 
ABSTRACT 
The paper studies the sale of patent ownership rights for European patents 
using a unique large scale inventor survey data. Existing literature on the markets for 
technology has primarily focused on patent licensing and largely overlooked an 
aspect of patent sale. Recently, few scholars attempted to fill up this gap by 
developing theories that could explain factors affecting patent sale. The current 
paper aims at contributing to this novel stream of research. We provide theoretical 
reasoning and empirical tests for a number of patent, firm, and industry level factors 
that may affect the likelihood that a patent is sold in the markets for technology. We 
believe that empirical findings provided in this study will enhance our knowledge 
about patent sale and foster future research in this field. 
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4.1. INTRODUCTION 
Within the markets for technology framework there is a substantial empirical 
work on patent licensing (Arora & Ceccagnoli, 2006; Fosfuri, 2006; Gambardella & 
Giarratana, 2006; Gambardella et al., 2007; Kim, 2004; Kim, 2005; Kim & Vonortas, 
2006; Motohashi, 2008). However, remarkably few studies have empirically analyzed 
patent sales, i.e. patent ownership transfer or assignment from one party to another. 
For instance, Serrano (2006, 2010) has studied the transfer and renewal of patent 
rights by firms and Galasso, Schankerman, & Serrano (2011) have studied patent 
sales by individual inventors. These recent papers on patent sales open up a new 
stream of research in the field of technology management that may potentially 
receive more scholarly attention in the future. This paper aims to contribute to this 
novel research agenda on patent sale. The objective of this paper is to determine 
what factors may affect the likelihood that a patent is sold. Given this objective, the 
study seeks to address the following research questions: What factors determine the 
likelihood that a patented invention is sold? What are the characteristics of patent sellers in 
the markets for patents? 
Although still in their infancy, patent sale is becoming an increasingly 
important component of the markets for technology. Many large corporations, like 
AT&T and Hewlett Packard, implement processes to constantly monitor and manage 
their patent portfolios. As a result of these processes, they identify patents that can be 
offered for sale in order to derive additional value from their innovations (AT&T, 
2013). As described by HP’s vice-president, motivations for active patent sales 
practice include the desire to generate revenue for the company, reduce maintenance 
fees and other costs associated with holding patents in the firm’s portfolio (Chapman 
& Shah, 2012). According to HP’s Intellectual Property website, out of about 37,000 
patents in its portfolio, currently more than 4,000 patents are available for license or 
sale (Hewlett Packard, 2013). Another empirical evidence suggesting for the 
importance of patent sale is provided by Serrano (2010). Using a pooling of all US 
patents granted from 1983 to 2001, he shows that 13.5% of all granted patents were 
sold at least once over their lifetime. Given this evidence, it becomes increasingly 
difficult to ignore the relevance of patent sale for the markets for technology. 
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For the purpose of this study, it is important from the beginning to define what 
we consider patent sale and how it differs from patent licensing. Patent sale 
represents a transfer of ownership rights for an invention from one party to another 
and needs to be registered in the form of assignment in a patent register. In order for 
an assignment to occur, the transfer to another legal entity must include the entirety 
of the bundle of rights associated with the patent ownership, i.e., all of the bundle of 
rights inherent in the right, title and interest in the patent or patent application 
(Serrano, 2010). In the case the bundle of rights transferred is less than the entire 
ownership interest such transaction is defined as patent license, which is a 
contractual agreement that the patent owner will not sue the licensee for patent 
infringement if the licensee makes, uses, offers for sale, sells, or imports the claimed 
invention, as long as the licensee fulfills its obligations and operates within the limits 
delineated by the license agreement (USPTO, 2012). Even if the license is an exclusive 
license that excludes licensor from using a patent it is not considered a patent sale. 
Therefore, in our study we clearly differentiate between patent sale and patent 
licensing and investigate the first phenomenon. For the sake of simplicity, 
throughout the paper the terms “sale”, “transfer”, and “assignment” of patent rights 
will be used interchangeably. 
The data to empirically test our hypotheses come from a large scale inventor 
survey developed and conducted within the InnoS&T project (Gambardella et al., 
2012). The PatVal II survey collects cross-sectional data on a number of issues related 
to the invention process, its determinants, the value of the invention, and its 
economic use. The dataset has been constructed by combining initial invention level 
survey data with additional firm and industry level information from public and 
commercial databases. 
Our empirical findings suggest that the effectiveness of patent protection, the 
presence of complementary assets, and the technological fit are negatively associated 
with the likelihood of patent sale; whereas the scientific nature of the invention (i.e. 
substantial reliance on scientific publications) is positively associated with the 
likelihood of patent sale. We also find that, compared to European firms, US firms 
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are more likely to sell their inventions, whereas Japanese firms are less likely to do 
that. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews 
the literature relevant for understanding and analyzing patent sale. The third section 
describes the dataset, variables and econometric methods used in the analysis. The 
fourth section reports descriptive statistics and econometric analysis results. Finally, 
the last section discusses and concludes the paper. 
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4.2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
4.2.1. Theoretical background 
The main objective of this section is to review theories that can help to 
understand determinants of patent sale. As noted earlier, theoretical and empirical 
literature addressing directly the issue of patent sale is very scarce and recent. 
Therefore, we draw on some insights relevant for studying patent sale borrowed 
from a substantial literature on patent licensing. Although patent sale and licensing 
are different, they both are part of the markets for technology and represent 
alternative means of externally using and profiting from internally developed 
inventions. Therefore, in some (though not all) cases the arguments used for 
technology licensing can be applied to patent sale. In other cases, however, certain 
factors relevant for patent licensing may have an opposite or no effect on patent sale 
decision. Since empirical studies on patent sale are limited, it is sometimes difficult to 
say upfront which theoretical arguments on patent licensing can be successfully 
extended to patent sale and which do not apply. Perhaps our further empirical 
analysis will contribute to filling this gap in the technology management literature. 
The managerial and technological literature have long been interested in the 
role of the patent system in lowering transaction costs associated with technology 
transfer. The transaction costs theory (Williamson, 1979)  suggests that market 
transactions depend on the related level of uncertainty and opportunism. The 
research on contracts and transaction costs has studied the effects of moral hazard 
and asymmetric information on transfer of technologies through arm’s-length 
contracts (Caves, 1996; Hart, 1995; Teece, 1992). Teece (1988) emphasizes four main 
sources of transaction costs in technology transfer: (a) incomplete contracts due to 
substantial uncertainty leave both parties open to opportunistic behavior of the 
partner; (b) the production of technology is a cumulative process based on tacit 
knowledge, which is organizationally embedded and difficult to transfer; (c) 
transaction-specific investments from both sides create so-called “lock-in” problem 
associated with high switching costs; and (d) technology transfer can involve 
disclosure of innovator’s sources of competitive advantage. Other transaction costs of 
103 
 
technology transfer can be associated with gathering information and search for 
potential buyers (Fosfuri, 2006). The transaction cost theory suggests that market-
based technology transfer mechanisms can be attractive when the associated 
transaction costs of using them are relatively low (Teece, 1988a). 
The value of a patent to any given firm depends on the extent to which the 
patented invention can be used to generate economic profits. The resource based 
theory highlights the role of unique combinations of resources in maximizing the 
value creation (Barney, 1991; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Wernerfelt, 1984). Starting with a 
seminal paper by Teece (1986), a significant body of theoretical literature has 
considered the role of complementary assets in appropriating returns from 
commercializing innovations. Complementary assets are defined as resources 
necessary to produce and commercialize a technology, such as manufacturing, 
marketing, and other assets (Teece, 1986). Since firms are endowed with different 
levels of complementary assets, patented inventions are best used by those who 
already posses necessary bundle of complementary assets or can relatively easy 
access them (Arora & Ceccagnoli, 2006; Mitchell, 1989; Rothaermel, 2001; Tripsas, 
1997). 
The real option theory is also useful to understand factors affecting technology 
transfer. The theory suggests that, under uncertainty, an option to preserve the right 
to make investment choices in the future is valuable to a firm (McDonald & Siegel, 
1986; McGrath & Nerkar, 2004). With respect to inventions, the patent ownership 
gives the right, but not the obligation, for a firm to use an invention in-house, license 
or sell it out to others at any time in the future. The sale of patent rights, however, 
requires giving up the real option, which means that if the patented invention later 
appears to be a blockbuster the original patent owner will be excluded from future 
revenues generated by the invention. Therefore, the theory suggests that under 
conditions of uncertainty patent owners may prefer to leave their inventions unused 
rather than selling them out in the markets for technology. 
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4.2.2. Hypotheses 
Further in this section we will consider various possible patent, firm, and 
industry level determinants of patent sale and develop hypotheses about their 
relationship to the likelihood that a patent is sold. 
Appropriability regime/effectiveness of patent protection. Teece (1986) defines an 
appropriability regime as the efficacy of the legal system to assign and protect 
intellectual property. The appropriability regime can vary across different industries 
and geographical regions. The main social function of the patent system is to increase 
incentives for innovations by giving a temporal monopoly power to inventors and 
patent owners. By defining property rights for technology or knowledge, patents 
should provide a way for technology owners to disclose information while 
preventing its unauthorized use, which should also reduce the challenges of 
assessing the value of innovation highlighted by Arrow (1962). However, the 
evidence suggests that patents do not work in practice as they do in theory (Levin et 
al., 1987). Although patents afford considerable protection for the invention in some 
industries, in others they do not confer perfect appropriability and can be “invented 
around” at modest costs (Teece, 1986). 
With respect to the effect of appropriability regime on patent sale, on the one 
hand, more effective patent protection should induce patent sale. First, as suggested 
in the literature better patent protection should reduce the transaction costs of patent 
sale by lowering the risk of opportunism on the demand side. The effective patent 
protection provides a way for patent owners to disclose information while 
preventing it unauthorized use and “free-riding” by others (Levin, 1986). Second, the 
effective patent protection increases the value of patent ownership rights. An 
invention that has an effective patent protection is more attractive to a potential 
buyer. Moreover, under a real threat of litigation a potential infringer may prefer to 
buy and pay for the well protected patent rather than trying to “invent around”.  
On the other hand, the tight appropriability regime may enhance an 
opportunity cost of patent sale by increasing the attractiveness of alternative 
methods of commercializing the patent, such as internal commercial use or licensing. 
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The effective patent protection enhances the payoff from exclusive commercialization 
of invention and secures larger market for products encompassing the patented 
invention (Arora & Ceccagnoli, 2006; Gans et al., 2002). Moreover, a long list of 
studies on licensing suggest that the tight appropriability regime favors technology 
licensing (Arora & Ceccagnoli, 2006; Arora et al., 2001b; Gambardella et al., 2007; 
Kim, 2005; Palomeras, 2007). 
According to the real option theory, an option to preserve the right to make 
investment choices in the future is valuable when an uncertainty characterizes the 
environment (McDonald & Siegel, 1986; McGrath & Nerkar, 2004). The literature 
suggests that uncertainty about technical success and commercial applicability of an 
invention is a constituent part of the markets for technology (Arora & Gambardella, 
2010). Under uncertainty, the effective patent protection facilitates an ability to 
exercise this real option by preventing imitation and giving sufficient time to a patent 
owner to decide what to do with its invention. The ineffective patent protection, on 
the contrary, makes the real option less effective and requires more immediate 
decisions whether to use an invention in-house or transfer it to other parties that 
have access to necessary resources and can use the invention immediately. Since the 
sale of patent ownership rights means giving up the real option, we argue that it is 
more likely to occur with patents that do not have the effective patent protection and, 
therefore, have the lower real option value. 
Finally, anecdotal evidence suggests that firms are reluctant to sell out well 
protected patents because these patents may be later turned against them. For 
instance, as noted by HP’s vice president, companies are concerned about a risk that 
patents they sell can be used against them in an offensive way by competitors or non-
practicing entities (NPE) (Chapman & Shah, 2012). 
As it apparent form the discussion above, arguments for a positive association 
between the effectiveness of patent protection and patent sale are related to demand 
side incentives and convenience of technology transfer process, whereas arguments 
for a negative association are related to supply side incentives. Since in order for a 
patent sale to occur it is first necessary that patent owner offers a patent for sale, we 
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argue that supply side incentives should have some precedence. Put differently, if a 
patent owner is unwilling to sell its well protected invention the patent sale will not 
occur despite potential buyer’s willingness to acquire the patent. Given the 
arguments above, we formulate our first testable hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, there will be a negative association between the 
effectiveness of patent protection and the likelihood that a patent is sold. 
Complementary assets. As noted earlier, starting with the paper by Teece (1986), a 
significant body of theoretical literature has considered the role of complementary 
assets for the economic use and transfer of technologies. When a patent owner does 
not have complementary assets necessary to commercialize an invention, the transfer 
of the patent through market-based arrangements to other parties that already 
possess these complementary assets or that can create them at relatively lower costs 
is a rational strategy. In principle, the patent owner without complementary assets 
could acquire these assets in strategic factor markets (Barney, 1986). However, often 
critical complementary assets necessary to develop a particular invention are not 
easily purchasable in the strategic factor markets, and need to be accumulated over 
time within the firm (Dierickx & Cool, 1989). Teece (1986, p. 303) argues that the firm 
that lacks necessary complementary assets and unable to easily access them is “left 
with the option of selling its intangible assets in the market for know how”, which is 
better than no remuneration at all.  
The lack of complementary assets can also be a result of strategic choice not to 
become a downstream producer and focus on upstream technology creation 
(Gambardella et al., 2007). Such upstream technology specialization implies a 
business model that is largely based on technology licensing and sale (Teece, 2010).  
Therefore, the effect of the presence of complementary assets on patent sale is 
relatively straightforward: 
Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus, there will be a negative association between the presence 
of complementary assets and the likelihood that a patent is sold. 
Technological fit. Next, we introduce to our discussion a notion of technological 
fit defined by Palomeras (2007) as a degree to which a given invention falls within an 
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area firm’s core activity and technological competence. This construct is usually 
operationalized using so called “focus index” suggested by Ziedonis (2007) that 
measures the weight of a technological class of the patented invention in the firm’s 
overall patent portfolio. Relatively higher patenting activity by the firm in a certain 
technological class indicates that a substantial part of firm’s innovative activity has 
occurred in that area (Ziedonis, 2007). Therefore, inventions that have high 
technological fit with the firm’s patent portfolio are characterized as core 
technologies. 
As it was emphasized by Prahalad & Hamel (1990), firms should invest in and 
protect their core technologies, which are key to their sustainable competitive 
advantage. Rivette & Kline (2000) suggest that while core technologies that provide 
competitive advantages should be rigorously protected, non-core technologies can be 
actively traded for revenue. The sale of non-core patents that have no direct use in 
current or planned products can also help to reduce the amount of patent portfolio 
maintenance costs (Rivette & Kline, 2000b).  
The real option theory suggests another argument for not selling patents that fit 
with the firm’s core technological activity. By selling a patent, firm gives up its 
waiting-to-invest option (McDonald & Siegel, 1986). Therefore, even if a firm is 
uncertain about the value of its invention or unable to exploit invention immediately, 
for core technologies firm is more likely to retain the real option by keeping 
ownership rights on the invention and use alternative ways to explore the value of 
technology, for instance, by licensing out the invention. Moreover, unlike patent 
licensing that permits a licensor to pose restrictions in terms of time, geographical 
area, or field of use to avoid direct competition with a licensee, patent sale does not 
provide means to refrain a patent buyer from competing with a patent seller in its 
core business sector.  
As it follows from the discussion, core inventions should have higher value and 
importance for a patent owner. Therefore, we posit the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Ceteris paribus, there will be a negative association between the 
technological fit and the likelihood that a patent is sold. 
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Scientific nature of the invention. An important factor that affects the transfer of 
knowledge about an invention is the level of its tacitness and codifiability (Nelson & 
Winter, 1982; Polanyi, 1966). Technological knowledge, as any other forms of 
knowledge, has both codifiable and tacit components. While the codified knowledge 
about an invention is relatively easy to transfer through patent documents, 
blueprints, and other documents, the tacit knowledge is more difficult to 
communicate and costly to transfer to other parties (Arora et al., 2001b; Arora & 
Gambardella, 1994a). As Polanyi (1966, p. 136) puts it in his seminal work, “we can 
know more than we can tell”. Teece (1988b) also points out that the production of 
technology is a cumulative process based on tacit knowledge, which is 
organizationally embedded and difficult to transfer across firm boundaries. 
Generally, science-based inventions that significantly rely on scientific publications 
are more likely to be codified and not tacit (Arora & Ceccagnoli, 2006; Arora & 
Gambardella, 1994a; Winter, 1987). Therefore, the scientific nature of the invention 
should make it easier to transfer technological knowledge from one firm to another 
and make patent sale a more convenient alternative. 
Another reason for a positive association between the scientific nature of the 
invention and the likelihood that a patented invention is sold is based on the 
argument that science-based inventions are in general more likely to be offered for 
sale because they are less practically relevant or too far from the market. Studies on 
patents by universities and public research organizations suggest that inventions that 
significantly rely on scientific literature often lack practical relevance (Arundel et al., 
2012). Therefore, science-based inventions are more likely to be offered for sale by 
their owners. If this argument is true, then patents that are actually sold in the 
markets for technology are more likely to be scientific because they were picked from 
a subset of more scientific patents preselected for sale. In any case, both sets of 
arguments suggest the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: Ceteris paribus, there will be a positive association between the scientific 
nature of the invention (i.e. the reliance on scientific publications) and the likelihood that a 
patent is sold. 
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4.3. DATA AND METHODS 
4.3.1. Data 
The data for our analysis come mainly from a large scale PatVal II inventor 
survey developed and conducted within the InnoS&T project (Gambardella et al., 
2012). The survey collects cross-sectional data on a number of issues related to the 
invention process, its determinants, the value of the invention, and its economic use. 
The dataset has been constructed by combining initial invention level survey data 
with additional firm and industry level information from Amadeus, EPOSYS, Orbis, 
Osiris, PATSTAT databases. 
The self-administered survey of inventors is global in scope and covers 
patented inventions from 21 European countries, Japan, and US. The sample was 
drawn at the level of patent applications with priority years between 2003 and 2005. 
The final composition of the sample is the following: Europe – 62,148 observations, 
U.S. – 45,861, and Japan – 16,125. After sampling the patents, one inventor listed on 
the patent document was randomly chosen and was sent an invitation letter to 
participate in the survey. The letter asked the inventors to fill out an online 
questionnaire on a website that they can access through an identification number and 
a password, generated for the specific inventor. The number of responses for the 
survey by the inventors in all surveyed countries is equal to 23,044, which 
corresponds to a corrected response rate of 20%. 
In the analysis, we use a part of the survey that contains only patented 
inventions owned by private for-profit firms. The patented inventions that belong to 
individuals and to non-profit organizations are excluded from the further analysis. 
The exclusion is justified by the fact that individuals and non-profit organizations 
have completely different institutional settings and different motivations for the use 
and transfer of their patented inventions. As a result of this restriction, incomplete 
responses about the economic use of patented inventions, and missing data for 
different explanatory and control variables, the final sample comprises 14,151 
observations on 6,206 firms. 
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The PatVal II survey asks respondents whether an ownership right to a patent 
was sold to another party not related to the original owner or applicant. In the 
survey, 809 respondents answered that patent or patent application was sold, and 
823 answered that the patent was not sold but the owner was willing to sell it. A 
preliminary analysis of patents and patent applications, characterized by survey 
respondents as sold patents, has revealed that some of them were not ever actually 
sold. In other words, we did not find any recorded transfer of ownership rights in the 
European Patent Register (EPR) or in the National Patent Registers (NPR) of 
European Patent Convention (EPC) member states (the last applies only if a 
European patent is granted); and the current patent owner is the same as initial 
applicant.  
The discovered discrepancy between survey responses and actual patent sale 
transactions necessitated an additional patent ownership check procedure to verify a 
final list of actually sold patents. Appendix III provides a detailed description of the 
check procedure.  
There are several possible explanations of this discrepancy between responses 
given by survey respondents and patent right transfer records in the patent registers. 
A first set of explanations suggests for a possibility of Type I (“False positive”) error, 
which means that a patent was classified by the survey respondent as sold despite 
the fact that a patent ownership transfer has never actually occurred. A second set of 
explanations suggests for a possibility of Type II (“False negative”) error, which 
means that we could fail to find records of patent sales that have actually occurred. 
Appendix IV provides a detailed analysis and discussion on the likelihood of both 
types of errors. The analysis concludes that, although there is a likelihood of the Type 
II (“False negative”) error and we may underestimate the amount of actual patent 
sales, this likelihood is relatively small and the use of data resulting from our 
additional patent transfer check process seems to represent a more accurate and 
conservative approach. 
Therefore, the final list of observations with confirmed patent transfer records 
includes 496 observations. This is an extended list that includes the following types 
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of transfers: transfers between unaffiliated firms (283), transfers between affiliated 
firms (116), transfers from individual(s) to a firm (57), transfers from a non-business 
organization to a firm (20), transfer between non-business organizations (16), and 
transfers from firms to an individual (4). However, 116 transfers between affiliated 
firms cannot be regarded as external market transactions, and we exclude them from 
our further analysis. At the end, we have 380 observations that can be truly regarded 
as patent sales. In the empirical analysis, for the reasons discussed earlier, we use 
only 283 observations for patent sales between unaffiliated for-profit firms. 
 
4.3.2. Variables and measurement 
Below we describe dependent, explanatory, and control variables used in the 
empirical analysis section. The measures that we used represent either indicators 
adapted from existing literature or novel indicators developed within the InnoS&T 
project. For a short summary of the variables and their measures see an Appendix V. 
 
Dependent variables 
Patent sale. Based on the survey responses and the subsequent patent ownership 
transfer check procedure results (see Appendix III), we generate a dependent 
variable called patent sale. The patent sale equals to 1 if the ownership right to the 
patent is sold to another firm not related to the original patent owner. The variable 
patent sale is used in the outcome equation of the Heckman selection model (the 
econometric model will be described further in the section).  
Commercial use. A dependent variable used in the selection equation is 
commercial use, which is generated using dichotomous responses about internal 
commercial use (i.e. exploitation in a product, service or manufacturing process), 
licensing, or sale of a patented invention. Commercial use equals to 1 if the invention is 
commercialized internally, licensed, or sold by a patent owner to an independent 
party not related to the original patent owner. 
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Explanatory variables 
Patent protection. The effectiveness of patent protection or the appropriability 
regime is a quite complex concept, and its measure in the literature is not 
straightforward. The survey measures the patent protection variable by asking 
respondents how important was the prevention of imitation as a reason for 
patenting. The answers are measured on the 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not 
important) to 5 (very important). Since the literature suggests that patent protection 
is an industry level construct, we aggregate individual survey responses at the 3-
digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) level. 
Complementary assets. The survey asks respondents whether the organization 
had all the resources to turn the invention into something economically valuable (e.g. 
new product, process or else). The answers are measured on the 5-point Likert scale 
ranging from 1 (completely disagree) to 5 (completely agree). 
Technological fit. The technological fit is operationalized as a fraction of patents in 
the same 3-digit International Patent Classification (IPC) class as the focal patent in a 
firm’s overall patent portfolio. Therefore, analogous to the “focus index” proposed 
by Ziedonis (2007), the technological fit is calculated based on two patent stocks: patent 
stock class and patent stock total. The patent stock class represents the number of patents 
received by a firm in the same 3-digit IPC class as the focal patent, i.e. the patent that 
was surveyed. The patent stock total represents the total number of patents received 
by a firm. The two variables measuring the patent stocks are constructed using a 
perpetual inventory method. The routine considers year 1985 as an initial period to 
calculate patent stock for entities that existed before 1985, and includes all patents for 
firms established after that year. The selection of year 1985 is reasonable because the 
term of patent lasts 20 years. The last date to calculate the patent stock is the priority 
year of the focal patent. The routine accounts for a depreciation rate of 15% due to 
technological obsolescence and the expiration of legal rights (Hall et al., 2007). 
Finally, to generate the variable technological fit we divide the patent stock class by 
patent stock total: 
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𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑖𝑡 = 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠
𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 
 
Scientific nature of the invention. The literature suggests that science-based 
inventions that significantly rely on scientific publications are more likely to be 
codified and not tacit (Gambardella et al., 2007). They may also have a more general 
purpose nature and, therefore, find a wider array of potential applications. The 
PatVal II survey measures the scientific nature of the invention by asking respondents 
to rank the importance of the scientific publications as a source of information. The 
answers are measured on the 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not important) to 5 
(very important). We generate a dummy variable that equals to 1 if scientific 
publications as a source of information for the invention were important. Scientific 
publications are considered to be important if the answer to the question equals to 3, 
4 or 5 and unimportant if the answer is 1 or 2 on the Likert scale. 
 
Control variables 
Further in the section, we describe variables that we use in our econometric 
analysis as controls.  
Firm size. The literature suggests that the firm size is an important factor 
affecting the economic use of patented inventions (Arora et al., 2001b), therefore, we 
control for it. Following many other studies, we measure the firm size by the number 
of employees collected via survey. The size of the firms ranges from very small (less 
than 10 employees) to very large (more than 5000 employees) firms. For convenience, 
in our empirical analysis the firm size variable is represented by 3 classes indicating 
the size of the organization based on the number of employees. The firm is classified 
as small if it has 1-49 employees, medium if there are 50-499 employees, and large if 
it employs more than 500 people. 
Patent stock total. Size of firm’s patent portfolio or patent stock may also affect 
the probability of firm’s participation in the markets for technology. For instance, 
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patent intensive firms with large patent portfolio may have more technologies 
available than they can commercialize internally (Kim, 2005; Kim & Vonortas, 2006). 
Hence, they may resort to the markets for technology in order to extract additional 
revenues by licensing out or selling their patents (Rivette & Kline, 2000b). However, 
by the same token, large patent stock may result in a large number of unused or 
“sleeping” patents due to firm’s inability to efficiently manage and profitably deploy 
their large intellectual property portfolio (Palomeras, 2003). We control for the firm’s 
overall patent stock using the logarithm of the patent stock total. The patent stock total 
represents the total number of patents received by a firm. The variable is constructed 
using the perpetual inventory method that was described above. 
Technological competition. The survey provides a measure of technological 
competition by asking respondents whether they were aware of one or several parties 
competing for the patent. The technological competition takes the value of 1 if the 
inventor was aware of such parties. For about 18% of observations respondents did 
not know whether there was a competition or not. To maintain the sample size these 
observations are coded as 0 (i.e. the absence of technological competition), and we 
include an additional dummy variable for these missing observations so that the 
technological competition coefficient will not be biased. 
Technological generality. The technological generality refers to a variety of areas 
where an invention can be potentially used. Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) 
characterize general-purpose technologies by their potential for pervasive use in a 
wider range of sectors, their technological dynamism, and the need for 
complementary investments after adoption. The technological generality characterizes 
a breath of the markets for technology (Arora et al., 2001b), i.e. the number of 
different areas for application and, therefore, the number of potential buyers of the 
invention. A commonly used method to measure the technological generality is based 
on the number of forward citations. Since the level of generality is associated with 
the wider range of technological areas in which technology can be applied, more 
general-purpose inventions will have a larger number of patent citations from within 
and outside their technological area (Hall & Trajtenberg, 2004). Therefore, as 
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suggested by Trajtenberg et al. (1997) the technological generality is measured on the 
basis of the Herfindahl concentration index by the following formula:  
 
𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 = 1 −  ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑗2𝑛𝑖𝑗 , 
 
where sij denotes the percentage of citations received by patent i that belongs to 
3-digit IPC class j, out of ni patent classes. Thus, if a patent is cited by other patents 
that represent a wide range of technological classes the measure should be higher, 
whereas if most citations originate in a few classes it is expected to be low (Hall & 
Trajtenberg, 2004). In the analysis we use the logarithm of the technological generality 
variable. 
Economic value. Since another generally recognized factor affecting the economic 
use of a patent is its value, we control for the economic value of the patented invention. 
The survey asks to rate the economic value of the patent relative to the other patents in 
the same industry or technological area (top 10%, 10%-25%, 25%-50%, bottom 50%). 
Based on this information we generate 4 dummy variables for the economic value. A 
small number of observations for which economic value is missing are included into 
bottom 50% group to maintain the sample size. For these missing observations, we 
include a dummy variable so that the economic value coefficient will not be biased. 
Technological class. We use 30 dummies to control for the technological class of a 
patent. Following (Gambardella et al., 2007), we use ISI-INPI-OST classification 
developed by the German Fraunhofer Institute of Systems and Innovation Research 
(ISI), the French Patent Office (INPI) and the Observatoire des Science and des 
Techniques (OST). Based on the International Patent Classification, the classification 
distinguishes among 30 different technological fields (see an Appendix II for a list of 
technological classes). 
Macro technological class. In addition, we use 6 dummies for macro technological 
classes that are also based on the ISI-INPI-OST classification. These macro technological 
classes include Electrical Engineering, General Instruments, Chemistry, Process 
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Engineering, Mechanical Engineering, and Consumption (see the Appendix II for a 
concordance between technological classes and macro technological classes). 
Region. Finally, to account for the geographical composition of the dataset we 
include 3 aggregated region dummies that control for patented inventions from 
Europe, Japan, and US. 
 
4.3.3. Estimated model specification 
In the empirical analysis section we will estimate a model in which patent 
owners first decide whether to commercially use their patent (i.e. to commercialize 
internally, license out, or sell), and if so whether to sell the patent. We use a 
Heckman selection probit model because it permits to estimate the selection model 
with dichotomous dependent variables with a similar set of factors affecting the 
selection and outcome equations. This is a maximum likelihood model in which both 
the selection equation and the outcome equation are probit models. In all our 
estimations we cluster observations by firms to account for unobserved correlation 
among the patents owned by the same company. 
We have two latent variable models y1= Xꞌ1 β1+u1 and y2= Xꞌ2 β2+u2. The latent 
variables y1 and y2 represent the commercial use of patent and the sale of patent, 
respectively. The Xꞌ are n×ki vectors of n observations and the ki (i=1,2) covariates. 
The β1 and β2 are the k×1 vectors of parameters to be estimated. Finally, u1 and u2 are 
the n×1 vectors of i.i.d. normally distributed errors, with 𝜎u1,u2 = 𝜌. Since the latent 
variables in the equations are not observed, we estimate a probability model whose 
log-likelihood function is the following: 
 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝐿 = � log𝜙 (𝜀1 >  −𝑥ꞌ1𝛽1, 𝜀2 >  −𝑥ꞌ2𝛽2)
𝑦1=1,  𝑦2=1  + � log𝜙 (𝜀1 <  −𝑥ꞌ1𝛽1, 𝜀2 >  −𝑥ꞌ2𝛽2)
𝑦1=0,   𝑦2=1 +  � log𝜙2 (𝜀2 <  − 𝑥ꞌ2𝛽2)𝑦2=0  
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where ε1 and ε2 are two generic elements of u1 and u2, xꞌ1 and xꞌ2 the 
corresponding row vectors of the ki covariates of the two equations. The Φ(· ) is a 
cumulative bivariate standard normal function, and Φ2(· ) is a standard marginal 
normal function of ε2. The three sums correspond to the following three probabilities: 
(1) Prob (Sale = 1, Commercial use = 1), (2) Prob (Sale = 0, Commercial use = 1), and 
(3) Prob (Commercial use = 0). The last one is a marginal probability because when 
Commercial use = 0, Sale = 0 with probability equal to 1. 
The Heckman selection model requires identifying the selection and outcome 
equations. The Heckman selection model is appropriate only when at least one extra 
explanatory variable influences selection but not subsequent outcome equation 
(Sartori, 2003). However, as highlighted in the literature, it is often difficult to think 
of a theoretically justified variable that affects selection but not the outcome. In this 
particular case we also cannot rationally exclude any explanatory or control variable 
from the outcome equation. The variables discussed above can possibly affect both 
the selection and outcome equations.  
Therefore, drawing on argumentation by Gambardella et al. (2007), we decided 
to exclude 30 technological class dummies from the outcome equation but not from 
the selection equation. The exclusion of technological class dummies seems to be 
reasonably safe because we have other variables that account for differences across 
technological sectors. Moreover, following the Gambardella et al. (2007) paper, we 
use 6 macro technological class dummies in our outcome equation to account for 
technological field effect. 
In addition, we have performed several robustness checks that are reported in 
the last section. We tried running the Heckman probit selection model using other 
variables as exclusion factors. The use of particular variables as exclusion factors was 
motivated by the fact that they appeared to be insignificant in the outcome equation 
our initial model with 30 technological dummies as the exclusion factor. In the 
robustness checks, the results for our explanatory variables remain stable and 
significant. 
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4.4. RESULTS 
4.4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 4.1 shows that, on average, 2.00% of patented inventions in our sample 
were sold to another firm not related to the original owner. With regard to the share 
of sold patents in the subset of commercially used patents (i.e. patents that were 
either used internally, licensed out or sold), it constitutes 3.75%. The relatively low 
share of sold patents in our data can be explained by the fact that most of these 
patents are in the early stage of their life cycle. The PatVal II survey sample was 
drawn at the level of patent applications with priority dates between 2003 and 2005. 
 
TABLE 4.1 Descriptive statistics, commercial use and sale of patented inventions 
(percentages in parentheses)  
 
Commercial use of patent 
 
Not sold 
    Sale of patent 
Sold 
Total 
Not commercially used 6,614 0 6,614 
 (100.00) (0.00) (100.00) 
Commercially used 7,254 283 7,537 
 (96.25) (3.75) (100.00) 
Total 13,868 283 14,151 
 (98.00) (2.00) (100.00) 
 
 
As shown in the Table 4.2, there are notable differences in the sale of patented 
inventions by patent owners from three regions represented in our study, namely, 
Europe, Japan, and US. The most active participants in the markets for technologies 
through patent sales are US firms. Their share of sold patents is about 3.55% which is 
almost two times more frequent compared to European and five times more frequent 
compared to Japanese firms with 1.99% and 0.70%, respectively. These findings 
suggest that there are significant differences across European, Japanese, and US firms 
in their propensity to sell their patents. These differences may stem from different 
organizational cultures or maturity of technology markets in various regions.  
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TABLE 4.2 Descriptive statistics, sale of patented inventions by region 
(percentages in parentheses) 
 
Region 
 
Not sold 
    Sale of patent 
Sold 
Total 
Europe 8,383 170 8,553 
 (98.01) (1.99) (100.00) 
Japan 2,983 21 3,004 
 (99.30) (0.70) (100.00) 
US 2,502 92 2,594 
 (96.45) (3.55) (100.00) 
Total 13,868 283 14,151 
 (98.00) (2.00) (100.00) 
 
Table 4.3 presents the sale of patented inventions by firm size. As expected, 
small firms with less than 50 employees have the highest share of sold patents, about 
7.52%. Large firms with more than 500 employees have lower than average 
proportion of patent sales. Therefore, it is necessary to take into account and control 
for the size of the patent owner in the empirical estimations. 
 
TABLE 4.3 Descriptive statistics, sale of patented inventions by firm size 
(percentages in parentheses) 
 
Number of employees 
 
Not sold 
    Sale of patent 
Sold 
Total 
1-49 empl. 1,438 117 1,555 
 (92.48) (7.52) (100.00) 
50-99 empl. 569 25 594 
 (95.79) (4.21) (100.00) 
100-249 empl. 1,029 22 1,051 
 (97.91) (2.09) (100.00) 
250-499 empl. 954 10 964 
 (98.96) (1.04) (100.00) 
500-999 empl. 1,079 11 1,090 
 (98.99) (1.01) (100.00) 
1000-4999 empl. 2,702 22 2,724 
 (99.19) (0.81) (100.00) 
5000 and more empl. 6,097 76 6,173 
 (98.77) (1.23) (100.00) 
Total 13,868 283 14,151 
 (98.00) (2.00) (100.00) 
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The proportion of sold patents across macro technological is reported in Table 
4.4. The patent sale is more frequent in Instruments and Chemicals/Pharmaceuticals 
with 2.59% and 2.47%, respectively. Patent sale is least frequent in Mechanical 
Engineering class with proportion equal to 1.06%. This finding is fully consistent 
with data reported by Serrano (2010) using a pooling of all U.S. patents granted from 
1983 to 2001. He also finds that the proportion of traded patents is highest in 
Chemical and Drugs/Medical technology fields and lowest in Mechanical field. He 
argues that this can be due to varying benefits from specialization across technology 
fields. 
 
TABLE 4.4 Descriptive statistics, sale of patented inventions by macro 
technological class (percentages in parentheses) 
 
Macro technological 
class 
 
Not sold 
    Sale of patent 
Sold 
Total 
Electrical engineering 3,387 70 3,457 
 (97.98) (2.02) (100.00) 
Instruments 2,183 58 2,241 
 (97.41) (2.59) (100.00) 
Chemistry/Pharmaceuticals 2,650 67 2,717 
 (97.53) (2.47) (100.00) 
Process engineering 1,955 37 1,992 
 (98.14) (1.86) (100.00) 
Mechanical engineering 2,809 30 2,839 
 (98.94) (1.06) (100.00) 
Consumption 884 21 905 
 (97.68) (2.32) (100.00) 
Total 13,868 283 14,151 
 (98.00) (2.00) (100.00) 
 
 
Table 4.5 displays the share of sold patents by their economic value. The table 
suggests that the proportion of sold patents is higher for economically more valuable 
inventions. Thus, the proportion of sold patent in the lowest value group is about 
1.59% and in the highest value group is about 2.83%. This finding is consistent with 
an argument by Serrano (2006) that more valuable patents are more likely to be sold. 
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Therefore, we include the economic value of the patented invention as a control 
variable in the empirical estimations.  
 
TABLE 4.5 Descriptive statistics, sale of patented inventions by economic value 
(percentages in parentheses) 
 
Economic value 
 
Not sold 
    Sale of patent 
Sold 
Total 
Value bottom 50%  5,694 92 5,786 
 (98.41) (1.59) (100.00) 
Value 25%-50% 3,490 77 3,567 
 (97.84) (2.16) (100.00) 
Value 10%-25% 2,832 60 2,892 
 (97.93) (2.07) (100.00) 
Value top 10% 1,852 54 1,906 
 (97.17) (2.83) (100.00) 
Total 13,868 283 14,151 
 (98.00) (2.00) (100.00) 
 
Finally, Table 4.6 presents the correlation matrix for explanatory and control 
variables used in the analysis. 
 
4.4.2. Empirical analysis results 
In this section, we empirically test hypotheses about the likelihood of patent 
sale developed in the second section.  
We present our empirical estimation results in Table 4.7. In the table, we report 
marginal effects because they have more direct interpretation. For instance, the 
marginal effect implies a change in probability of patent sale as a result of transition 
from 0 to 1 in the dummy explanatory variable. For continuous variables, the 
marginal effect present change in probability of patent sale due to one unit change in 
the explanatory variable. Since our continuous variables are in logarithms, by 
multiplying the marginal effects by any percentage change in an explanatory variable 
one can obtain the respective effect on the probability of patent sale. 
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TABLE 4.6 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
Variables Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. Patent protection  4.05  0.17 1.00              
2. Complementary assets  3.45  1.48 0.06 1.00             
3. Technological fit (log) -1.78  1.50 0.05 0.01 1.00            
4. Scientific nature  0.52  0.50 -0.06 -0.02 -0.02 1.00           
5. Size small  0.11  0.31 0.01 -0.12 0.24 0.03 1.00          
6. Size medium  0.18  0.39 0.10 0.02 0.14 -0.04 -0.17 1.00         
7. Size large  0.71  0.46 -0.09 0.06 -0.29 0.01 -0.54 -0.74 1.00        
8. Patent stock total (log)  4.93  2.63 -0.21 0.06 -0.51 0.02 -0.45 -0.31 0.57 1.00       
9. Technological competition  0.32  0.47 0.02 -0.04 -0.06 0.16 -0.06 -0.05 0.09 0.05 1.00      
10. Technological generality (log) -3.58  1.74 -0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.10 -0.00 -0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 1.00     
11. Value bottom 50%   0.41  0.49 -0.06 -0.07 -0.05 -0.08 -0.07 -0.05 0.10 0.13 -0.07 -0.04 1.00    
12. Value 25%-50%  0.25  0.43 -0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 -0.02 -0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.48 1.00   
13. Value 10%-25%  0.20  0.40 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.03 -0.05 -0.06 0.03 0.03 -0.42 -0.29 1.00  
14. Value top 10%  0.13  0.34 0.04 0.00 0.04 -0.01 0.09 0.05 -0.10 -0.13 0.03 0.01 -0.33 -0.23 -0.20 1.00 
15. Electrical engineering  0.24  0.43 -0.31 -0.03 0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 0.08 0.18 -0.00 -0.02 0.04 0.02 -0.04 -0.04 
16. Instruments  0.16  0.37 -0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.01 -0.06 -0.04 -0.00 0.03 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 
17. Chemistry/Pharmaceuticals  0.19  0.39 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.25 -0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.07 0.13 -0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.00 
18. Process engineering   0.14  0.35 0.17 0.03 -0.01 -0.06 0.02 0.05 -0.06 -0.10 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.05 
19. Mechanical engineering  0.20  0.40 0.09 0.00 -0.06 -0.13 -0.05 -0.01 0.04 0.03 -0.01 -0.08 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
20. Consumption  0.06  0.24 0.16 0.03 0.05 -0.12 0.06 0.06 -0.09 -0.14 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.04 
21. Europe  0.60  0.49 0.05 0.05 0.10 -0.12 0.08 0.11 -0.15 -0.08 -0.29 -0.14 -0.05 -0.03 0.05 0.05 
22. Japan   0.21  0.41 0.02 -0.14 -0.15 0.08 -0.15 -0.13 0.21 0.13 0.44 0.01 0.03 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 
23. US  0.18  0.39 -0.08 0.08 0.02 0.06 0.06 -0.00 -0.03 -0.03 -0.10 0.18 0.04 0.01 -0.03 -0.04 
 
Variables Mean s.d. 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23      
15. Electrical engineering  0.24  0.43 1.00              
16. Instruments  0.16  0.37 -0.25 1.00             
17. Chemistry/Pharmaceuticals  0.19  0.39 -0.28 -0.21 1.00            
18. Process engineering   0.14  0.35 -0.23 -0.18 -0.20 1.00           
19. Mechanical engineering  0.20  0.40 -0.28 -0.22 -0.24 -0.20 1.00          
20. Consumption  0.06  0.24 -0.15 -0.11 -0.13 -0.11 -0.13 1.00         
21. Europe  0.60  0.49 -0.09 -0.07 -0.07 0.06 0.12 0.10 1.00        
22. Japan   0.21  0.41 0.06 0.00 0.03 -0.04 -0.02 -0.07 -0.64 1.00       
23. US  0.18  0.39 0.05 0.08 0.05 -0.02 -0.12 -0.05 -0.59 -0.25 1.00      
Note: N=14,151 
123 
 
TABLE 4.7 Heckman probit estimations of sale and commercial use of patented 
inventions, marginal effects (p-values in parentheses) 
 
Variable 
P - selection 
Pr(commercial use) 
P – outcome 
Pr(sale=1|commercial use=1) 
P - bivariate 11 
Pr(sale=1, commercial use=1) 
    
Patent protection  0.086 (0.002)*** -0.044 (0.002)*** -0.017 (0.011)** 
Complementary assets  0.074 (0.000)*** -0.012 (0.000)*** -0.002 (0.003)*** 
Technological fit (log) -0.005 (0.143) -0.004 (0.066)* -0.002 (0.038)** 
Scientific nature -0.072 (0.000)***  0.019 (0.000)***  0.006 (0.018)** 
Size medium -0.027 (0.093)* -0.033 (0.000)*** -0.017 (0.000)*** 
Size large -0.090 (0.000)*** -0.038 (0.000)*** -0.023 (0.000)*** 
Patent stock total (log) -0.026 (0.000)*** -0.004 (0.021)** -0.003 (0.000)*** 
Technological competition  0.004 (0.724)  0.001 (0.808)  0.001 (0.763) 
Technological generality -0.001 (0.736)  0.002 (0.339)  0.001 (0.368) 
Value 25%-50%   0.082 (0.000)*** -0.002 (0.741)   0.003 (0.355) 
Value 10%-25%  0.130 (0.000)*** -0.011 (0.092)*  0.001 (0.808) 
Value to 10%  0.151 (0.000)*** -0.009 (0.205)  0.003 (0.443) 
Technological class1 Yes   
Macro technological class1 Yes   
Japan  0.031 (0.010)*** -0.029 (0.002)*** -0.012 (0.007)*** 
US  0.013 (0.258)  0.019 (0.005)***  0.0.10 (0.002)*** 
    
N 14,151   
Ll -9,847.46   
Chi2 288.62   
Athrho 1.716 (0.331)   
Predicted probability 0.533 0.041 0.020 
Note: p-values in parenthesis are based on robust standard errors adjusted for clusters by firms’ 
identifier. 
1 For the identification reasons Technological class dummies are included only in the selection 
equation and Macro technological class dummies are included only in the outcome equation.  
* p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01  
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Table 4.7 presents the impact of our explanatory and control variables on the 
following three probabilities. The first column reports the impact of the variables on 
the probability of selection into commercial use, i.e. Pr (Commercial use = 1). The 
second column presents the impact of the variables on the probability of patent sale 
conditional on selection, i.e. Pr (Sale = 1|Commercial use = 1). The third column 
reports the marginal probability of patent sale, i.e. Pr (Sale =1, Commercial use = 1). 
The third probability is the product of the first two probabilities3. Therefore, we will 
primarily focus our further discussion on the differences in the effect of our 
explanatory variables on the first two probabilities.  
Our patent protection variable is statistically and practically significant in both 
selection and outcome equations. However, the effect of patent protection is opposite 
in the two equations. We find that tighter appropriability regime favors commercial 
use of patented inventions in general but discourages patent sale in particular. This is 
fully rational from the patent owner’s perspective and supports the real option 
reasoning in our first hypothesis. Thus, with respect to patent sale, our findings 
contradict the wide spread opinion that more effective patent protection encourages 
patent transfer by lowering transaction costs. On the contrary, the patent protection 
increases the option value and, therefore, hampers or leads to delay the decision to 
sell the patented invention. Moreover, the effective patent protection may actually 
increase the opportunity costs of selling the patent by making other commercial use 
alternatives such as internal use and licensing more attractive. 
Similarly, the complementary assets are positively and significantly associated 
with the commercial use but negatively and significantly associated with the patent 
sale. In other words, the ownership of complementary assets is one of the key 
reasons for not selling the invention. This finding is in line with the literature and our 
second hypothesis. As noted by Teece (1986), the firm that lacks necessary 
complementary assets and unable to easily access them is left with the option of 
selling or licensing out its intangible assets in the markets for technology, which is 
better than no remuneration at all. Although numerous empirical studies have 
                                                          
3 Pr (Sale=1, Commercial use=1) = (Sale=1|Commercial use=1) × Pr (Commercial use=1). Moreover, 
Pr(Sale=1) = Pr (Sale=1, Commercial use=1) because Pr (Sale=1| Commercial use=0) = 0 
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provided support for this argument with respect to patent licensing, here we provide 
an additional empirical support with respect to patent sale. 
The technological fit variable is statistically insignificant in the selection equation. 
In the outcome equation, the relationship between the technological fit and 
probability of patent sale is statistically significant at the 0.1 level. The relationship is 
statistically more significant for the marginal probability of patent sale (i.e. third 
column in Table 4.7). These findings provide some support for the third hypothesis 
and suggest that core technologies are less likely to be sold in the markets for 
technology. In other words, firms are more likely to sell out non-core or marginal 
technologies to other firms. 
Finally, the scientific nature variable is statistically and practically significant in 
the both selection and outcome equations. We find that the variable is negatively 
associated with the commercial use and positively associated with the sale. The 
negative relationship in the selection equation suggests that highly science-based 
inventions that significantly rely on scientific publications are less likely to be 
commercially used. More scientific patents are also likely to be more basic with fewer 
opportunities for economic use or to be far from the market with higher level of 
required investments and associated risks. 
The positive relationship in the outcome equation supports our last hypothesis. 
However, there are two alternative interpretations for this positive relationship. The 
first interpretation is based on the argument that highly science-based inventions 
that rely on scientific publications are more likely to be codified and not tacit. Since 
codified knowledge is easier to transfer across firm boundaries science-based 
inventions are more likely to be sold in the markets for technology. An alternative 
interpretation is that the positive relationship in the outcome equation is not because 
science-based inventions are easier to transfer but because such inventions are more 
likely to be offered for sale due to the patent owner’s inability to exploit them 
internally. This, in turn, may explain the positive relationship between scientific 
nature of the invention and likelihood of actual patent sale. In other words, patented 
inventions that are actually sold in the markets for technology are more likely to be 
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scientific because they were picked from a subset of more scientific patents 
preselected for sale. Further, in our robustness checks section we test the consistency 
of this alternative interpretation. 
Findings associated with the control variables used in our empirical analysis 
also deserve some attention. First, we find that the firm size is negatively associated 
with both commercial use and patent sale. This finding is consistent with arguments 
in the literature that large firms may patent their inventions for strategic motives and 
use them for defensive (e.g. freedom to operate), offensive (e.g. patent blocking and 
litigation) or cross-licensing reasons without using them commercially, licensing or 
selling them to others (Hall & Ziedonis, 2001). Another possible explanation is that 
smaller firms with limited financial resources are more scrupulous and efficient at 
the patent application phase in weeding out inventions that are unlikely to be 
commercially valuable.  
Second, we find that the size of patent stocks is also negatively associated with 
both commercial use and patent sale. This suggests that patent intensive firms with 
large patent portfolio may have more technologies available than they can 
commercially exploit. Moreover, the large number of unused or “sleeping” patents 
may stem from firms’ inability to efficiently manage and profitably deploy their large 
patent portfolios. Finally, since the firm size and the size of patent stock are 
correlated, we can also use the above mentioned argument about the strategic role of 
unexploited patents. 
Third, we find that the economic value of the patent is important in our selection 
equation and insignificant in the outcome equation. This suggests that patent value is 
important for the commercial use but not for sale conditional on commercial use. 
With regard to commercial use, it is fully rational that firms are more likely to 
commercially exploit more valuable patents. In the case of patent sale, statistical 
insignificance of the economic value may have several interpretations. First, there can 
be high uncertainty about the economic value of the invention that were sold. 
Therefore, respondents give dispersed answers about the economic value of 
inventions. Second, in order for a patent sale to occur it is necessary to balance the 
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interests of patent sellers and patent buyers. Since patent sellers would like to sell 
less valuable patents but patent buyers would like to buy more valuable ones, these 
two tendencies may neutralize each other resulting in a relatively even distribution 
of values across inventions that are actually sold in the markets for technology. Our 
findings suggest that, although patented inventions that were sold are more valuable 
compared to unused inventions, they are neither superior nor inferior in terms of 
value compared to other commercially exploited inventions. 
Finally, it is worthwhile to note the differences across regions in terms of the 
sale of patented inventions. The estimation results confirm our findings in the 
descriptive statistics section that compared to European firms, Japanese firms are less 
likely to sell their patents and US firms are more likely to do that. The difference may 
be interpreted either by different organizational cultures or by the efficiency of 
functioning of the markets for technology in different regions. 
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4.5. DISCUSSION 
4.5.1. Implications of the study 
We have used a unique dataset constructed on the basis of the large scale 
inventor survey to study the determinants of patent sale. In this section, we will try 
to discuss our findings and draw some implications for research, management, and 
policy. 
Our empirical findings suggest that the effective patent protection restrains and 
hampers patent sale. This finding is in contrast with a wide spread opinion that the 
effective patent protection (or tight appropriability regime) facilitates technology 
transfer by lowering transaction costs. In the case of patent sale, we find the real 
option reasoning to be more helpful to understand the behavior of patent owners. By 
preventing imitation, the effective patent protection provides sufficient time to a 
patent owner to wait and learn more about the potential value of an invention before 
deciding whether to invest in the technology, license or sell it out. Moreover, as 
noted by HP’s vice president, companies are seriously concerned that patents that 
they sell can be used against them in an offensive way by non-practicing entities 
(NPE) (Chapman & Shah, 2012). Therefore, firms can be reluctant to sell well 
protected inventions and be better of using them for defensive purposes. The policy 
implication suggested by our finding is that policies that reinforce patent protection 
do not seem to facilitate surplus-enhancing transfers of patent rights, where the 
alternative owner has greater valuation for a patent than the current owner. Instead, 
such policies may facilitate defensive behavior by firms and decrease the share of 
patented inventions traded in the markets for technology. 
In line with the literature on patent licensing, we find that the presence of 
complementary assets necessary to turn the invention into something economically 
valuable is negatively associated with the likelihood of patent sale. Thus, the 
ownership of complementary assets is one of the key reasons for not selling the 
invention. On the contrary, firm that lacks necessary complementary assets and 
unable to easily access them is more likely to sell its patented invention in the 
markets for technology. Although numerous empirical studies have provided 
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support for this argument with respect to patent licensing, in this study we provide 
an additional empirical support and confirmation with respect to patent sale. 
Considering managerial implications, firms should deliberately evaluate their 
position in terms of availability of respective downstream complementary resources 
to turn their inventions into economically valuable innovations in deciding whether 
to keep or sell out their patented inventions.  
Our findings suggest that core technologies are less likely to be sold in the 
markets for technology. This implies that, as suggested by Prahalad & Hamel (1990), 
firms understand that they need to protect their core technologies, which are key to 
their sustainable competitive advantage. It also in line with the prescriptions given 
by Rivette & Kline (2000b), which suggest that while core technologies should be 
rigorously protected, non-core technologies can be actively traded for revenue. The 
managerial implication of this finding is that firms should implement processes to 
constantly monitor and manage their patent portfolios to identify non-core patents 
that can be offered for sale. These processes can help firms not only to generate 
additional revenues but also to reduce maintenance fees and other costs associated 
with holding non-core patents in their patent portfolio. 
Another research implication is related to the relationship between the 
economic value of patented inventions and the likelihood of patent sale. Serrano 
(2006) finds that traded patents, on average, are more valuable than their non-traded 
counterparts, and argues that better and more valuable patents are more likely to be 
traded. In our study, we refine Serrano’s argument and provide strong empirical 
evidence that sold patents are neither superior nor inferior in terms of value 
compared to other commercially exploited patents. Our empirical results suggest 
that, after controlling for other variables, the economic value is highly significant for 
the probability of commercial use, but it is not statistically significant for probability 
of patent sale. 
Finally, we find notable differences across regions in their propensity to sell 
their patented inventions and these differences are statistically significant. We find 
that compared to European firms, Japanese firms are less likely to sell their patents 
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and US firms are more likely to do that. This finding suggests that US firms are more 
likely to adopt the “Open Innovation” approach emphasized by Chesbrough (2003) 
and profit from their inventions by selling them in the markets for technologies. 
Japanese firms, on the contrary, prefer to keep patented inventions in their portfolio 
instead of sharing them with others. As noted earlier, these differences in the 
propensity to sell patents may be interpreted either by different organizational 
cultures or by the efficiency of functioning of the markets for technology in various 
regions. This finding, therefore, may have implications and be useful for developing 
policies that foster technology transfer and commercialization or support the 
development of efficient technology markets in different countries. 
 
4.5.2. Robustness checks 
We run several robustness checks to find out whether our results are stable. We 
also run additional regressions with different specification of variables in order to 
check some alternative interpretations. For reasons of space, we provide a brief 
overview of the robustness checks and do not include tables in the paper. The 
robustness check tables are available from the author. 
First, we exploited our empirical finding that the economic value influences the 
commercial use of patent and does not influence the patent sale to try an alternative 
exclusion strategy in our robustness checks. When we run Heckman probit selection 
regression using economic value as the exclusion factor instead of 30 technological 
class dummies, the results for our explanatory and control variables remained 
similar and statistically significant. The results suggest that our initial identification 
strategy did not introduce any biases to the empirical estimations. 
Second, we tried the Heckman probit selection model with different selection 
criteria. Instead of the variable commercial use we generated a variable external use 
that took value 1 if the invention was licensed or sold by a patent owner to an 
independent party not related to the original owner. The results for the relationship 
between the key explanatory and control variables and the probability of patent sale 
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in the outcome equation remained very similar even after using the external use as a 
dependent variable in the selection equation. 
Third, in one of our interpretation of the positive relationship between the 
scientific nature of the invention and the probability of patent sale we argued that 
sold patents are more likely to be scientific because they were picked from a subset of 
more scientific patents preselected for sale. Our dataset allows us to check this 
alternative interpretation by measuring not only actual patent sale but also patent 
owner’s willingness to sell the patent. In particular, the PatVal II survey asks 
respondents whether the patent owner was willing to sell a patent when it was not 
actually sold. Using this information, we generated an alternative dependent variable 
willingness to sell that took value 1 if the invention was sold or patent owner was 
willing to sell it. The variable was used as dependent variable in the outcome 
equation of the Heckman probit model. The findings support our interpretation and 
suggest that inventions that significantly rely on scientific publications are more like 
to be offered for sale and, therefore, more likely to be actually sold. However, our 
data do not allow us to find out why more scientific patents are more likely to be 
offered for sale, whether it is due to due to the patent owner’s inability to exploit 
them internally or for other reasons. 
Finally, since the correlation between commercial use (selection) and patent sale 
(outcome) equations is not statistically different from zero, as a robustness check we 
run independent probit estimation of the commercial use equation and of the patent 
sale equation for the selected sample of commercially used patents. These 
independent probit estimations provide relatively similar results and confirm the 
robustness of our findings reported in the paper. 
 
4.5.3. Limitations and Future Research 
This study is subject to several limitations that need to be briefly discussed. 
First, as it has been emphasized in the literature it is important to look at both supply 
and demand sides of the market because the likelihood of the transaction is affected 
by the behavior and characteristics of parties from both sides. Our data contains 
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information only on the supply side of the markets for technology. In our future 
research, we plan to deal this limitation by collecting additional data on the demand 
side, i.e. information on patent buyers. To accomplish this task, we have already 
identified the names of patent buyers by tracing the flow of patent rights and by 
looking at patent assignment records in the patent registers. The next step is to collect 
comprehensive firm and industry level data on patent buyers from various company 
and industry databases. 
Second, cross-sectional nature of the data precludes the adaptation of 
longitudinal perspective and poses certain limitations on the range of applicable 
econometric methods and estimations. Moreover, cross-sectional data do not allow to 
fully account for firm-specific unobserved heterogeneity. Thus, obtaining a panel 
dataset with a longitudinal dimension could significantly improve the quality of 
empirical estimations. 
Third, since patents and patent applications used in our study are at an early 
stage of their life cycle and only about 42% of them were granted a European patent, 
we admit that many of these inventions are likely to be sold in the future. However, 
the use of more early patents would significantly compromise the ability of survey 
respondents to recall accurate information about their patents. 
Finally, we do not have information on the price paid for the patents. Such 
information often remains confidential and is difficult to obtain. Nevertheless, in the 
analysis we use some measures that may allow us to assess the economic value of a 
patent. 
All these limitations notwithstanding, we believe that this study will contribute 
to a better understanding of patent sales, which have important consequences for the 
diffusion of technology and the functioning of the markets for technology in general. 
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APPENDIX I. SHORT DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES 
Dependent variables  
Pure commercial use 
 
 
Pure licensing 
 
Mixed use 
 
 
No use 
 
Variable equal to 1 if the applicant(s) or affiliated parties only used 
this patented invention commercially, i.e., in a product, service or 
in a manufacturing process, 0 otherwise 
Variable equal to 1 if the patent has only been licensed by the 
patent owner to an independent party, 0 otherwise 
Variable equal to 1 if the applicant(s) or affiliated parties both used 
the patent in a product, service or manufacturing process and 
licensed patent to an independent party, 0 otherwise 
Variable equal to 1 if the patent has neither been used internally by 
any of the applicants nor licensed out to other parties, 0 otherwise 
Independent variables  
Complementary assets 
 
 
Organization-specific 
complementary assets 
 
Scientific nature 
 
Technological competition 
 
 
Technological distance (log) 
 
 
Technological generality (log) 
 
 
4 dummy variables based on the presence of complementary assets 
in the organization for the technical or economic success of the 
patent 
The number of other functional departments of the organization 
different from the inventor’s department with which the inventor 
communicated frequently for the invention 
Variable equal to 1 if scientific publications as a source of 
information for the invention were important, 0 otherwise 
Variable equal to 1 if during the invention process the inventor’s 
was aware of one or of several other parties competing for the 
patent 
Variable indicating the distance of the invention from the firm’s 
core activity ranging in the interval between 0 and 1 
Variable indicating the range of technological areas in which 
technology can be applied measured on the basis of the number of 
forward citations and the Herfindahl concentration index 
Control variables  
Technological class 
 
Macro technological class 
 
 
Economic value 
 
 
Firm size 
 
Patent stock total (log) 
 
Patent protection 
 
Region 
30 technological classes based on the OST classification (Appendix 
II) 
6 macro technological classes based on the OST classification: 
Electrical Engineering, General Instruments, Chemistry, Process 
Engineering, Mechanical Engineering 
4 dummy variables based on the patent value that is rated as being 
either bottom 50%, 25% - 50%, 10% - 25%, or top 10% in comparison 
with other patents in the industry or technological area 
3 classes indicating the firm size based on the number of employees 
in the organization 
Variable measuring the total number of patents in the firm’s patent 
portfolio 
Variable indicating patent protection in the 3-digit IPC class  
3 dummies indicating the geographical regions: Europe, Japan, and 
US 
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APPENDIX II. TECHNOLOGICAL CLASSES ACCORDING TO THE ISI-INPI-
OST CLASSIFICATION (Source: Schmoch, 2008)  
Technological classes 
I. Electrical engineering 
1. Electrical machinery and apparatus, electrical energy  
2. Audio-visual technology  
3. Telecommunications    
4. Information technology  
5. Semiconductors  
II. Instruments  
6. Optics  
7. Analysis, measurement, control technology   
8. Medical technology  
9. Nuclear engineering  
III. Chemistry/Pharmaceuticals 
10. Organic fine chemistry  
11. Macromolecular chemistry, polymers  
12. Pharmaceuticals, cosmetics  
13. Biotechnology  
14. Agriculture, food chemistry  
15. Chemical and petrol industry, basic materials chemistry   
16. Surface technology, coating  
17. Materials, metallurgy  
IV. Process engineering/Special equipment 
18. Chemical engineering  
19. Materials processing, textiles, paper   
20. Handling, printing 
21. Agricultural and food processing, machinery and apparatus  
22. Environmental technology  
V. Mechanical engineering/Machinery 
23. Machine tools 
24. Engines, pumps, turbines   
25. Thermal processes and apparatus  
26. Mechanical elements  
27. Transport 
28. Space technology, weapons  
VI. Consumption 
29. Consumer goods and equipment   
30. Civil engineering, building, mining 
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APPENDIX III. PATENT OWNERSHIP TRANSFER CHECK PROCEDURE  
In this appendix, we describe the patent ownership check procedure used to 
verify the list of patents that were actually sold.  
Following Serrano (2010), we use patent assignment records in the patent 
registers to verify PatVal II survey responses and check the actual transfers of patent 
rights across owners. When a patent or patent application is transferred, an 
assignment of rights is recorded at the European Patent Register (EPR) or National 
Patent Registers (NPR) acknowledging the change of patent ownership. A 
conventional assignment entry records the patent involved, the name of the buyer 
(assignee), the name of the seller (assignor), the date at which the assignment was 
registered at the patent office (Galasso et al., 2011). The European Patent Office (EPO) 
also provides scanned copies of applicant’s “request for transfer of rights” and EPO’s 
“communication of the registration of a transfer”. 
We have conducted several rounds of checks using different information 
sources and databases such as the European Patent Register (EPR), National Patent 
Registers (NPR) of European Patent Convention (EPC) member states, Espacenet 
(INPADOC Legal Status), PATSTAT, and Orbit databases.  
We have manually checked 809 observations reporting that patent or patent 
application was sold and 823 observations reporting that the invention was not sold, 
but the owner was willing to sell it. At the first round of check, we used Espacenet 
and PATSTAT online databases to find out whether the EPR contained any record of 
the patent transfer. 
In the second round, we used the legal status section of the Orbit database to 
check whether any equivalent patents (i.e. patents protecting the same invention) 
were ever sold. The Orbit database provides legal status information on all patents in 
the patent family around the world. The Orbit database also keeps track of patent 
assignment by the EPR and NPRs. NPRs need to be checked only if a European 
patent was granted. Therefore, in the third round of the procedure we check online 
NPRs of EPC member countries for a subset of inventions that were granted a 
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European patent. At this stage, we check only those NPRs in which the patent is alive 
and active. 
Galasso et al. (2011) note that there is a challenge to distinguish changes in the 
patent ownership from other events recorded in the register. To tackle this challenge, 
we used manual check procedure, in addition to semi-automated search tools. 
Following Serrano (2010), we conservatively dropped all assignments that are likely 
not to be associated with an actual transfer of patent rights. For instance, we dropped 
assignments to financial institutions in which a patent was used as collateral because 
such assignments do not represent a real ownership transfer. As noted by Serrano 
(2010), main concern related to US patents is that the first assignment of an 
unassigned patent that occurs very close to an application date may not be a patent 
sale but rather be a transfer of ownership from an inventor to an employer firm. 
Therefore, we ignore such assignments for the US patents only, while for European 
patents such problem was not observed. Finally, there are patent right transfer 
records associated with the change of company’s name or patent transfers between 
affiliated companies that belong to a same business group, e.g. from subsidiary to a 
parent company. Since such patent transfers cannot be regarded as external market 
transactions in a true sense, we keep track of such transfers separately. 
During the check procedure, we have also collected additional information on 
patent transfer and characteristics of patent seller and patent buyer. For instance, we 
have collected information on patent application, patent publication, patent grant, 
and patent transfer dates, which enrich our data by providing some dynamic 
perspective. Moreover, we obtained information on organization type, country 
origins, and patent stock for both patent sellers and buyers. Although this 
information for patent sellers was largely available from the PatVal II survey, 
equivalent information for patent buyers was lacking. Since we still need to collect 
more comprehensive data for patent buyers from various company and industry 
databases in order to conduct the analysis, we do not report this information in this 
study and reserve it for future research. This additional information on patent buyers 
and patent sellers will allow us to open up a black box and look at both supply and 
demand sides in the markets for technology. 
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APPENDIX IV. DISCUSSION ON TYPE I AND TYPE II ERRORS 
The Appendix IV provides a detailed discussion on reasons that could cause the 
discrepancy between responses about patent sale given by survey respondents and 
patent right transfer records in the patent registers.  
A first set of explanations suggests for a Type I (“False positive”) error, which 
means that a patent was classified by the survey respondent as sold despite the fact 
that a patent ownership transfer has never actually occurred. 
The first argument here is that in the management literature the term “patent 
sale” has an ambiguous meaning and often used in relation to patent licensing 
(exclusive or non-exclusive) (e.g. Cohen et al., 2000, p. 4). Therefore, some inventors 
could understand the term extensively and misclassify licensed patents as sold 
patents. Our data shows that 31% of observations that didn’t have a recorded 
confirmation of patent right transfer were also classified by respondents as licensed 
patents. As discussed in the introduction section, in this study we clearly 
differentiate between “patent sale” and “patent licensing”. 
 Second, as shown by some psychological and social cognitive studies, 
questionnaire and survey respondents may indulge in a “wishful thinking” defined 
as interpretation of facts and events according to what one desires rather than 
according to the actual evidence (Babad, 1997; Gordon, Franklin, & Beck, 2005). 
Moreover, people are more likely to recall accurate information when it is consistent 
with their wishes and less likely when it is not (Woike & Polo, 2001). Thus, the 
discrepancy between survey responses and actual patent right transfer records may 
stem from the “wishful-thinking bias” and tendency to present desirable event as 
real.  
The presence of such “wishful-thinking bias” can be supported by another 
observation from the PatVal II survey. For the subsample of 401 observations in 
which respondent’s positive answer about patent sale didn’t find support in the 
patent registers we have compared the respondents’ answers to the question “Has 
the patent been granted already?” with the data from the PATSTAT database on 
10/2012 (for EPO patents) and the Orbit database (for other patents in the world). 
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Interestingly, 194 out of 401 (48.4%) have reported that their invention has been 
granted a patent, whereas the PATSTAT data were telling that these patents have 
never received a European patent. Since the survey question did not explicitly 
specify whether respondents were asked about a grant of European patent or any 
other equivalent patent (i.e. patent protecting the same invention) in the patent 
family, we have used the Orbit database to check if any of these 194 inventions has 
been granted a patent anywhere in the world. We have found that 121 out of 194 
inventions were granted patents in other countries. Nevertheless, at the end we still 
got 73 inventions out of 401 (18.2%) that have never been granted a patent in any 
country in the world, while survey respondents were reporting that they have been. 
Hence, we can argue that there happen to be some “wishful-thinking biases” and 
survey responses should always receive a certain amount of caution and discretion. 
A second set of explanations suggests for a possibility of Type II (“False 
negative”) error, which means that we could fail to find records of patent sales that 
have actually occurred. 
The first explanation is that either European Patent office (EPR) or National 
Patent Registers (NPR) could fail to record and publish the patent right transfer in 
their online databases. As stated in the European Patent Convention (EPC) and in the 
European Patent Office Guidelines for Examination, during the examination period a 
European patent application may be transferred for one or more of the designated 
contracting states. The transfer of a European patent application is recorded in the 
EPR, usually within few weeks after a request is received by the EPO. Once granted, 
a European patent separates into a bundle of national patent rights for member states 
of the EPC, and each national patent can be assigned independently of the others. 
Therefore, the transfer registration should be undertaken in each individual member 
country separately. After a grant of a European patent, the registration of a transfer 
at the EPR is not sufficient because it is to the individual NPRs that the public are 
required to look when seeking to determine patent ownership4.  
                                                          
4 On this issue see the UK Patents Court decision related to patent dispute between Lundbeck AS and 
Infosint SA: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Patents/2011/907.html 
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Most of the NPRs in the EPC member counties have online databases that 
frequently update information about patent owner, patent transfer, and payment of 
renewal fees on active patents. However, there is a chance that some NPRs are not 
that well organized and efficient as the EPR in recording and publishing online all 
patent right transfers. Therefore, it may occur that few patents within a bundle of 
national patent rights were sold in certain countries, but respective NPRs have failed 
to timely and accurately record these transfers. However, the last argument is only 
valid if an invention has been granted a European patent because otherwise patent 
application does not reach a national phase any patent application right transfer need 
to be recorded at the EPR only. 
Out of 809 observations for which survey respondents reported a sale of patent 
rights 401 observations did not have any record of patent transfer. Only 123 patents 
out of 401 (31%) were granted a European patent, while remaining 278 (69%) patents 
were under examination, withdrawn, or refused5.  
The efficiency of NPRs in recording and publishing patent legal status data 
decreases the likelihood of committing the “false negative” error in our checking 
procedure. As it is apparent from their online registers, France, Germany and UK are 
efficient in providing sufficient information about patents’ legal status at a national 
phase. Other countries either less efficiently update legal status information (e.g. 
Estonia and Finland) or do not have online patent registers at all (e.g. Italy and 
Sweden). Therefore, we classify 123 patent discussed above into three groups of 
patents: (a) active only in efficient NPR countries (31), (b) active in efficient and 
inefficient NPR countries (90), (c) active only in inefficient NPR countries (2). 
Therefore, only 92 patents in the last two groups can be a subject to the “false 
negative” error due to inefficiency of some NPRs to report patent assignments. 
Another explanation suggests that patent buyers may fail to report or to request 
a record of their acquisition at the EPR or NPRs. However, evidence and legal 
practice suggests that in many countries in Europe the recording of the transfer of 
patent rights is important for various reasons. The most important reason is that in 
                                                          
5 Patent grant information is collected from the PATSTAT database on 10/2012 
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most countries, if a transfer of patent rights is not registered within six months of the 
transaction date, then damages and costs related to any infringement of the right 
may be reduced. In the UK, for example, Section 68 of the UK Patents Act states that 
if there is a failure to record the transfer of a patent right at the United Kingdom 
Intellectual Property Office within six months of the transaction, the party will not be 
awarded costs or expenses in proceedings relating to infringement, if the 
infringement took place before registration of the transfer. Another reason is that in 
case if patent rights were fraudulently sold by their owner to different “bona fide” 
purchasers, the rights will be finally owned by the purchaser who is the first to 
proceed with the registration of the transfer agreement at the relevant NPRs. 
Considering similar regulations in other non-European countries, in the US, under 
Section 261 of the US Patent Act, registering the assignment protects the patent 
owner against previous unrecorded interests and subsequent assignments. However, 
if the patentee fails to record the transfer, subsequent recorded assignments will have 
priority (Dykeman & Kopko, 2004).  
For these reasons, although recording of a patent transfer is usually not 
mandatory patent owners have strong incentives to register transfers and European 
and US patent attorneys strongly recommend doing that as soon as possible in order 
to fully protect patent owner’s intellectual property rights (Dykeman & Kopko, 2004; 
Oliver, 2007). The registration of a patent right transfer usually requires a few page 
request letter with support documents and relatively small amount of fee (e.g. 
transfer registration fee for EPO is 95 EUR). Therefore, after spending a substantial 
amount of effort and money to patent an invention, deal with oppositions, and 
transfer it, it seems unlikely that a patent buyer may fail to accomplish this simple 
registration procedure that legally asserts the ownership rights on an invention. 
Summarizing the discussion above, although there is a likelihood of the Type II 
(“False negative”) error and we may underestimate the amount of actual patent sales, 
the use of data resulting from our additional patent transfer check process seems to 
represent a more accurate and conservative approach. 
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APPENDIX V. SHORT DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES 
Dependent variables  
Patent sale 
 
 
Commercial use 
 
 
Variable equal to 1 if the ownership right to the patent was 
sold to another party not related to the original owner or 
applicant, 0 otherwise 
Variable equal to 1 if the invention was commercialized 
internally, licensed, or sold by a patent owner to an 
independent party not related to the original owner, 0 
otherwise 
Independent variables  
Patent protection 
 
Complementary assets 
 
 
Technological fit (log) 
 
Scientific nature 
 
Variable indicating patent protection in the 3-digit SIC 
sector 
Variable measuring whether the organization had the 
resources to turn the invention into something 
economically valuable (e.g. new product, process or else) 
Variable indicating the fit of the invention with firm’s core 
technological activity 
Variable equal to 1 if scientific publications as a source of 
information for the invention were important, 0 otherwise 
Control variables  
Firm size 
 
Patent stock total (log) 
 
Technological competition 
 
 
Technological generality (log) 
 
Economic value 
 
 
 
 
Technological class 
 
Macro technological class 
 
 
Region 
3 classes indicating the firm size based on the number of 
employees in the organization 
Variable measuring the total number of patents in the 
firm’s patent portfolio 
Variable equal to 1 if during the invention process the 
inventor’s was aware of one or of several other parties 
competing for the patent 
Variable indicating the range of technological areas in 
which technology can be applied  
4 dummy variables based on the patent value that is rated 
as being either bottom 50%, 25% - 50%, 10% - 25%, or top 
10% in comparison with other patents in the industry or 
technological area 
30 dummies for the technological classes of the patent (ISI-
INPI-OST classification) 
6 macro technological classes based on the ISI-INPI-OST 
classification: Electrical Engineering, General Instruments, 
Chemistry, Process Engineering, Mechanical Engineering 
3 dummies indicating the geographical regions: Europe, 
Japan, and US 
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